Afghanistan

In the UK Parliament

2012-01-29T12:41:00.000Z

There was an Afghan forum last Thursday in the House of Commons organised by Khalid Nadeem of the SOUTH ASIA & MIDDLE EAST FORUM. Hamad Ghailani, head of the Hadra sufi sect, was a speaker. His comments were fairly tame and largely supportive of Karzai. He claimed that the West had been wrong to make 2014 a date for troop withdrawal and that the National Dialogue (in which the major players are the Taliban and the Northern Alliance) was of some importance.
Tobias Elwood MP spoke rather better, talking of the importance of infrastructure. For instance the tarmac road to Lashkagar has made people in that region more prosperous to such a degree that the locals report I.E.D.s more readily. He views Herat and Kandahar as economic hubs. He says that economic development might make the difference - if Afghanistan had more credible politics. But to this day Afghanistan has no proper political parties and way too much power for the President. Tobias favours the Single Transferable Vote system rather than the current first past the post system for Afghanistan. But he laments the state of the Afghan armed forces with an army that is largely Tajik and Uzbek and a police force that is largely Pushtu.
We were reminded that the West currently has 130,000 troops in Afghanistan and intends to leave 20,000 behind after 2014.
Sabrina, an Afghan MP, reminded us of the importance of UN resolution 1325 (see below).
We were reminded that the USA does not want to stay in Afghanistan. Another questioner emphasised the importance of dealing with the warlords if you want to control drugs because they are the ones forcing the farmers to produce them,
The NCF suggested that the proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan had to end - and that meant resolving the Kashmir issue.

ON UNSCR 1325: PeaceWomen.org writes: The first resolution on women, peace and security, Security Council Resolution 1325 (SCR1325), was unanimously adopted by United Nations Security Council on 31 October 2000. SCR1325 marked the first time the Security Council addressed the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women; recognized the under-valued and under-utilized contributions women make to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace-building. It also stressed the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in peace and security. SCR1325 is binding upon all UN Member States and the adoption of the Resolution marked an important international political recognition that women and gender are relevant to international peace and security.

Parwan raises questions over Afghan sovereignty

2012-01-10T16:02:00.002Z

The disagreement over the role that the United States will play within Afghanistan after their scheduled withdrawal in 2014 has become more pronounced recently, with some observers suggesting that advisors with ‘anti-western’ agendas are becoming more influential within the Hamid Karzai’s close circle. A New York Times article published yesterday describes how the Parwan detention facility has become the latest focal point in the escalating war of words between the Afghan government and the United States. The issue revolves around the ‘sudden’ demand for the full transfer of the prison from US control to Afghanistan. This is despite the Americans’ claims that a programme specialising in the training of Afghan prison officers is behind schedule and that there is definite timetable for the handing-over of the prison.

The escalating tension over the future of Parwan can be seen as a metaphor for the issue of sovereignty in a post-US Afghanistan. Obama’s administration has been accused of interfering with sovereignty before, most notably by Pakistan, and it is now the turn of the Afghan government to blame the United States of sidestepping the correct diplomatic channels and making unilateral decisions about the country’s future. Allegations of torture at the base are being used as the primary reason for requesting it to be transferred to Afghan control, but the whole case is also being used as a political exercise by Karzai to show the US that he and his government are willing to go public if they feel that private negotiations are leading nowhere.

With a timetable for withdrawal finalised, the question of what the USA’s involvement in Afghanistan will be after 2014 needs to be answered. The ‘strategic partnership document’ that will be published at some point this year will go some way in describing how the United States will maintain a presence in the country that it has been in seemingly forever. How this document will be received by Karzai’s government, however, remains to be seen, and it will be of utmost importance to the Afghan administration that national sovereignty is not threatened.

A Kabul visit!

2011-11-02T12:32:00.002Z

Sadly our friends are leaving Afghanistan and I think that things seem to be getting worse.
We thought that these friends had been caught in the suicide bomb that had killed a number of people europeons along with Afghans but luckily they weren't! There are more and more attacks even Kabul doesn't appear to be safe. Last time I wrote it was 194 casualities, but to date it's 383 British service men and women.
God bless Akghanistan and all the brave men and women that live there.

Recent events

2011-09-21T11:33:00.002+01:00

Yesterday there was a blow to peace in Afghanistan as Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed. He was the man whom Karzia was trying to work with to stabalise the country, working towards a peaceful solution in Afghanistan. But the Taliban envoys look ready to tip the country into an even deeper crisis, and this must be what they want.
I have friends in the country, who are now preparing to leave. Sadly as they have made so many friends amongst the Afghans, who were sad to see them go.
A difficult time for any of us to go to the Afghanistan, but we should try for the sake of people there!

Taliban Attack in Kabul

2011-09-15T12:10:00.003+01:00

On Tuesday 13th September, the US Embassy and NATO Headquarters in Kabul were the targets of Taliban suicide bombers and rocket- launched attacks. Four civilians and three police officers were reportedly killed in the preliminary attacks, and a further ten civilians and nine police officers were killed in three smaller incidents on the second day of the assault. It is significant in itself that it took Afghani forces two days to suppress the insurgents; this is the first time in the capital that an attack has lasted this length of time, and its implications are worrying.

The indication that the Taliban are growing in strength is particularly concerning in the aftermath of July’s ‘security transition’ from US to Afghan- led forces. Kabul and six other regions have now been taken over from foreign troops, in the build- up to complete US withdrawal in 2014. Despite President Karzai’s assurances that that this attack will not impact on the smooth running of the security transition, and will actually strengthen the resolve of people to fight the Taliban, the incident does pose a question in terms of the strength of the Afghan forces. Kabul is normally considered to be more secure than other parts of Afghanistan, but the recent concentration in raids on Western targets does, to some degree, represent the resentment felt towards the foreign occupation.

The fact that Taliban forces attacked a region where the US had largely relinquished control merely exposes the weakness of the Afghan army on their part, and it signals that as the US prepare to step- up their withdrawal, it may only be a matter of time before the Taliban gain more and more influence in Afghanistan. This attack on the US Embassy in Kabul questions whether the Afghan army are sufficiently equipped to reckon with the persistence of the Taliban, especially when the civilian death toll is taken into account. Indeed, questions have been raised in regard to the wounding of an RTA reporter in the attack; steps need to be taken to ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place in order to protect members of the press. Hillary Clinton vowed that they would continue to work for the safety of people at the US Embassy, whilst the Head of News National Television explicitly condemned the injuring of the RTA reporter. Combating the threat to the free press is of paramount importance to the overall stability of Afghanistan, and whilst President Karzai is limited in his capacity to stop the Taliban’s attacks, he does need to ensure that the freedom of the press is regulated.

BBC Reporter killed by NATO forces in Afghanistan

2011-09-09T11:14:00.003+01:00

It has emerged that Nato forces shot dead BBC reporter Ahmed Omed Khpulwak in July, mistakenly believing that he was a suicide bomber. ISAF, the Nato- led International Security Assistant Forces were at the time responding to several suicide bombings at the offices of Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), in the town of Tarin Kowt, southern Uruzgan province.

Khpulwak’s body was discovered at the broadcasting offices, in the aftermath of two suicide bombings, which had injured US soldiers. He had been shot eleven times. ISAF claim that its soldiers acted in accordance with the laws of armed conflict under the circumstances, and soldiers maintain that Omed Khpulwak had ‘something clinched in one of his fists and [was] reaching for something on his person with his other hand’, fuelling fears that he was a suicide bomber.

Tarin Kowt has experienced a surge in violence in recent weeks; three suicide bombings in the town market led to air strikes and heavy fighting between NATO forces and the Taliban. Khpulwak was one of nineteen people initially believed to have been killed by the Taliban in this particular attack. However, NATO were prompted to launch an inquiry into the death of the BBC reporter, following the Taliban’s claim that they were not responsible for the shooting. The Taliban did assume responsibility for the earlier suicide bombings.

The death of Omed Khpulwak once again brings the safety of journalists into the spotlight. If the actions of ISAF forces really were in compliance with international standards and laws governing conflict, then we have to question whether the ‘safeguards’ put in place are adequate enough protection for the reporters on the front line.

Omed Khpulwak worked as a reporter for the BBC Pashto service, but some of his reports also reached English- speaking audiences. He has been described by colleagues as a ‘brave reporter’. The death of Khpulwak is the third casualty for the BBC in Afghanistan.

New NCF Report on Afghanistan

2011-09-02T14:21:00.003+01:00

Last month (August) saw the highest level of US casualties since hostilities began (67 American dead out of a total of 81 Western forces killed in August in Afghanistan). The shooting down of the Chinook early in the month accounted for many of the dead but none the less things are not good.

The NCF have compiled the following report on the current situation in Afghanistan.

REPORT 49 - Breaking New Ground -

A report on security and governance in Afghanistan

Key Recommendations

Security: ISAF would suggest that the ANA and ANP (Afghan National Army and Police) have improved not deteriorated. Sadly our Afghan interlocutors think otherwise (source 36 reports that the ANA now feels so insecure that it demands that when new camps are constructed they are built next to coalition bases so that the coalition will protect them if attacked). In response to the deterioration of the ANA and ANP, provinces would be better served if given control over their own security. This could be done through tribal levies in cooperation with the shuras: local initiatives for local security. This must not be confused with the troubling US policy of setting up localized paramilitary forces to bolster central government.
Governance: In the context of the upcoming presidential election and scheduled withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014, a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) should be called to provide a legitimate environment for political reform. A Loya Jirga would facilitate discussion of reform and the subsequent process of rearranging the Upper House (members should be appointed by a National Council representative of civil society and traditional structures of governance). The aim is to restructure the Afghan government as an Afghanized democracy.
Economy: Investment and productivity must be protected and developed within ‘secure zones of commerce’, as insecurity and corruption are the two biggest obstacles to development in Afghanistan. Drastic measures would be required to promote investment in Afghan business. The licensing of opium farming and trade in Afghanistan would allow the Afghan state, rather than the insurgents, to accumulate revenue from opium cultivation and further enable the channelling of poppy production into the fabrication of opium-based drugs. Any licensing system must be implemented under the surveillance of local shuras.
Situation of women and civil society: Empowering Afghan women and reinforcing their position in Afghan civil society is a powerful tool through which to deliver good governance at this late stage. A single forum is needed for a mix of modern aspirational civil society groups, i.e. women’s societies, trade unions, shopkeepers associations and professional associations, together with traditional structures such as tribal shuras. These would link into the political process, fostering key elements of civilized practice, e.g. accessible education for women and an independent judiciary. Afghanistan is fast becoming a failed state. Without the stability and continuity that the basic foundations of civil society provide, Afghanistan will slide swiftly into chaos.

The recent assassinations of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, by one of his bodyguards, and Mayor Ghulam Haider Hamidi of Kandahar by a suicide attacker remind us of the level of instability that still exists in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai has again confirmed he will not stand for re-election. Western casualties remain high. This has been the deadliest month for American troops so far. Afghan casualties are far higher.

The recommendations in this report are controversial but it is the belief of the authors that whilst they may be difficult to implement, they are not merely the best, but the only solutions to the problems faced by Afghanistan today. The situation in Afghanistan remains desperate and it is vital that steps are taken to remedy the awful position the country now finds itself in.

The announcement by President Obama in June 2011 emphasizes comprehensive troop withdrawal by 2014 and though America’s recent decision to remain in Iraq beyond its long advertised deadline for withdrawal calls any statement of this kind into question, a considerable reduction in troop numbers by summer 2012 is almost inevitable. At present, much of the country is dominated by insurgents. If President Karzai follows through with his plan to step down as leader in 2014, a political vacuum may be created. Afghans fear civil war in the aftermath of US disengagement. The perceived worst-case scenario is that the Taliban would be able to exploit the immature political system and underdeveloped national security forces that would remain once President Karzai had left. Sustainable alternatives for Afghanistan’s governance are needed post-2014. If they are to succeed, such alternatives must accommodate traditional Afghan structures of governance, whilst meeting the requirements of the contemporary world.

The absence of effective security is facilitating the downward spiral of the nation. Every fortnight 1400 Afghan troops graduate from the Kabul military training centre, where they have been provided with a crash course in basic artillery and military training. An estimated 25% of troops then go absent without leave, 98% of these deserting the army in the areas of most intense fighting. Few Afghans feel particular loyalty to the country. This fuels the popular perception that the ANA (Afghan National Army) is not a true ‘national force’. Encouraging reports showing improved security can be anticipated during the coming winter months when insurgent conflict decreases dramatically as a result of the bitterly cold temperatures. As the warmer season approaches in the Spring of 2012, insurgents, warlords and opposing criminal gangs will renew their aggressive activities and fatality rates increase once more.

The US has become the average Afghan’s enemy. Civilian deaths caused by Special Forces’ night raids are emphasized by local and international media, though in reality such night raids are generally highly surgical and collateral damage is minimal. The Afghan media adds further fuel to the fire, providing continuous propaganda comparing the US occupying forces to the Soviet forces that invaded during the 1980s. The Afghan government distances itself from the West and stresses the failings of Western troops, particularly the excessive use of military force, most noticeable in air-based operations such as the ‘Takhar incident’ (source 48). Those living in remote areas such as Nuristan and Kandahar claim that the US intentionally ‘levels villages’ (source 49). Afghans not only view this degree of force as unnecessary but as a weakness, implying the West is unable to fight hand to hand (source 50).

The view of US troops as an occupying force is exacerbated by the rhetoric of countries such as Iran, which have a strong influence in Afghanistan. The Kill-Capture strategy which was increasingly utilized by General Petraeus leads to a feeling of increased alienation and persecution (Petraeus’ successor General Allen has just taken over and has yet to place his own stamp on operations). The strategy has undermined political engagement with the more moderate insurgent commanders, as these have often been easier to target and therefore targeted first (source 21). This enables more fundamentalist Afghans to gain disproportionate influence. None-the-less, many Afghans still equate the departure of ISAF/NATO with a return to chaos.

One possible outcome for Afghanistan is de facto partition (though the semblance of national unity would remain). The South would once more be under Taliban rule. For obvious humanitarian reasons, a Taliban ruled province is not an ideal solution despite the existence of some more moderate voices within the Taliban (source 50). Whilst this outcome is favoured by some Western representatives, it is a solution that would be regarded as unthinkable by many Afghans and a sure path to greater civil unrest.

A stable and secure Afghanistan will be difficult to achieve with an exit strategy based on the mere repair of existing structures of governance. Genuine reform is required to enable a politically sophisticated, democratic, peaceful, sustainable future for Afghanistan. Most importantly, Afghanistan needs security. Many neighbouring countries and local actors are not interested in a stable Afghanistan and members of the international community have differing agendas and strategies. Improvement thus requires an Afghanization of the currently imposed structures. The key to stability and progress is finding the most appropriate balance of power between devolved political bodies and the central government.
Security Sector Reform

Just as an Iranian/Saudi proxy war takes place in Iraq, so too a RAW/ISI proxy war takes place in Afghanistan, i.e. India's Secret Service (the Research and Analysis Wing) versus Pakistan's Secret Service (Inter-Services Intelligence). Pakistan cannot allow itself to be encircled by enemies (Afghanistan’s present government is India's ally).

China is becoming increasingly involved in Afghanistan, particularly with resource exploration activities, which could be a partial solution to Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment. Other neighbours, including Western countries, compete for influence in the ‘Afghan playground’. All actors contribute significantly to the enormous troubles facing the country, for this reason, many progressive security efforts are repeatedly undermined.

Security deliverance in Afghanistan also includes the protection of schools and villages from insurgent hostilities. The ANA and ANP suffer high levels of corruption, drug abuse, illiteracy and desertion. Control of the ANA is divided between political and criminal parties who fight for influence (source 49). The ANA is largely composed of people whose allegiance is not to the government or the country, but to a party, group or warlord and, in some cases, even to a neighbouring country.

With a 90% illiteracy rate in the ANA, 15% higher than that of the nation, troops are failing to carry out the most basic tasks, including tracking weapons from serial numbers and understanding their payment receipts. Those who are literate are often promoted to NCO rank, despite lacking the necessary leadership skills. Experienced senior NCOs, who should be the backbone of the army, are in dangerously short supply which, as well as being a problem in terms of operation, contributes to low morale.

Afghans often prefer to turn to the Taliban for protection and local conflict resolution. The weakened state the ANA finds itself in is reminiscent of the poorly trained militias set up by the Soviets in the 1980s. Both the ANA and ANP lack the strength to protect civilians from the Taliban (source 49). A complete reform of structure is needed.

(I) Reform of the ANA and ANP

Promoting devolved responsibility for a locally recruited army and police force would entail a similar relationship between local and national forces to that which exists in the United States. The ANA and ANP must serve locally, and be locally accountable and recruited. Training resources/policy would still be a central government provision. This would ensure a guaranteed minimum standard. Shuras and/or tribal authorities must be involved in order to increase pressure on recruits who currently lack the commitment required for acceptable performance in the ANA and ANP.

A traditional Arbakai system (a security force made up of local tribesmen) was introduced by the MOI (Ministry of Interior), and has been successful in some areas, though back-fired in others. Higher pay is a popular method to increase commitment and reduce desertion. A smaller but better paid and thus more reliable standing army/police force would be infinitely preferable to the current situation. Careful implementation is required:

• The current ANA platoons should be reorganised into local platoons allocated to their home regions (operating much like a civil defence force) and tasked with maintaining security, rolling out an improved safe area in the current ‘inkspot’ fashion. The proximity to home is important, as being based in the local area would inspire the commitment that is lacking when recruits serve away from home. They should be answerable to and controlled by the regional governor, working alongside tribesmen (even when those tribesmen were former insurgents). The emphasis must be on the ‘tribes’ rather than the ‘mullahs’. Those loyal to ‘mullahs’ must not be excluded, but the objective would be to reinforce traditional tribal structures rather than the more recent ‘Taliban’ structures of governance. The MOI should relinquish control over regional security forces, and regional governors should answer to a committee of the Upper House (transparently appointed), which should both manage and monitor the ANA’s and ANP’s overall activities, leadership and interaction with civilians.

• The best trained elements of the existing armed forces should be retained as a centrally accountable force. This force would be used to reinforce and support local units struggling to deal with insurgent activities (as well as being a deterrent against regional rivalry). This force must be broadly representative of all regions, unlike the current armed forces. The force must be exceptionally trained and equipped with heavy weapons as well as having access to specialist kit such as drones / surveillance / aviation / support weaponry, which the regional commands lack. Their overall aim would be to maintain stability within the districts and provinces.

• Poor health care provision in the ANA is a problem. Soldier health care provision must be radically improved in order to encourage commitment.

(II) Unleash education security initiatives

Improvement of school security can be achieved through civil society and ANP initiatives by:

• Parents’ groups could help safeguard schools by undertaking initiatives to engage with local tribal elders and moderate Taliban. This may foster a sense of responsibility for the next generation of former insurgents. Fears that education is being used to propagate Western belief systems should be ameliorated with the help of local shuras.

• Community based one-teacher Primary Schools should be established with the help of educational civil society groups that analyse the potential for the establishment of a school by registering adults with adequate teaching skills. Setting up these informal schools would give children living in isolated parts of Afghanistan an opportunity to get primary education without being subjected to long-distance travel through dangerous areas. Where long-distance travel cannot be avoided, attention should be given to developing transport schemes in order to secure long-distance roads leading to schools, either by shifts of adults accompanying children, or by the use of cars and vans.

Governance

The Afghan parliament includes the advisory (veto empowered in some instances) Upper House (Meshrano Jirga) and the law making Lower House (Wolesi Jirga). President Karzai appoints one third (34) of Upper House members, the other 68 members being decided by the 34 Provincial and 398 District Councils (unfortunately there were no District Council elections in 2005 and all current Upper House members are Provincial Council nominees).
Sadly, governorship of the provinces is purchasable for several million dollars. Upper House members have often been placed into power by questionably motivated individuals. Although the Lower House is theoretically a more democratic sector of the Afghan Parliament, it remains at the mercy of the President, the Upper House and the Supreme Court (the last parliamentary elections were tainted with as much corruption as the presidential elections, and the majority of more legitimate candidates failed to win seats). The Lower House is unable to pass any remarkable or progressive laws as a result of the inertia that exist in the executive.

Corruption is rampant. $180 will allow a civilian to receive a driving license within hours and $60,000 will get one out of jail immediately. Public positions are purchasable, notably in the courts, the provincial government and the police force. 63% of civilians believe that filing complaints against corrupt officials is a waste of time. The low level of popular faith in the government and political process is clearly illustrated by the low turnout in the latest presidential and parliamentary elections.

During the transition process in the aftermath of the 2001 liberation of Afghanistan, the West ignored calls by Afghans to implement a system of transitional justice so as to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses, warlords and criminals to account. The high level of impunity granted to those who would have been brought before the ICC in alternative circumstances has enabled these strongmen to penetrate Afghan state structures. This has facilitated the infiltration of organized crime into Afghan politics.

Afghanistan must have a system of governance that is built with an understanding of what the Afghan people perceive as just and representative. The government must be capable of providing the rule of law in accordance with a reformed Afghan constitution and the will of the Afghan people. The state must be one in which citizens have confidence, and that offers a better future than that offered by the Taliban and other criminal insurgent groups.

In the Absence of Reform

A semblance of order is only maintained, at present, by the sheer scale of Western engagement. Continued instability is likely in the absence of reform. This report envisages two phases in Afghanistan’s future:

1. The de-facto partition of Afghanistan into:
a. A rump presidential state in the North, quasi Northern Alliance in character, supported by India, China and the USA.
b. A quasi-Taliban state in the South with the covert support of Pakistan.

2. A civil war for dominance in Afghanistan conducted over a prolonged period in which the North will dominate in the short term (if only because of the predominance of Northern soldiers and sparse numbers of Pashtun in Afghanistan’s immense army). In the long term however, the South will assert itself (though it is by no means certain that the Pashtun would prevail). Afghans regard the possibility of civil war as ‘unthinkable’ (source 51) but the risk that the nation will ‘slide’ into civil war remains considerable.

These two phases are just one possible future for Afghanistan. At various points there will clearly be opportunities to rewrite this scenario. One such seminal moment is in the aftermath of the forthcoming Presidential elections (2014). This report therefore suggests a second scenario as an alternative to the two phase scenario described above:

Alternative: To foster a ‘national unity group’ with grass root support, backed by the West as well as regional powers, in an effort to turn Afghanistan back in the right direction. Most of the country is now Taliban dominated. There will not be effective security in Afghanistan under current plans and strategies for the ANA and ANP. Arms have been assembled in Logar and West Nangahar provinces (source 36). The current model of governance is no longer repairable. The necessary seeds for progress and cohesion can be planted now.

Regional Council for Afghanistan and her Neighbours

Recognising the importance of the regional actors, it may be beneficial to form a regional council at a second-track, unofficial level, in order to facilitate a more confidential, open and idea-oriented process of dialogue.

The participants should be people with close links to relevant governments (e.g. China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the USA) and to other influential actors such as the Pashtun tribes. It would be important to involve all major actors that have a significant stake or interest in the outcome of the conflict.

The convenor of a regional council would ideally be a third-party which is trusted and independent.

National Council

Democracy in Afghanistan must underpin traditional decision-making processes by including tribal groups, local shuras and civil society associations. The best way in which to do this is via an independent National Council. Such a council would gain cross-generational support. The younger generation, who have not known traditional governance, would view such an approach as a fresh start, whereas the older generation would remember the pre-1973 ‘golden age’ of Afghanistan (note that though a traditional form of governance with some role for the royal family is supported in Afghanistan, this is unlikely to be translated into support for a return of a constitutional monarchy).

Without access to the state, the opportunities for civil society to impact policy formulation are limited. Any such council should gain international recognition as a representative body for Afghan civil society, via support from UNAMA. Its role in domestic politics should be further promoted by garnering support in the Lower House. This would increase the possibility of a call for a Loya Jirga pre-2014 and 2015 elections.

Cohesion and ownership

Even among higher state officials, commitments are to factions rather than to the future stability of the nation as a whole. Measures needed to promote increased cohesion and ownership include developing regional and district shuras facilitated by the aforementioned National Council.

Loya Jirga

The best and simplest way to deliver reform in Afghanistan would be to recreate the opportunity previously available in June 2002 and call a credible Loya Jirga. Anti-government forces such as the disenchanted Pashtun paramount chiefs (and those of the moderate Taliban who have not been assassinated) would have to be included in the talks. All voices must be welcomed.

The aim would be to accumulate enough support to generate a substantial call for a Loya Jirga prior to the 2014 and 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively; a Loya Jirga which could provide the required circumstances for constitutional reform and restructure the Afghan government as an Afghanized democracy.

The Loya Jirga would facilitate reform and initiate the subsequent rearrangement of the Upper House. Members would thereafter be appointed by the National Council.

The Loya Jirga would determine the form of the future governance of Afghanistan.

There need be no rigid timescale for this process. The Loya Jirga itself could (and perhaps should) even act as the pro-tem government of Afghanistan for up to three years. This would be sufficiently supported by all, if the alternative was believed to be continuance of the present system.

This process requires a Loya Jirga that can facilitate the repair of today’s government via constitutional reform. A Loya Jirga is arranged in accordance with Article 111 of the constitution:

‘Grand Council [Loya Jirga]' is convened in the following situations: To take decision
on the issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and supreme interests of the country’

The Loya Jirga would:

• Amend the constitution and approve necessary changes. This would lead to a suspension of the existing senate and parliament, putting restraints on Presidential power in favour of a more Prime Ministerial system. Such a move would ideally require the support of the incumbent president, which may prove difficult to obtain.

• Establish independent control commissions to provide a mechanism of checks and balances on the workings of the reformed government.

• Order the exemplary arrest of a few significant warlords and criminals (some of whom have positions in government) and hold them to account for atrocities they have committed. This should enhance the population’s confidence in the legitimacy of the system of governance. The families of many warlords are already privately expressing the view that their fathers should legitimize their activities, with an eye on the day that Western forces depart Afghanistan. These families have significant business that could be legitimized. The second and third order consequences of making an example of one or two warlords are likely to be positive.

• Address and aim for a reconciliatory approach towards tribal leaders (and where appropriate the Taliban, recognising that the ‘Taliban’ are composed of many different factions).

• Contribute to the appointment of district governors, in close co-operation with the ‘National Council’.

It is important that those involved do not attempt to manipulate the outcome of the Loya Jirga. Rather, the process must be indigenously driven and shaped in order that the outcomes garner the support of the population as a whole.

Upper House

Initially, the Upper House should be Loya Jirga appointed. Subsequently it would be partly ‘National Council’ appointed.

The National Council would, in 2015, have sole responsibility for the appointment of one third of the members to the Upper House (currently the prerogative of the President). The National Council would facilitate appointments in accordance with the potential members’ political and vocational competence (rather than their bank balances or relations to the president).

The appointments would be made via votes in the National Council, not by the head of state. The remaining two thirds in the Upper House would be elected via the provincial and district councils - checks and balances on the Lower House would, in this way, be coordinated by a legitimate set of members protecting the Afghan people from clientelist policies.

The Speaker of the Upper House should be elected (as at present) by the House itself or alternatively by the nation, but given the title and trappings (though not the power) currently associated with the President. This new President would be Head of State.

As at present, the role of the Upper House would primarily be advisory, with some limited legislative veto powers. It would have substantive power in three arenas however:

1. Foreign Policy: In addition to its advisory role, it would appoint all ambassadors.

2. Judicial: In addition to its advisory role, it would appoint all judges.

3. National Army: The Commander in Chief would report to the Prime Minister, but would be appointed by the Upper House.

4. Local Tribal Commands / Police Force: Local law enforcement bodies, both civil and military, should report to regional Governors. Governors would be appointed by the Upper House. Considerable political power would thus be devolved to Provincial Governors around the country.

This must be a gradual course of action to avoid the risk of having powerful warlords running independent personal fiefdoms. In the initial transitional stage, these governors would be appointed by the National Council in close co-operation with the original Loya Jirga. This would ensure recruitment of governors on the basis of talent and capacity, not personal relationships or political ideologies, as is the situation today.

5. Elections: The independent electoral commission would be answerable to the judiciary but appointed by the Upper House.

Lower House

The Lower House should be elected, as at present, but with greater transparency and significantly more independent oversight of the electoral process. New electoral legislation should also be introduced, allowing candidates to run under the banner of a political party on the actual ballot slip, hence improving the electoral process and ensuring a broader base of candidates. This is vital.

The Prime Minister would be selected (for a fixed term) by the Lower House, and he/she would appoint all Ministers. Principal power would lie with this Prime Ministerial post and the cabinet in a central government. The Lower House itself would have budgetary and law-making powers.

Ceremonial Head of State

The head of state should have substantially limited influence in comparison to the power currently executed by the Afghan President – the new president would have to be a neutral figure that would be acceptable to the majority of all Afghans. Acting beyond everyday politics, not possessing significant political power and serving as a unifying figure for the Afghan people, his main official tasks would be:

a) To call elections
b) To give advice and be kept informed by the Prime Minster of the affairs of the State
c) To swear in the new Prime Minister on his/her assumption of office
d) To swear in the chief justice
e) To convene the Loya Jirga on the advice of the Upper House and the Prime Minister, or following a decision of the Wolesi Jirga to that effect
f) To inaugurate the National Assembly and the Loya Jirga
g) To award Honours
h) To accept the credentials of ambassadors
i) The prerogative of mercy
j) To appoint one third of the Meshrano Jirga members on the advice of the National Council

Economy

Due to the conflict, and the levels of control exercised by mafias and opium traffickers, economic environment is insecure. There are three main tracks that should be prioritized to foster economic improvements.

(1) Create secure, stable, ‘corruption-free’ zones of commerce

Corruption (i.e. bribery), poor rule of law and low levels of security hinder investment and reduce productivity in Afghanistan. This report recommends the development of local initiatives based on ‘secure zones of commerce’. The crucial characteristic of these zones are that they are less bureaucratic and are corruption free.

Some suggest it would be more pragmatic to merely make such zones ‘less corrupt’. They ask what the incentives to reduce this corruption might be, and suggest that corruption is ‘the Afghan way’. We would dispute that. Most Afghans are exhausted by current corruption levels, fostered by the international community’s practices of paying bribes for co-operation, e.g. for safe passage of goods and services through hostile areas by road. They now desire to work in a corruption free zone.

The absence of corruption is a pre-requisite if such economic zones are to promote international engagement. One possible approach would be to establish them from the outset in cooperation with Transparency International, applying strict law enforcement mechanisms. It would be preferable if anti-corruption surveillance were performed by an Afghan team, but the initial phase of development might require close monitoring by the international community. These zones would trigger further diversification of Afghanistan’s agriculture-oriented economy. Dynamic business ‘hubs’ would be created in Afghanistan which would enable the state to reduce the business risk for national and foreign investors, as well as attract entrepreneurial skills.

The establishment of these zones requires practical measures. First, their complete security would have to be assured. A stable government must be in place, and they must make promises such that foreign investors are guaranteed business security. A guarantee of property rights is particularly imperative, though not the only necessary measure that must be taken by government.

The zones must each be connected to one of the major cities in Afghanistan (and, where possible, adjoining countries), through secured lines of transportation. This is difficult to achieve, but functional, reliable communications are critical to the successful promotion of investment.

Negotiations for special trade relationships would also be desirable; for example, preferential trading quotas with the European Union. Border controls, tariffs and duty levies are all critical to reducing the risk to foreign business. To attract investment, these zones must be free-trade zones. In 2002 the government tried to establish Afghanistan as a free trade zone, to encourage foreign investment, but the initiative was not successful. At present academics (Pain and Goodhead) identify three functioning Afghan economies: the warlord economy, the black market economy and the subsistence economy.
Economic/agricultural development must be stimulated both top down and bottom up. Small business enterprises must be encouraged to participate in these new zones. Some Community Development Councils (CDC) or CDC clusters could serve as local entry points to establish these zones and foster local participation in their development.

Afghanistan’s relationship with Iran must be addressed as a source for stability. India’s investment in Iranian ports could be used to secure an Indian-Iranian-Afghan secure trade route, without the involvement of Pakistan.

This does not mean that Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan should be of less importance; rather, a balanced relationship should be maintained whereby Indian rapprochement with the Kabul government is not perceived as a threat by Pakistan. (Indeed were this report’s recommendations on governance adopted, much of the tension that creates the RAW – ISA proxy war would be diffused).

Furthermore, stimulating entrepreneurship through targeted programs and funds, for instance linked to specific shura projects, could be an important element of business development.

(2) The opium trade

Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest producer of illicit opium. This activity pervades every level of the Afghan economic system, from the poorest farmers in the country to the inner circles of the government. This is made possible through the exploitation of the hawala system, through which large sums of money are transferred anonymously.

The illegal trade in opium represents a major threat to sustainable Afghan development, undermining efforts to ensure security. A radical shift in anti-drug policy should be considered. Although controversial, we suggest that the implementation of pilot projects for legal poppy production should be accelerated.

Opium is a crop of high value, very well-suited to Afghanistan’s climatic conditions. Many rural livelihoods are dependent on its growth. Opium cultivation is highly labour-intensive and employs up to 480 persons per hectare per day during the harvesting period. A legal system of opium production would allow the Afghan state to tax the products of legitimate poppy cultivation and increase government revenue.

Legalisation would also enable the channelling of poppy production into the manufacture of opiate-based drugs, such as morphine. Demand for opiate-based medicine is not being met by current world production. The World Health Organization estimates that 80% of the world population has insufficient access to essential analgesics. Afghanistan would benefit from a legal framework to establish a national pharmaceutical industry.

The legalisation process should be based on a licensing system comparable to that already being implemented in India. This report would recommend keeping the processing of the opium within the rural community in which the poppy is grown. This has the advantage of both supporting rural employment and of promoting local ownership of the process.

The Indian experience shows that the village community can provide sufficient leverage against any attempts at illegal diversion of the product. The village control system means that if one farmer sells product illegally, the entire area loses the license. In Afghanistan, village license based production could be developed under the surveillance of village shura.

Naturally any attempt to licence poppy production requires a strong administrative system (one of Afghanistan’s main weaknesses). Yet with the appropriate level of international technical assistance, this programme could present an opportunity to develop a very successful, corruption-free, state agency.

Developing legal poppy production does not mean forgetting other strategies that have been deployed. Efforts to develop alternative livelihoods should continue hand in hand with the legalisation process. A legalisation scheme could not be effective if it was not complemented by a reinforcement of the anti-drug and anti-corruption policies which should involve the prosecution of corrupt officials.

(3) Support the development of Afghan agriculture

More than 80% of the population in Afghanistan derives its livelihood from agriculture. If Afghan agriculture is to develop, attention should be paid to the extent of feudal relations in rural societies. Economic prosperity must extend beyond landlords to the farmers and tenants, based on a realistic degree of equity. Whilst land reform seems unrealistic at this stage, there are practical steps that can foster agricultural modernization and transform the semi-feudal system that currently exists.

1. A greater effort is needed to achieve the effective registration of land ownership. The absence of official cadastral record impedes the determination of land ownership. It leads to multiple overlapping ownership claims, land grabbing and cumbersome land purchase and sale procedures, causing many land disputes. A cadastral survey should be associated with a strengthening of local structures addressing land disputes, such as Primary Courts. Inadequate land registration is not only bad for agricultural development but discourages foreign direct investment in the whole Afghan economy.

2. In order to reduce the striking inequalities in Afghan rural areas, the legal framework must be strengthened so as to offer better protection to tenant farmers. Legislative improvements are required to enhance tenure security through the development of legal contracting arrangements between tenants and landlords stating a clear distribution of revenues. A national minimum for the share of revenues allocated to tenants would be desirable.

There are three main lines of thinking which could be followed to accelerate the reconstruction of the Afghan agricultural sector and cultivate alternative products to opiates.

1. An agricultural policy should be developed, with some elements similar to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This report’s recommendations involve the implementation of two mechanisms:

a. A system of direct subsidy payments to farmers, which would target high value products such as watermelon, almonds, pomegranate, wheat and saffron.

b. This system would be complemented by a government decision to guarantee farmers a minimum price for their products. This would mean setting an intervention price. If the market prices fall below this intervention price, the Afghan state would buy up agricultural goods in order to raise prices to the minimum price.

A comprehensive system of support to agriculture would both create economic incentives to abandon the production of opiates and ensure peasants have a minimal livelihood. If Afghanistan’s application for accession to the WTO is approved, these subsidies will, of course, have to be in line with the WTO Agricultural Agreement and specified in Afghanistan’s list of commitments.

2. Investment in infrastructure and irrigation systems is also necessary. The destruction caused by years of conflict significantly impedes the rebuilding of Afghan agriculture. Water management is imperative when seeking to enable wide usage of agricultural land. Examples include Northern Africa and Central Spain.

Polyculture may be useful in this context (i.e. combining fish farming or reed bed water treatment with resources intended for irrigation). The potential development of organic farming should also be explored, in particular emphasizing a variety of local species that are adapted to drought (e.g. pomegranates, raisins).

3. The government must also increase their level of investment in university-level education of Afghanistan’s future agricultural professionals.

4. In-kind food aid from the international community should be reduced in order to stimulate greater indigenous production.

Women

Gender Equality:
With government reform, amendment of the penal code and the re-education of the Taliban generation, Afghanistan could see a better future for women.

• The Penal Code – the 1976 code in place today classifies adultery (or 'zina') as a punishable crime, whilst rape, sexual harassment, sex slavery and human trafficking are not. This needs amendment (particularly of Articles 422-433) which could take place at a Loya Jirga.

• Implementation of the law for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) – this would ensure equality, education and health care for women. At the same time abuse and violence against women, child and forced marriages and the buying and selling of women for marriage ('baad' and 'baadal') would all become punishable offences. Prohibiting the buying and selling of women could additionally reduce domestic abuse – many men are resentful of the high dowries that must be paid which in turn leave them with high levels of debt.

• Educated religious leaders are absent from the shuras where they are most needed – the presence of enlightened religious figures in the provincial tribes would mean that communities would be encouraged to treat women equally. This would also provide an advisor to be consulted on domestic issues that are brought before the shura.

• The creation of female shuras – women-only shuras should be introduced into provincial communities, giving women local, female support. Only 18% of women are aware that other females suffer abuse due to their enforced isolation. The implementation of all women shura structures would sharpen the focus on previously neglected issues such as women’s (and subsequently children’s) health. The long distance between homes and health centres, the widespread illiteracy that limits educational and employment aspirations of women and tribal customs that forbid women to work or be visited by male heath workers, compound difficulties faced by many Afghan women and children seeking health care. Only 40% of Afghan basic health facilities employ female health-care providers.

• National and local awareness programs and workshops – should be offered via local shuras, clergy and elders. This would empower local communities and eventually the long-term benefits of community education would show. A balance must be struck between the religious and modern curriculums, which would pave way for increased school attendance for girls in rural Afghanistan.

• Media outlets such as community radios should focus on women’s health, family and children to help counter excessive patriarchal control. Connecting women with one another will have a transformative effect.

Current Situation:

Afghanistan's post-Taliban reforms have little improved the lives of women. A 2010 report conducted by UNAMA found that in 29 out of the 34 Afghan provinces, abuse of women’s rights occurs on a daily basis. In Kabul, during the 1950s, women could be students, work on university faculties, hold respected office jobs and even labour on construction sites. In the 1920s, under King Amanulla, women first won the right to go to schools and under King Zahir Shah, they walked the streets safely without burqas. In the communist 1980s, women were finally viewed as having the right to be involved in policy formation. Many have died as martyrs in order to fight for women's rights over the years in Afghanistan: Malalai Kakar - a prominent policewoman, Safia Ama Jan - Director of Ministry of Women's Affairs in the Kandahar province and Zakia Zaki - journalist, to name but a few, have been murdered and tortured by Afghan men for their progressive ideals. Suraya Parlika is a veteran protestor, a widely respected Nobel Peace Prize Nominee and an Upper House member in the Afghan Parliament. She was imprisoned, beaten regularly and had her fingernails removed. If the Taliban were given an opportunity to return to power in Southern Afghanistan, it would seem that these women’s momentous sacrifices have been in vain.

Opposition to women’s rights not only exists among Taliban members but is also prevalent within the Afghan government itself. The high level of impunity imposed by the West during the transition process in 2001-2002 has facilitated the continued presence of fundamentalist forces in state structures. These extreme conservatives in government oppose reform in the educational sector, so crucial for the advancement of women’s rights.

President Karzai is currently negotiating with the Taliban. In 2009, the Afghan government reintroduced the Shia Family Law which curtailed women’s custody rights and their freedom of movement. President Karzai’s talks with the Taliban precede a possible division of the nation whereby the Taliban may (de facto) rule the South once more. This report recommends the decentralization of state power. The allocation of power and responsibility to provincial, traditional shuras would allow for a more optimistic future for women.

Conclusion

The problems caused by the current fragmentation of Afghan society form an inextricably interwoven web, each issue reliant on the other’s resolution. Whilst attempting to strengthen the basic societal structures, pre-existing traditional institutions must not be overlooked. The shuras, the jirgas and the mirabs are well-functioning local platforms for debate, conflict resolution and decision-making. Attempts to foster a greater civil society should stem from these.

Afghanistan has a strong chance of a stable and exciting future. We so often fail to remember that Afghanistan had a comparatively stable and prosperous period in the modern era, remembered by older Afghans as a near golden age under Kings Nadir and Zahir Shah (1929-1973). Problems existed that eventually allowed the possibility of Soviet interference and put an end to the traditional structures of governance. A reaffirmation of these traditional structures would provide stability and better standards of human rights, especially for women, as well as real hope for the future.

Three More

2011-08-03T15:18:00.000+01:00

A suicide attack in Kunduz, Kabul has killed three private security guards, and wounded nine others. The bomb detonated this morning, just before dawn, in a suicide attack at the entrance of a building. After the attack, officials were engaged in a two-hour long fire fight with the flames. It follows a list of Taliban attacks that have occurred over the past few months, many targeted specifically at military and police institutions.

Three were also killed in June after a car bomb north of Kunduz, and another three policemen died after a suicide blast near a mosque in the same area. Not only in Kabul have attacks continued; in Lashkar Gar, eleven were killed in another suicide bomb yesterday. Government officials are often targets.

The list of civilian and military deaths at the hands of the Taliban, who take blame for many of the attacks, continues to grow.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-14368258

Troubles in Afghanistan: the increasing brutality of the Taliban.

2011-08-01T12:45:00.000+01:00

Blood on the streets of Afghanistan is on the rise. The timing could not come at a worse time for President Karzai, as NATO starts to hand over parts of the country to local security forces.

The most recent suicide attack took place in Lashkar Gah. The target was police headquarters, where 13 people were killed; including Afghan policeman and a child.

In other developments, Afghan interpreters who have worked for the British army are under threat of kidnapping and execution by the Taleban. As British troops prepare to withdraw from Afghanistan, Afghan interpreters fear for their lives. Not like other NATO countries, Britain has no immigration arrangement for these interpreters to immigrate here.

A Fashionable Spring

2011-07-29T17:11:00.002+01:00

So far, 2011 has brought with it a worrying trend among Taliban members: the fashion of assassinations. Six government officials have been killed by Taliban members since January; four of them from Kandahar, Taliban’s former stronghold, including President Karzai’s younger brother, who served as Chief of Kandahar Provincial Council. Generally, many of those assassinated are claimed to be close to Karzai, wrapped up in allegations of corruption and illegitimate exertion of power.

While the assassinations are not necessarily destabilizing enough to cause a government collapse, the effects are extremely disruptive because it takes time to choose replacements. As demonstrated in June with Karzai’s attempt to form his cabinet, appointing governmental officials is a slow and painful process in Afghanistan.

However, beyond the practical consequences of the assassinations come the analytical interpretations: what does this say about security in the respective provinces? Does this show a strengthened or weakened Taliban? How can the Afghan government protect the people if they cannot even protect themselves?

On the one hand, NATO leaders and diplomats have said the recent spate of assassinations is a sign of the Taliban’s weakness and desperation in the nearly decade-old Afghanistan war. On the other hand, a spokesperson for the Afghan National Army has commented: “The message is clear. They want to show their power. These attacks are a psychological victory for the Taliban”.

Ironically, though to a grotesque extent, are the allegations of US use of military contractors, or ‘mercenaries’, in Afghanistan; press reports say that Blackwater is still at the centre of secret programs, despite CIA’s recent announcement that they have stopped using them. Taking out significant al-Qaeda and Taliban groups is their aim.

Whether the Taliban’s fashionable technique of assassinating is just a copy-paste of mercenary methods adopted in weak and desperate times, or actually an extension of their general approach implying strength and confidence is for no one but the Taliban to tell. However, with a troop withdrawal around the corner leaving a fragile national security system it is definitely an alarming trend.

Another Afghan Official Murdered

2011-07-27T15:43:00.006+01:00

The mayor of Kandahar, Ghulam Haidar Hameedi, has been killed in a suicide attack.

The perpetrator detonated explosives hidden in his turban as the mayor made an address to tribal officials, discussing a land dispute. This is not the first time an attack has been made by hiding a bomb in a turban but tradition dictates that turbans must not be removed.

The Taliban has claimed responsibility for the attack, which coincides with the start of the security handover from NATO to local troops. They claim that the attack was in response to the deaths of two children which had occurred after Hameedi ordered the demolition of 200 illegally constructed houses.

Hameedi was a popular mayor by all accounts, who stood up to the militia and encouraged the building of roads and public buildings. The BBC report refers to him as ‘competent and trusted’.

The US Ambassador offered his condolences and sincere regret at the loss of yet another top Afghan official. Karzai’s senior aide was assassinated a week ago and it has been just two weeks since President Karzai’s brother was killed in the very same city.

Kandahar was the countries designated capital during Taliban rule until 2006 so it is unsurprising that much of their efforts have been centred here.

Follow the story...

http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/07/27/mayor-death-wont-affect-ongoing-projects-wesa

Taliban to make peace?

2011-07-25T17:13:00.001+01:00

On July 14^th, two members of the Afghan parliament held a press conference, announcing that that they had met with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar over a year ago.

During this meeting he agreed on an outline for peace negotiations with the Kabul government.

There were further claims that this had been approved by President Karzai himself. Omar was said to have signed an agreement that he himself revised but this was rejected by the president.

The president’s office say that they have doubts that the signature on the document is truly Mr Omar’s.

http://www.rferl.org/content/gandhara_afghan_legislators_claim_to_have_met_with_taliban_chief/24266866.htm

Luck runs out for President Karzai’s half brother

2011-07-12T11:14:00.002+01:00

Ahmad Wali Karzai, the head of the Kandahar provincial council and the half brother of President Karzai, has been assassinated.

He was shot twice by the head of security, Sardar Mohammed (who was shot dead on the spot).

Ahmad Wali Karzai was considered a highly corrupt warlord who was involved in the drug trade.

There is an old Afghan saying “whoever rules Kandahar rules Afghanistan”. Given the dire state of internal affairs in Afghanistan at the moment, the assassination of such a corrupt official might invite the possibility of a more moderate one to rule such an important province in Afghanistan.

Issues Raised by Journalists: Afghanistan: Freedom of Press? Only on certain (an...

2011-06-17T16:26:00.000+01:00

Issues Raised by Journalists: Afghanistan: Freedom of Press? Only on certain (an...: "A religious grand council in Afghanistan, the Ulema Shura , which often is involved as an advisory unit for Karzai regarding religious and c..."

IT'S NOT A WOMAN'S WORLD

2011-06-15T14:30:00.006+01:00

To be placed above the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, Somalia and India as the most perilous place for a woman to live is not easily achievable. TRUSTLAW POLL revealed that an Afghan woman is considered to have a better quality of life in the Congo where among the 400,000 women that are raped each year; many of them are as young as 3 years old; are raped with bayonets and are afterwards shot in the vagina. It is impossible to imagine a more harrowing, inhumane and hateful existence...

Due to NATO air strikes, harmful cultural practices, violence and dismal health care; Afghanistan's post-Taliban reforms have barely improved the lives of women. A 2010 report conducted by UNAMA HR found that in 29 out of the 34 Afghan provinces, abuse of women’s rights occurs on a daily basis. The Government is completely inept in fully protecting the rights of women and girls. It is a shocking and unconventional devolution: in 1950s' Kabul, women were students; on their university faculties; worked in respected office jobs and even on construction sites. Under King Amanulla in the 1920s, women first won the right to go to schools and under King Zahir Shah, they walked the streets safely without burqas. In the communist 1980s, women were finally viewed as having the right to be involved in policy forming. Many have died as martyrs in order to fight for women's rights over the years in Afghanistan: Malalai Kakar - a prominent police woman, Safia Ama Jan - Director of Ministry of Women's Affairs and Zakia Zaki - journalist, to name but a few have been murdered and tortured by Afghan men for their progressive ideals. Suraya Parlika is a veteran protestor; a widely respected Nobel Peace Prize Nominee and Upper House member in the Afghan Parliament. She was imprisoned, beaten regularly and had her fingernails removed. It seems that these women’s momentous sacrifice has somehow not transgressed into the 21^st Century.

Hamid Karzai was appointed into presidency in the (poorly-conducted) 2002 Loya Jirga with the ever present Western Big Brother. The Taliban's repressive regime was over and the Afghan Constitution changed. In Articles 22, 43, 44 and 54, more acts of discrimination against women were criminalised and it was asserted that women are equal to men in the eyes of the law. However, the Penal Code from 1976 is still utilised which classifies adultery (or 'zina') as the only punishable crime out of rape, sexual harassment, sex slavery, human trafficking and many others. Even in cases of honour killings, perpetrators are usually given lenient prison sentences of around 2 years. The law takes a selective approach when faced with a law matter involving women: complaints of domestic abuse and child marriages are categorised as "private matters," yet when a young girl flees from a life of abuse, she is imprisoned for intention to commit adultery. In fact, half of the country's female prison population is detained for 'moral crimes' all of which centre on accusations of adultery. Many of these disrespectful, un-Christian and misogynistic acts are also extremely inconsistent with Islamic/Sharia Law (e.g. Holy Quran, Al nisa, Verse 124 and Al Hujurat Verse 13).

There is some light ahead for the brave and suffering in. The Law of Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) has been introduced into Afghanistan, however it is proving difficult to be incorporated into daily life and to penetrate the more conservative and rural areas of Afghanistan. The UNAMA HR is calling for the Afghan Government, religious leaders, communities, civil societies and international donors to take all possible measures to implement EVAW law immediately. This law would criminalise and prohibit sexual abuse and violence on women; child and forced marriages; the buying and selling of women for marriage ('baad' and 'baadal') and on the other hand enforce equality, education and health care for women. International and domestic charities are also very much involved in this uphill battle for equal rights. The Afghan Civil Society organisation strives for literacy programs to be set up for women to try counteracting the effects left on an entire generation from the Taliban rule - the current literacy rate of women is 14%. There is also a special program being set up in Kandahar where female shuras are being created to offer grassroots civic management of women. The idea is to meet twice a month in their respective districts in order to voice their grievances about their community and plan to bulwark against continued discrimination and abuse. A very important achievement is the Women's Income Generation Project which encourages women to learn skills in order to start their own businesses. The Khamak embroidery business is already underway - all profits are returned to the female workers. Without financial independence, women shall never reach equality. For this, we need education, skills, health care and ideally but not necessarily a supportive family.

In the midst of the obstacles faced by various women’s charities, President Karzai is currently negotiating with the Taliban. In 2009, Karzai reintroduced the Shia Family Law which curtails women’s custody rights and their freedom of movement. Karzai’s talks with the Taliban are extremely confidential, yet the situation indicates a possible division of the nation where the South will be ruled once more by the Taliban. Where does this leave the women of Afghanistan? The President does not appear to be a chauvinist – his wife is highly educated and granted many freedoms that many Muslim women in the Middle East could only dream about. Unfortunately, some suspect he is relying on the support of many ‘conservative’ and Taliban-influenced provinces for the 2014 election; of course the vote is more important than the quality of 15 million women’s lives. So, like its predecessors in the run for the “most dangerous place in the world for women,” Afghanistan shows very little real hope in the near future.

The forgotten story about Abdul Haq

2011-06-10T11:50:00.008+01:00

Yesterday, on June 9th, a new book was launched by an extraordinary woman with experiences and insights that probably go beyond many people`s imagination of the possible - "The Afghan Solution: The inside story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and how Western hubris lost Afghanistan". Lucy Morgan Edwards worked as an aid worker in Afghanistan during the height of the Taliban regime in Kandahar, and further served as an election monitor during the 2002 Loya Jirga. Onwards, she wrote articles for the Economist and Daily Telegraph before she was appointed Political Advisor to the EU Ambassador in Kabul from 2004 to 2005. Her work has consisted of interviewing hundreds of Afghans about the events following 9/11 and the subsequent invasion of Western troops. Mainly, her book tells the story about Abdul Haq; one of the most famous Afghan commanders of the resistance movement against the Soviets, and well-known critic of the Taliban rule. After the invasion in 2001 and outbreak of civil war between the Taliban and more moderate fractions of the old mujahedeeen, Haq, who had fled to Dubai during the Taliban rule, returned via Pakistan in an attempt to build resistance to and topple the Taliban. Haq was one of the few warlords who had remained admired and well-respected among the Afghans after the brutality and violent greed of the mujahedeen civil war in the early 1990s. However, his attempt turned into a Hollywood 24-hour thriller as he was captured and killed by the Taliban shortly after he entered Afghanistan (Guardian October 28, 2001). Speculations have been going on about whether he was betrayed by the Pakistani ISI, and maybe also his alleged supporters in the CIA.

What is interesting and extremely important about Morgan Edwards book and the story of Abdul Haq is the attention towards someone who resisted both the Taliban rule and the American invasion; Haq`s approach to Afghanistan`s crisis after 9/11 deviated from the 'either-Taliban-or-Karzai idea' that so often seems to be the only option accounted for. Unfortunately, Haq`s wish for a pan-ethnic loya jirga and united solution to Afghanistan did not come true until after his death, and that in a far less united fashion than what he aimed for. At the early days of the invasion Haq had stated: "If they leave things up to us, it will only be a few months before the Taliban are toppled", with a further comment that civilian casualties caused by Western troops would only steel especially Pashtun support for the Taliban. Haq`s words seem to have a noteworthy truth attached to them, as the Western forces 10 years after the invasion still struggle to counteract Taliban insurgents and still strive to understand the reasons for the dysfunctional and highly corrupt features of Afghanistan's Western-style democracy, imposed after the 2002 Loya Jirga, which had the UN and US pulling the strings behind the scenes. According to Haq`s obituary (The Guardian, October 29, 2001) he was one of the few anti-Taliban faction leaders that had presented Aghanistan`s exiled monarch with a coherent political programme for the country; Haq`s political goal was a revival of the old Afghan monarchy under the authority of the highly popular king, Zahir Shah. However, Haq gained no support from the Americans.

Morgan Edward`s book serves as an important contribution to the discussion and understanding of why the West seem to have so seriously misunderstood Afghanistan. During the civil war in the early 1990s Haq warned: " For us, Afghanistan is destroyed. It is turning to poison, and not only to us but for all others in the world. If you are a terrorist you can have shelter here, no matter who you are. Day by day there is the increase of drugs. Maybe one day the US have to send hundreds of thousands of troops to deal with that. And if they step in, they wil be stuck. We have a British grave in Afghanistan. We have a Soviet grave. And then we will have an American grave". Haq`s warning seems at this point to have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, Morgan Edwards says: "Unfortunately the West lost its best chance to eject the Taliban and bring stability to Afghanistan when it failed to understand the potential offered in 2001 by Abdul Haq". It is therefore maybe time that the West starts to listen more closely to those who know Afghanistan better than anyone else: the Afghan people. To read "The Afghan Solution" by Lucy Morgan Edwards might be a good way to start.

More Responsibility to be Allocated to Tribesmen

2011-06-02T11:27:00.007+01:00

The Afghan National Army has experienced certain positive changes under Western military forces during the past 6 months, however evidence dictates that these changes remain superficial and temporary in effectiveness. With appalling attrition rates, continued 'crash-course' training for new recruits and corrupt leadership, it is quite apparent that the ANA stand as little chance of being a functioning, sustainable, legitimate enforcer of security today as they did two hundred years ago.
The Ministry of Interior has consistently failed to control and organise the forces under their command, especially the Afghan National Police who are much less respected than the ANA. The current police force receive such poor salaries that corruption is perceived as being the only way of survival. Many believe that the Upper House should take over responsibility of the ANP as transparent elections and promotions are more probable there, thus making non-corrupt and effective leadership of the ANP more achievable.
As we approach 2014 - the agreed departure date of Western forces from Afghanistan - it is hard to imagine that such thorough reforms of two broken security forces will ever occur at all, let alone in such a short time frame. Some propose that Afghanistan will be split - the North will be under Karzai control with subtle Western influence and the South will once again be under the Taliban. The expected conflict brought about by the separation will undoubtedly overwhelm security forces, possibly leaving the nation spiralling down at a much faster rate with less Western military supervision.
The other approach which attempts to ease the fragile Afghanistan into the 2014 transition is allocating more responsibility to local tribesmen. This would mean an Afghan Government that cooperates with former insurgents such as the Pashtuns and allows them a greater stake in their own country through financial incentives to secure and manage their own local region. The ANA could be organised into smaller divisions and placed in certain regions to oversee and offer support to the tribes. This analogy could also provide greater security to the porous and vulnerable Afghan-Pakistan border as many tribes operate there already and are at high risk of daily assassination. Through creating a strong network of regional security bodies and promoting a more self-determined nation of Afghan civilians with occassional input from a small but organised ANA, Afghanistan can hope to enjoy a better system of security and a more peaceful society.

Afghanistan, crossroads of the Ancient World, British Museum. Extended until 17 July 2011

2011-05-16T12:00:00.004+01:00

16-05-2011

It is always refreshing to hear something about Afghanistan that does not relate to war and violence. This is why the extension of the British Museum exhibition on Afghanistan until mid-July is good news for all those who wish to learn more about the immense cultural richness of this country. The exhibition displays some of its most beautiful treasures, dating back from the Bronze Age to the 1^st century AD. It gathers over 200 objects, ranging from classical sculptures to inlaid gold ornaments, mainly coming from the collection of the National Museum of Afghanistan.

The fate of some of these treasures over the past decades reflects the troubled history of Afghanistan during the same period. Discovered by the Greco-Russian archaeologist Victor Sarigiannidis in six different tombs in the North of the country, in 1978, on the eve of the Soviet invasion, these objects were saved by the staff of the National Museum from the great turmoil that followed. While the National Museum was looted and bombed and most of its treasures lost forever, these objects survived in the safety boxes of the National Bank. It is only in 2003, while Afghanistan was in the middle of another conflict, that President Karzai announced that the treasures had resurfaced. The fragile destiny of Afghan treasures makes the present exhibition even more important.

There is another reason why this exhibition is worth noting. As suggested by the subtitle – Crossroads of the Ancient World – it is useful to remind us of the long history of the country, once opened to multiple cultural influences and trade exchanges, going against the common present perception of Afghanistan as an inherently closed and isolated country. The Museum’s director said it was part of the initial project to ‘demonstrate that [this is] a historically anomalous moment’[i] in the long history of Afghanistan. An opportunity to see another picture of Afghanistan is rare these days, it is better not to miss it!

http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/future_exhibitions/afghanistan.aspx

[i] Quoted by The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2010/nov/29/afghanistan-treasure-british-museum

2011 Media Awards, Oxford & Cambridge Club UK

2011-04-30T18:06:00.003+01:00

Hanif Hangham won the Press Freedom Award - a special Award given to this brave Satterist who has risked his life for many years. The programme that he hosts is one that the people of Afghanisan tune into if they wish to know what is going on politically!
He got as far as London, but a day late so we have this award for next year so 2012 we hope to see him here!
See you next year, Hanif, safe travelling!
Veronica Morris.

Afghanistan: time to face reality

2011-03-15T20:32:00.000Z

Ranj sent us his latest article - he's a prop up Karzai man:

Afghanistan continues to edge towards the precipice. State-building efforts in the country are still plagued with inefficiency, corruption and disorganisation, whilst international coalition forces in the form of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) find themselves at the losing end of a battle to dominate the public perception on the Afghan street: ongoing daily violence, coupled with increasing calls for a firm withdrawal among the international community has signaled to average Afghans that the West will soon pack up and go, whilst the resilient, unwavering Taliban are there to stay.
All is not yet lost though. The international community will have to soon start taking tough decisions and bring the conflict back to its basics if it is going to achieve the underlying objective that took it to the country in the first place.
The US and its international partners’ objectives in Afghanistan have generally fallen under three over-arching categories: stability, representative governance and the rule of law. The stability objective in specific terms means ensuring Afghanistan does not once again become a place from which extremist forces can attack the West and its interests. The narrative, as diplomats, analysts and academics alike, currently tell it is that this can only be achieved once the other objectives are met. In other words, Afghanistan cannot be secured until you have an efficient and legitimate government that can implement some respectful standard of democracy and human rights.
It is now clear that this argument and strategy is utterly flawed and unrealistic. What the nine-year conflict has shown is that the numerous over-arching objectives cannot be met in their entirety, will certainly not be achieved should the US begin its drawdown in July 2011 or within the five year troop withdrawal deadline being proposed by Prime Minister David Cameron, and will most certainly not be achieved within the next ten years – if the current record is anything to go by.
The realities on the ground justify this inconvenient truth.
Firstly, there is no political strategy in Afghanistan that can reconcile the Karzai-led government with other rival tribal and political factions, all vying for power and a serious stake in the country. The reality is that the current government is entrenched in a tribal and political web of patronage and corruption that has become impossible to remedy.
Beyond this, and secondly, there is no clear consensus on how, and whether, to negotiate and reconcile with the fragmented Taliban. The Taliban is not the cohesive, hierarchical and organised entity that they may come across as being. Three disparate entities are currently fighting in the country: the Taliban, which is led by Mullah Omar but whose whereabouts remains elusive; the Haqqani network, led by the former mujahideen warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj Haqqani and, finally, a collection of domestic and foreign fighters that includes al-Qaida. There is, therefore, no leadership to negotiate with.
Finally, even if a grand strategy was offered, elements within and beyond Afghanistan in neighbouring states have become convinced that the west will not be around long enough to enforce it. The now clear commitment to withdraw troops within a fixed deadline or, at the very, least reduce troops in the country justifies their concerns.
More importantly, what this means is that Kabul will have little incentive to carry out the reforms essential for any counter-insurgency initiative to work. The Afghan government, suffering from a legitimacy crisis, is not committed to maintaining stability. It is aware of the above limitations in the state-building process and thus individuals within its upper echelons will continue to maximise their political and financial gain while they are in a position to do so, convinced that an ISAF withdrawal and potential defeat lies on the horizon.
The west, unwilling to publicly repudiate the government and its shambolic elections, or advocate an alternative, has inadvertently consolidated their positions and is now unable to displace them and their obstructive networks of power, so that reform takes place. To remove them from power now would invite a violent backlash of epic and uncontrollable proportions.
The international community must accept that a stable and representative government is no longer feasible, and certainly not one able to adequately implement the rule of law and enforce human rights. These are values that may have to be sacrificed. Sadly, Afghans never had such luxuries in the first place, at least not in recent times, and in truth the west is unlikely to ever be in a position to provide them with it.
To carry on in denial and futility will be a waste of human lives (civilian and military), resources and in essence unfair on the Afghan people. Instead, the west must go back to what it does best: make do with what it has and pursue its historic policy of supporting suspect regimes in the middle east, Asia and Latin America.
Karzai and his government may have to be propped up; heavily supported (financially and militarily) and assured, so that it becomes the West’s bulwark against the insurgency and extremists – the ultimate objective. The West would therefore leave Afghanistan to Afghans but without handing the state back to the Taliban and al-Qaida.
To make this effective and rewarding, focus must continue to be on the Afghan security forces, ensuring they are up to the task of countering the insurgency. Defeating them may not be an option, at least according to on-the-ground observers. Containing and reducing them to sporadic attacks is though.
That requires maintaining, beyond any withdrawal, an international force of military and police advisors, engaged in non-combat duties and comprised of the renowned EU police training missions. At present there are some 3,600 trainers on the ground. There is still a shortfall of nearly 500 trainers, but once the focus turns from combat to training that can be rectified by states who may have previously been reluctant.
More challenging is keeping at bay Afghanistan’s neighbours. The proxy conflict between the Pakistani intelligence service (the ISI) and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) suggests that Pakistan will not cooperate with the west in Afghanistan, despite pretences to the contrary. In reality, Pakistan seeks instability in Afghanistan since a stable Afghanistan will likely be pro-India. India has a vested interest in the current government, possibly more so than the West, because it is a means of containing Pakistan.

China feels that NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is an effort at securing a strategic base in the region whilst securing access to energy resources and encircling China. Iran, meanwhile, will be ill at ease with a stable NATO ally on its Eastern border. Keeping NATO resources tied up in Afghanistan means the probability of war against Iran is reduced.
All this renders it even more imperative to ensure the current government is consolidated, lest the withdrawal of ISAF leads to a civil war intensified by regional neighbours and which leads to the collapse of the Karzai government, much like the 1992 collapse of the Najabullah government three years after the Soviet withdrawal.
Pursuant to this, it is also an option to maintain the above-mentioned international force of advisors for at least another twenty-years. There is no reason why these non-combat personnel cannot be deployed alongside Afghan forces in the most extreme and unlikely of cases, upon the request of the Afghan government and in the event the government does edge towards the brink.
In short, the strategy in Afghanistan must revolve around what is viable and sustainable. Propping up Karzai is not the ideal choice to take but it is perhaps the only realistic option amidst what is a complex political, security and geopolitical environment.

Conference on Afghanistan- Saturday 9th April 2011

2011-03-01T14:33:00.001Z

The NCF is holding a conference on Afghanistan on Saturday 9th April 2011 from 9:30am - 4:00pm.

If you would like to attend this, please email Joanna Lewis at ncfmepp@aol.com.

Details of the conference are below:

The Next Century Foundation working in cooperation with Innovation Arts have convened a conference on Afghanistan:

Emerging from Crisis
A spotlight on the difficulties facing the people of Afghanistan

9:30 am: Registration and coffee

10:00 am: Opening remarks

Policy working groups in cooperation with Innovation Arts.

Working discussion groups 10:30am – 4:00pm (working lunch 1:00pm).

1. Traditional Governance Issues

2. Corruption and the Judiciary

3. The Ongoing Battle Against the Illegal Narcotics Trade

4. Afghan Civil Society: Woman, Education, Human Rights and Press Freedom

5. The Future of Security Policy and International Involvement in Afghanistan

6. Transition: Prospects for the Transfer of Power

7. Afghanistan and her Neighbours

An informal, creative atmosphere will allow you as participants, the main actors in the session, to work together as peers. Discussion leaders will encourage participation and share their experiences. The discussion in the groups will be used as the basis on which to formulate the proceedings of the day.

New Speaker

2011-02-27T15:38:00.000Z

From Saad Mohseni today: Raoof Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek from Kunduz, becomes Afghanistan's Speaker (Lower House of Parliament)

Hanif Hangam

2011-02-11T17:48:00.004Z

Hanif Hangam has now been shortlisted for a media award by the NCF. The scripts that he writes for this satirical political show, by which the population of Kabul is able to see what is going on in the city "Alarm Bell" is a show that lampoons Taliban rebels, warlords, UN diplomats and pilgrims to Mecca. He treads a narrow path with threats of being beaten up, it's amazing he's still alive!

News of what is going on in the UK about Afghanistan

2010-11-16T21:56:00.006Z

We have a "Fashion Compassion" show run by Carole Naim, Fashion Compassion is a premium ethical fashion house, they will be launching their first collection of unique and handmade accessories crafted by women's artisans, based on Afghan designs.
It will be held at
Horne & Harvey,
23a St James's Street
London SW1A 1HA
Time: Thursday 18th November, 6pm - 9pm
Friday 19th November, 10am - 5pm
---------------------------------------------------
The Media Nominations have selected one very brave Afghan man as a nominee who will always say there are others in his show, but the show is presented by Hanif Hangam. It is incredible that he has survived the many times of being beatened up and threatened. The Afghans are glued to their sets every Weds night and it is a satirical look at what is going on in the country it is the only means they have on finding out.
About the show Hanif says with pride "I made something out of nothing" The Afghans appreciate what he is doing.
it is a satirical look at what is going on in the country the only way they find out!!!

Karzai Admits Cash Payments

2010-10-25T15:24:00.002+01:00

The Karzai administration in Afghanistan has confirmed reports that they have been accepting cash donations from Iran amongst other countries but strongly denies links to corruption.

Last week the New York Times reported that Iran had been handing bags full of cash, largely denominated in Euros , to Karzai's aides for the past couple of years. The Times' journalists said that the money was used in order to buy influence in Kabul and to strengthen Iranian presence there. But President Hamid Karzai said that many countries, including the US, gave money in this way and it was all part of a "transparent" process.

Doubts remain however as to, transparent or not, this is a source of funding that should be endorsed. The whole process of handing over bags of cash, in Iran's case hundreds of thousands or millions of euro's once or twice every year, seems to be an effort to work outside the framework for aid that is in place for the government. As more and more about the story comes out it appears the main reason for doing so is that Karzai and his administration could then used the money for personal use rather than public.

The fact that there is corruption in Afghanistan probably comes as no surprise to anybody but the way it occurs and the source of the funding is another issue entirely.

Two Afghan Nominees for the International Media Awards

2010-10-11T17:04:00.000+01:00

Hanif Hangam

Hanif Hangam is a writer and comedian who puts his life on the line with every show that is aired. He is most famous (or infamous) for his starring role in the prime-time weekly satire ‘Alarm Bell’, a show that lampoons Taliban rebels, warlords, UN diplomats, pilgrims to Mecca, and petrol pump attendants. Despite complaints and threats after every broadcast, the producers, and Hangam, maintain that ‘Alarm Bell’ is crucial for the political health of the country.

In 2006 Hangam was forced to flee Afghanistan after a film in which he starred, ‘Kabul Express’, cause offence to many in the country – particularly the Hazara community.

To see an Al-Jazeera report on the phenomenon of ‘Alarm Bell’:

http://english.aljazeera.net/video/asia/2010/09/201091723517107879.html

Saad Mohseni

Saad Mohseni is an Afghan-Australian, who along with his brothers Zaid and Jahid and sister Wajma, set up Moby Group, Afghanistan’s largest media company, in 2002. Prior to establishing Moby, Mr. Mohseni was the head of the equities and corporate finance division of an Australian investment bank.

Moby’s interests include Tolo TV, Afghanistan’s most-watched television channel. Tolo TV is best known in the West for ‘Afghan Star’; the series that followed the pop idol talent-show format, and gave many Afghans their first taste of democracy via a mobile-phone voting system.

Despite its relatively short lifespan, Moby Group has developed a reputation for quality productions which address issues facing ordinary Afghans, including The Kite Runner (in collaboration with Dreamworks and Paramount Vantage) and the drama series Raaz Hai En Khana (“The Secrets of This House”). These both explore issues of family, tradition and change within the context of contemporary Afghanistan. (Held from 2009)

Succeeding in Afghanistan?

2010-09-07T17:49:00.000+01:00

The Henry Jackson Society has put out a positive report on Afghanistan:
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/cms/harriercollectionitems/Succeeding%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

I wish I could share their optimism. And with regard to Afghanistan: When will journalists use normal terminology - calling a spade a spade? Not that their report is culpable at that level. But sending reinforcements is not "a surge" and an increase in violence is not "a spike". I heard the great polemiscist Robert Fisk saying as much yesterday in Old Chelsea Town Hall. Not that I agree with him on much but on this he and I are one.

We have lost control of the border Afpak area and are swiftly losing control of the entire country. Minister of Defence Wardak cannot even visit his own province. Things aren't good.

The Last Jew in Afghanistan

2010-08-27T14:53:00.003+01:00

One man, living alone in a small room next to a crumbling synagogue is the only remaining Jew in Afghanistan. He is the last of 4,000 and a thriving community that has been decimated by years of war and oppression. Zabolon Simantov believes that he has to keep the Jewish history in Afghanistan alive:

"I don't want my Jewish heritage erased. My father was a rabbi, my grandfather was a rabbi. We were a big, religious family. I feel like the lion of Afghanistan, nobody can touch me."

But Zabolon has faced a fair amount of persecution at the hands of fundamentalists and radicals, who constantly pressure him to convert.

"They are dumb. For me, that kind of talk is like a matchstick you use to light a cigarette. You throw it away without a second thought," he says.
However, he is doubtful that any Jews will return to Afghanistan and, if he leaves, hundreds of years of tradition will no longer have a representative.

Thoughts on Afghanistan

2010-08-24T16:53:00.007+01:00

The current state of Afghanistan is subject to perspective. General Petraeus believes that military operations in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan have begun to “reverse Taliban momentum”. However, some people believe that the Taliban are, in fact, gaining in strength, or at least holding off the British and American advances. Either way, there needs to be a strong Afghan government to support a counterinsurgency strategy and gain the trust of the Afghan people, which is likely to be complicated in the upcoming election of 18^th September.

A major problem that has to be addressed by the government is the continuing recruitment and radicalisation of young people by the Taleban. There are three main reasons for the Taleban’s success. Firstly, the Afghanis tend to resent the West. Historically, Britain has had a turbulent military involvement in Afghanistan (the first in 1839), which may lead some Afghanis to believe that the invasion is some sort of vengeance. This resentment is strengthened by the American air-strikes and bombings, which often lead to civilian casualties, and consequently the villagers are likely to be more inclined to support the Taleban. Secondly, the Afghanis feel that there is a lack of human interaction with the American soldiers, who patrol the streets heavily armed and wearing sunglasses. Although this is a minor issue, it does have an effect on the allegiances of the people, who see the soldiers as a repressive and frightening force rather than one that could help. However, most importantly, it is a matter of demographics. The percentage of people under 25 is currently 65%, set to rise to 80% by 2015. Considering that there are very few jobs for young people, and that the Taleban pay better than the Afghan security forces (by $60), combined with the previous reasons, the Taleban seem to be a very attractive organisation. Furthermore, the Security Forces are pervaded by factionalism and tribal loyalties, effectively excluding a lot of potential recruits. Indeed, 90 of the first 100 generals appointed to the new army were Tajik, reigniting ethnic struggles. Thus, to slow the Taleban’s recruitment program, which would be a huge step in the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the government has to somehow address the jobs available to young people, the fractious nature of the Security Forces and work with the British and Americans to promote a positive image of the western troops.

However, it is doubtful whether President Karzai’s government has enough strength or legitimacy to enact any consequential change. The British and American influence can only go so far, and President Obama’s plan to make the Afghan Security Forces independent and self-reliant by 2011 depends on a strong and legitimate government, elected in a fair and non-fraudulent election. Indeed, this legitimacy was an important factor in General McChrystal’s assessment (August 2009), which suggested a counterinsurgency strategy to ‘protect the Afghan population’. Unfortunately, corruption is a major problem in the government. Indeed, a US report claims that up to $3 billion in funds has been embezzled by Afghan officials since 2005. Furthermore, a U. N report states that 59% of Afghans think corruption is more important than the security concern. Thus, Karzai evidently lacks the legitimacy or credibility needed from his people to create a strong government.

So, the upcoming election could go two ways, depending on the response of Karzai to western pressure to cut corruption and clean up the Security Forces. Firstly, if the troops pull out in 2011, as planned, then Karzai will not survive. Presently, the Security Forces are neither strong enough nor organised enough to pull off a successful counterinsurgency operation. If this happens, then it is likely that the Taleban will take control. Alternatively, some believe that if Karzai can be seen governing competently by the Afghans, and taking “measurable” steps against corruption, then there might be a way to regain his legitimacy and take the steps needed to effectively protect the Afghan people.

So very sad

2010-08-08T11:36:00.000+01:00

The news of the killing of the aid workers is so very very sad. What can any of us say? It has traumatised us all. Depressing and dissheartening in a disturbing world, and a reminder that we should heed the lessons of history and leave the Afghans be:

6 Americans on medical team killed in Afghanistan
By KATHY GANNONAP
KABUL, Afghanistan -Ten members of a medical team, including six Americans, were shot and killed by militants as they were returning from providing eye treatment and other health care in remote villages in northern Afghanistan, a spokesman for the team said Saturday.
Dirk Frans, director of the International Assistance Mission, said one German, one Briton and two Afghans also were part of the team that made the three-week trip to Nuristan province. They drove to the province, left their vehicles and hiked for hours with pack horses over mountainous terrain to reach the Parun valley in the province's northwest.
Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid told The Associated Press that they killed the foreigners because they were "spying for the Americans" and "preaching Christianity."

Frans said the International Assistance Mission, the longest serving nongovernmental organization operating in Afghanistan, is registered as a nonprofit Christian organization but does not proselytize.
"This tragedy negatively impacts our ability to continue serving the Afghan people as IAM has been doing since 1966," the charity said in a statement. "We hope it will not stop our work that benefits over a quarter of a million Afghans each year."
The team, made up of doctors, nurses and logistics personnel, was attacked as it was returning to Kabul after the two-week mission in Nuristan, Frans said. They had decided to travel through Badakhshan province to return to the capital because they thought it would be the safest route, Frans said.
Among the dead was team leader Tom Little, an optometrist from Delmar, New York, who has been working in Afghanistan for more than 30 years, Frans said. Another relief organization, Bridge Afghanistan, said on its website that the group included one of its members, Dr. Karen Woo of London.
Little, who oversaw eye hospitals in Kabul and two other major cities as well as small clinics in three smaller towns, had been expelled by the Taliban government in August 2001 after the arrest of eight Christian aid workers — two Americans and six Germans — for allegedly trying to convert Afghans to Christianity. He returned to live in Afghanistan after the Taliban government was toppled in November 2001 by U.S.-backed forces.
Frans said he lost contact with Little on Wednesday. On Friday, a third Afghan member of the team, who survived the attack, called to report the killings. A fourth Afghan member of the team was not killed because he took a different route home because he had family in Jalalabad, Frans said.
According to Frans, two members of the team worked for IAM, two were former IAM workers and four others were affiliated with other organizations, which he did not disclose. He said five of the Americans were men and one was a woman. The Briton and German also were women.
Gen. Agha Noor Kemtuz, police chief in Badakhshan province, said the victims, who had been shot, were found Friday next to three bullet-riddled four-wheel drive vehicles in Kuran Wa Munjan district. He said villagers had warned the team that the area was dangerous, but the foreigners said they were doctors and weren't afraid. He said local police said about 10 gunmen robbed them and killed them one by one.
He said the two dead Afghans were interpreters from Bamiyan and Panjshir provinces. The third Afghan who survived "told me he was shouting and reciting the holy Quran and saying 'I am Muslim. Don't kill me,'" Kemtuz said.
Frans told The Associated Press that he was skeptical the Taliban were responsible and that the team had studied security conditions carefully before proceeding with the mission. The team trekked from village to village during the two weeks, treating about 400 people for eye disorders and other illnesses.
"We are a humanitarian organization. We had no security people. We had no armed guards. We had no weapons," he said.
In a blog posting last month, Woo said the expedition would include an eye doctor, a dental surgeon "as well as me as the general practioner."

"The trek will not be easy; it will take three weeks and be done on foot and with packhorses — no vehicles can access the mountainous terrain," she wrote. "The expedition will require a lot of physical and mental resolve and will not be without risk but ultimately, I believe that the provision of medical treatment is of fundamental importance and that the effort is worth it in order to assist those that need it most."

UK pull out from Sangin

2010-07-16T15:39:00.001+01:00

There has been much discussion in the press about the British pull out from Sangin in early July. It was the area in which the UK suffered its heaviest losses; around 100 deaths since 2001. Though only having a tenth of British troops in Afghanistan, it contributed almost a third of total British military losses.

In some ways, the move seems entirely logical – even routine. The US has recently increased troops in Afghanistan by 30,000 which means that the ratio of British to US troops has shifted and so the ratio of responsibilities should shift too. Furthermore, British troops need to consolidate the gains they have made in Central Helmand and freeing up troops from Sangin would help do that.

However, there are some worrying things to be noted from this episode. The first is the reaction from the military itself; they were insistent that it be called a re-deployment, and not a retreat. In some ways, by vehemently claiming it was not a retreat, the military actually made it look more like a retreat. The phrase “methinks he doth protest too much” really comes to mind!

Another area for concern is that many of the problems faced by British troops in Sangin are similar in other areas of Afghanistan. The volatile mix of clans around Sangin highlighted the lack of planning in Britain’s venture, as they did not have the adequate knowledge to deal effectively with these local tribes. The difficult terrain required more British helicopters, which never came. Local militants, who knew the lay of the land, were able to kill British troops through mastering two tactics, the use of the sniper rifle and the use of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Asked about the vulnerability of British troops in Sangin, Brigadier George Norton said: “We are all vulnerable to IEDs, but the insurgents are increasingly using long-distance small arms.” Major General Gordon Messenger, the Ministry of Defence’s chief military spokesman, said Taliban-led insurgents were resorting to what he described as an “increasing use of single shots at range”. The issue is, if British troops couldn’t think of adequate tactics to deal with this type of insurgency in Sangin, how can we have much hope for the rest of Afghanistan?

Finally, the reaction of the Taliban to this is absolute delight. Over and above the physical workings of the war, the war to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans is raging. Afghan support for coalition troops is already very strained, not helped by the “collateral damage” by which thousands of Afghans have been killed. Now, what the Taliban will portray as a coalition failure, will further encourage ordinary Afghans to switch their allegiance; why wouldn’t they if they think the Coalition forces are beginning their retreat?

Rory Stewart: Afghanistan & Western Policymaking

2010-07-13T11:11:00.005+01:00

He was born in Hong Kong and raised in Malaysia. He recounts tales of ham and cheese sandwiches followed by raft building deep in the Malaysian wilderness - aged four years old. He served in the British Army as an officer and studied at Oxford University reading History and Philosophy. Since then he has enjoyed a prestigious career in the Foreign Office - working in places such as Kosovo and Indonesia. He has penned two critically acclaimed books. He has walked over 6000 miles in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India and Nepal. At the age of thirty he was made Deputy Governer in a province in Southern Iraq subsequent to the US-led invasion of Iraq. In academia he has excelled holding the distinguished Directorship of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. And in 2010 he was elected to the UK parliament.

His name, if you do not know yet, is Rory Stewart. And this is only a brief sketch of his career and life thus far. Incredibly he is only thirty-seven years old!

And his analysis of Western policymaking, in particular, the much heralded "Afpak Strategy" is at times powerful:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion

More and More die in lost war

2010-06-20T18:33:00.000+01:00

The number of deaths in Afghanistan have reached an all time high. More Western servicemen killed than ever before, bucking the seasonal trends. Not good news. According to the MEC analytical group:

According to the latest quarterly report on the situation by the Secretary General of the UN on 16 June (http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/400/06/PDF/N1040006.pdf?OpenElement ):

Overall, the number of security incidents increased significantly, compared to previous years and contrary to seasonal trends. This is attributable to an increase in military operations in the southern region during the first quarter of 2010 and to significant anti-government element activities in the south-east and eastern regions of Afghanistan . . .
The majority of incidents continue to involve armed clashes and improvised explosive devices, each accounting for one third of the reported incidents. The rise in incidents involving improvised explosive devices constitutes an alarming trend, with the first four months of 2010 recording a 94 per cent increase compared to the same period in 2009. Suicide attacks occur at a rate of about three per week, half of which occur in the southern region. Complex suicide attacks are recorded at roughly two per month, higher than the average of one complex attack per month during 2009. . .The shift to more complex suicide attacks demonstrates a growing capability of the local terrorist networks linked to Al-Qaida Insurgents followed up their threats against the civilian population with, on average, seven assassinations every week, the majority of which were conducted in the south and south-east regions. This constitutes a 45 per cent increase, compared to the same period in 2009. In the south, high-profile assassinations of civil servants, clerics and elders in Kandahar City (including the Deputy Mayor and the head of the Agriculture Cooperative Department) are aimed at establishing control over the urban population.

Ajmal Attacked

2010-05-30T19:02:00.001+01:00

Justin sends this disturbing news about our friend Ajmal:

To all concerned about CHIEF AJMAL KHAN

Further to email below from yesterday: see http://blog.freerangeinternational.com/. The article appears below the email.

Ajmal, unhurt despite his car seat being peppered with bullets, was ambushed for 45 minutes in Zazi Valley yesterday while in 18 vehicle convoy, a concerted attack causing casualties with viz rocket launchers and machine guns by Taliban with identifiable suicide bombers on the loose. The Police chief, who is supported by US and NATO, and forces stood idly by with involvement presumed for good reason. US military did not react and were ambushed later. Khan has no US hardware support while the perpetrators are well armed. Help requested re hardware and action on Police chief. Urgent. Khan’s number: 00 821 6444 27606.

The name of the Police Chief is Nabi.
Last night I received a call from my good friend Chief Ajmal Khan Azizi who had just escaped a serious Taliban ambush. As I reported in this post last February Chief Azizi had returned to his tribal homelands to coordinate with The Boss on reconstruction projects and to renew his pleading with the American army stationed in his area for support in battling the Taliban. Ajmal is a tribal chief as well as a Canadian citizen. He has gone hat in hand to London, Kabul and Washington DC to raise support for his beleaguered tribal area, and although he finds a sympathetic audience wherever he goes, what he never gets is a firm commitment to help. I am not the only one taking up his cause, The Boss has been working with the US Embassy in Kabul and Steven Pressfield published a multi part interview with Ajmal this year too.
Last night as Ajmal was moving through the town of Ali Khel near the Pakistan border, he was ambushed by a platoon of Pakistani Taliban. They recognized them as Pakistani’s due to their accents when the attackers shouted back and forth to each other during the 45 minute fight. As these things normally are the ambush was initiated with an IED explosion followed by small arms fire (SAF) and RPG’s. I talked with the chief of the Zazi Valley police, Amir Mohammad who said the Paki’s shot volley after volley from at least 6 RPG’s and they threw over 14 grenades during the fight. Ajmal called on the near by Afghan Border Police for help and they declined to intervene, so the ambush was not broken until Zazi Valley tribal police reinforcements showed up and drove the attackers back towards Pakistan. Ajmal lost a truck and had three men wounded. One of them was seriously wounded and was being transported to Kabul (a five hour drive) in order to get him proper medical care.

Getting worse

2010-05-01T00:04:00.001+01:00

Sobering words from a friend in Afghanistan:

Not sure how fast this country is heading further down the downward spiral but any rays of optimism are being blanketed by the multi-layered clouds of corruption, hypocrisy and dysfunctionality to name but a few. Sadly there is no western leadership, inspiration or hard handed determination to keep in check (let alone protect its citizens) or moderate the loose-canon of leadership here. Just think of this place as a war machine - chaos and dysfunctionality are the oil which keeps the machine rolling and as long as the machine is rolling pockets are being lined and bank balances swelled for the knights and the bishops playing this global game of chess - while the pawns are thrown around the table to sacrifice their lives in the name of freedom or fall further down the tunnel of poverty. This is a modern day Alice in Wonderland - the Dormouse of the West sleeps at the table of - the Tweedle Dums and Tweedle Dees of "diplomacy" continue to twiddle their thumbs while the Mad Hatter and King and Queen of Hearts execute their crazy dance around the kingdom of insanity - the Caterpillar smokes his hookah of magic mushrooms and "embedded" media reporter Alice is on a permanent high as she takes "trips" down the tunnel baffled by all the madness around her - - and for those who have faith in the existance of the the illusiary White Rabbit of Resolution they now begin to question whether it exists or not. Meanwhile the Machinary of War continues to churn out it conveyor belt of profits.

There is no honor in this country as it stands now - sadly the only honor we acknowledge is measured in human sacrifice as we watch the corteges crawling through the streets of Wootton Bassett honouring the young fallen Brits - or wtiness the same in some small town in Georgia or Alabama - or France - or Italy or Germany. What about the poor innocent Afghan villagers - men women and children slaughtered by the Taliban - or young girls getting gassed in their school by "enlightened" Taliban intent on denying women any degree of human rights or - whole villahes blown to bits by errant "drone"missiles. Who will honor them in this Afghan war machine? Meanwhile while the fat-cats getting fatter and fatter and continue to lick the ever increasing amount of cream accumulating round their greedy mouths.

So much for the dreams of Afghanistan - as perceived by a cynical old curmudgeon.

The 256th soldier to die!!

2010-02-10T16:08:00.009Z

The Independent on Feb 9th seems to make us aware that there are contradictory messages coming from Afghanistan. This death toll is more than the no. killed in the 1982 Falklands war.

Gen Stanley McChrystal the US commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan is aiming to retake Marjah which is now in Taliban hands; he wanted the citizens to know that an Afghan Government will be there to replace the Taliban. But the Taliban are not going to leave without a fight. They said that they would "defeat the infidel invader". They also have brave international Mujahedin behind them.

Mahar now looks empty; most of the families have now gone, but as a farmer says: he has no money to leave with his family and cannot move them to safety.

With accusations being levelled at MI5 today Feb; and there are prisoners at Guantanamo Bay that "committed suicide" simultaneously by hanging themselves in their cells, yet the cells are checked every 10 minutes, with 5 guards for 28 prisoners but the bodies weren't discovered for two hours!

Lord Newburger cited that MI5 must have known about the treatment and torture of Binyam Mohamed with apparently all those condoning this treatment. The trials go on and the public get more and more disillusioned with the institutions that they had trusted for so many years.
We are from a first world country, but how will the Afghans be able to trust the US, UK,China and the big powers.

The Insurgency

2010-01-14T22:51:00.006Z

There is a disturbing element to this insurgency. In 2010 more Afghans are dying in their country's dispute than anytime since 2001. This is due to the Taliban's use of roadside bombs. This contradicts the fact that the Afghans are less in conflict with them than the imposed forces of the US, UN and NATO. The UN, stated that at least 2,412 civilians were killed last year and a further 3,566 wounded as a direct result of the war between Taliban led insurgents and the Western backed government. A friend who is a traveller in the area is quick to point out that the Afghans, apart from their treatment of women, admire what the Taliban are doing on the ground getting electricity working, but "These suicide attacks and roadside bombs most often kill innocent Afghans, not international forces," a human rights advocate said. "This is not the way of Islam and is against international law. This disregard for lives, must stop."

A vindication of US General Stanley McChrystal's policy of restricting the use of air strikes, even so 359 were still killed in air strikes. He told President Karzai that everything would be done to protect civilians. Yet he is the architect of a troop surge, that will see 37,000 more foreign soldiers arrive in Afghanistan this year, and this will certainly result in more violence and deaths.

Carnage in Afghanistan-again.

2010-01-06T14:50:00.006Z

Balawi was seen as a devout but an aloof Muslim and he told his family that he was going to visit his second wife in Turkey to continue his studies as a doctor, before he returned to Afghanistan. He was recruited in Jordan and managed to lure the CIA officers into a meeting at a gym at Base Chapman with promise that he would reveal the top men in Al Queda.
He detonated himself at this meeting killing all there, amongst the 6 CIA men was a cousin of the son of the late President of Jordan.

The Total Mounts

2010-01-04T15:43:00.003Z

Watson a bomb dispersal expert was killed on New Year's Eve by a Taliban bomb. His death took to 108 the forces that have died in this conflict. But a few days ago, I believe as we speak the total has gone up to 110. I see in the Independant today Jan 4th that a Canadian platoon has already taken part in offering the Afghan forces support as two months ago 5 British soldiers were gunned down by a Afghan Policeman they were mentoring, it was reported in The Times he was called Golbadein. It must have proved difficult to inspire confidence in the troops with this happening!

The way the Afghan war is likely to go is for US President Barack Obama and the British Prime Minister and other heads of govenment to meet and discuss the issue as all believe that Afghanisation should take place. An agreement between Mr Brown and Hamid Karzai is expected after his recent visit in London.

The first headquarters would be in the Kandahar province, General Shir Mohammed Zazai, working alongside Major General Nick Carter, in charge of 45,000 UK, US and other NATO forces in Southern Afghanistan. We shall be in a supporting role to the Afghan forces.

I hear today there is a demonstration at Wooten Bassett against the forces families that show so much respect for all the soldiers that give their lives and whether you believe that they should or shouldn't be there, you can understand that this is a powder-keg about to go off!!

The elephant is down

2009-12-04T16:33:00.001Z

Jonathon sent this: From The Times : December 4, 2009

Barack Obama’s plan is seriously flawed. We need more

By Paddy Ashdown

The Taleban’s favourite phrase in recent months has been: “The elephant is down, now all we have to do is slay it.” The best thing about this week’s Obama speech was that they now know the elephant is not down; it is engaging the fight with renewed strength, determination and vigour. The Taleban are now under real pressure in northern Pakistan and, with the right resources, the right leadership and the right military strategy on the ground, we now have a chance to begin to turn the military tide in Afghanistan. So is this enough for success (however limited your definition)? The answer is no. The Obama speech gave us was a military plan — but not yet a political one. It was, in short, necessary, but not sufficient.
When General Stanley McChrystal sent his proposal to the President, it included a carefully integrated plan for both the military (broadly, an extra 30,000 troops and a focus on protecting the people, not chasing the enemy) and the political aspect. The speech contained the first but was almost silent on the second. Perhaps this is still to come. But if it is not, then what we have heard so far will not be enough. What the President intended was for audiences in the US and Afghanistan to hear different things. His message to the domestic audience was supposed to be “troops home in 18 months” and to the Taleban, “30,000 extra troops”. My worry is that the wrong people got the wrong message. What the US heard was “30,000 more troops” while what the Taleban heard was “in 18 months, they’ll be gone”. The Taleban commander Mullah Omar once famously said: “They may have the watches, but we have the time.” I fear we may have inadvertently given volume to that message. I understand the temptation of timelines and exit strategies for those who have to win domestic support. But they also tell our enemies how long they have to wait before we give up. It is far better to deal with these things through milestones rather than timelines. For instance we could set milestones for the growth and professionalisation of the Afghan Army and police, set target times for them to be delivered and, as they are, hand over our functions to Afghan structures and pull out as we do so. In Bosnia, we formulated this into a Mission Implementation Plan, a public document that served not just to hold us to key tasks, but also to provide accountability to our political masters. A mission implementation plan for Afghanistan, capable of being debated in national parliaments at home and providing a visible road map of progress for Afghans as well, is a better way to gain public support than artificial deadlines that, in the case of July 2011, look to me almost undeliverable. It is not difficult to see why the President felt that he needed, for domestic purposes, to say that withdrawal would start in July 2011. But this does not make it right. Other elements of the strategy were also either missing or too lightly glossed over. First and foremost, there was nothing about the absolute necessity to ensure that, at last and after six damaging years of muddle, the tower of Babel that is the international community in Afghanistan will now work to a single plan, act on a single set of priorities and speak with a single voice. It is the absence of this, more than anything else that has caused our failures and cost us so many lives. The only person whose authority is powerful enough to bash international heads together and make this happen is the US President. Yet there was nothing of this in his speech. Second, what political element there was in the President's speech seemed to rely still on the belief that President Karzai is reformable and will reform. Some might think this a triumph of hope over experience. Of course we cannot change Afghanistan’s newly elected President; of course we have no option but to support him. But that does not mean we need to pile all our eggs into this rather rickety basket. One of the impediments to success in Afghanistan is that we have been trying to force a Western-style centralised constitution on to a country whose traditions have been tribal and local for 1,000 years. This is a golden opportunity to begin to shift the weight of our effort away from strengthening Kabul, to building up governance from the bottom. This would at once give us a political strategy that runs with, rather than against, the grain of Afghan society, while creating the best context for a serious programme of reconciliation with the tribally based Taleban. Taleban reconciliation was mentioned in the President's speech — but only with a single, almost off-hand, remark. Yet this was a main plank of the McChrystal strategy. We need to be clear here. Taleban reconciliation is not an easy option to hard fighting. It may always be possible to split the oddly low-level Taleban commander away with a bag of gold or the promise of a job. But serious negotiation with a Taleban prepared to put aside the gun in favour of pursuing constitutional means will never come while they think — with justification — that they are winning on the battlefield. But if in the next year or so we can begin to turn this around we will need a serious, thought-through, heavyweight programme to bring those Taleban who will lay aside the gun for the ballot box into the fold. And that needs to be much more clearly laid out now if it is to have significant impact and be properly prepared for — especially among non-Pashtun Afghans who regard such an approach with deep suspicion. I had also hoped to see, in the President’s speech a clear statement of a wider regional strategy that would include not just Pakistan but also Iran, India, and maybe even Russia and China. Without this, success will be much more difficult. One other thing struck me about this week’s speech. The old Obama so famously comfortable in his own skin, seemed distinctly uncomfortable in that of a war leader. Gordon Brown, too, looks especially miserable talking of conflict. I do not think either feels comfortable with this — and who would? We all understand that our Prime Minister will never be Henry V before Agincourt. But the US President has formidable gifts of oratory and he will need to deploy them more confidently, if he is to pull this one off. As my colleague Nick Clegg has said, you cannot win a war on half horsepower. Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon was the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia

Four Ways to Fix Afghanistan Without Guns

2009-12-03T23:30:00.003Z

Robin sent this in:

Once before, Clare Lockhart was charged with rebuilding Afghanistan. Now, as the new administration sends her — and 30,000 troops — back there, she has a new plan. Read more: http://www.esquire.com/features/best-and-brightest-2009/clare-lockhart-1209#ixzz0YfhrgRRU

99th and counting!!

2009-11-30T20:47:00.000Z

In the Independant this Monday 30th Nov the news stated that one more soldier had died in the Helmand provance and the army were fearing defeat at home. Today Obama promised
that the US would go from 68,000 to 100,000 and the President walked round Fort Hood shaking hands with the young soldiers as these would be going out, Cape Hood which was where the medic Psychiatrist suddenly turned his gun on 10 soldiers and himself as he was expected to go to Afghanistan the next day, and it was thought that he was a muslim and the presence of the US army in Afghanistan really insenced him, the true reason we shall never know.
General Stanley McCrystal the commanding officer said that it was not going to be easy and he hoped that their stay wouldn't be too long!!

Afghan equivalent of "Pop Idol"

2009-11-19T17:27:00.004Z

I was horrified to hear of the death of Sheema who it was alleged had 'committed suicide' or was it a mercy killing? I don't think her sister could bring herself to say what had happened although she was able to say that they were all pleased that she had taken her own life as it made it easier for the family!! I just wonder how much pressure she was under to make a statement like that

.

The 98th this year

2009-11-19T12:04:00.003Z

Do we we have to wait until we reach 100 of young men killed in Afghanistan, which the public are becoming insensed by, as they felt the war was never legitimate.
John Simpson and Menzies Campbell on Newsweek last night were quite disparaging about the way things were going, but they felt that still the public were behind them, but is this only the milatary families? As in Babaji again an area of Helmand province, I have heard that the Afghans find it a very disquieting area. This area is as large as Northern Ireland, and to look for suicide bombers would be a time consuming job, I saw in the Metro on the 11th that 2 TA's were still waiting for their body armour Rifleman Andrew Fentiman and Cpl Loren Marlton-Thomas both died in a bomb blast, his commanding Officer said that Fentman was one of the most irrepressable and positive junior commanders that he had met.
Amidst this milatary furore the Afghans have not lost their sense of humour and glued to ther sets to see "Zang- e- Khatar" "The Alarm Bell" a show about the Political tribulations going on in Afghanistan!! "The Daily Show" is trying to show Hamid Karzi being inaugerated today (19th) in front of foreign dignitories. The incessant bickering is too much for Karzi, it would appear that he is trying to strangle the US ambassador!
"Alarm Bell" is shown every Weds and Ahmad Fawad, a shop keeper, says it's our custom to watch it every week,
and he says "Our Goverment is weak and Alarm Bell tells the people what is going on!"

A young female MP said Politicians ignore the programme but they should pay more attention!!

Princess Zohra praises Nato

2009-11-17T22:12:00.002Z

Our friend Princess Zohra has been speaking on the 60th anniversary of Nato. She said:

My name is Zohra Mahmoud Ghazi and Afghanistan is my homeland.

I hold no personal nor political ambition.

My contribution tonight is inspired by my grandfather, Sardar Naim Khan, (brother of Sardar Daoud Khan, the first President of Afghanistan) who’s thoughts and beliefs have motivated me through my whole life.

Being one of four daughters and a son, not once did I feel like a second class citizen to my brother. Education and aspirations for our futures were of equal importance.

Thirty years ago, Afghanistan was a functioning State evolving but the roots were cut from under us. Even in our state of chaos today, the determination of the young to be a part of the world community is thriving.

Nato’s contribution in Afghanistan can bring the stability to unify the country. This can also be achieved whilst recognising its tribal history and the ability of its women, who are resilient, proud and a valuable asset for the county’s future development.

Afghans as a whole understand good motives;

No Afghan family has escaped tragedy, and so no Afghan underestimates the importance of Nato’s commitment to long-term peace.

Gordon Brown takes on Karzi

2009-11-06T15:54:00.010Z

Gordon Brown met Karzi yesterday the 6th Nov, and said that his government was too corrupt and would loose international support if he failed to improve it's performance, this I would suggest as his brother is a major figure in the drugs trade it was suggested in a news paper this October and a position was held for him in this government, now Brown is tightening the screws and telling him to clear up the parliament. General Aminullah Amarkhail, the former head of security at Kabul airport was sacked for his succsess in arresting heroin smugglers he says you have to pay £6,000 in bribes to get a job as a chief of police any where on the border! Between 10,000 and 15,000 Afghan Police have been killed in the past 5 years 4 times more likely to be killed than their military counterparts, not surprising that recruitment is at a whole time low. Curruptiom is rife and Nadine Ghouri says in the Guardian on 7th Nov senior officers commonly pay a fee to secure promotions, the more senior the post the higher the upfront fee.

It is difficult with this scale of corruption going on what possibily can Karsi do? Abdullah Abdullah has pulled out of the run as he felt the initial election was fraudulent, does this have an echo of Iran about it and I believe an individual took on Ayatollah Kamini and with a telephone conversation.

Taliban moves to terrorise guests in suicide attack

2009-10-29T21:40:00.009Z

On Oct 28th it was reported that The Taliban struck in Kabul, friends that we know living there were amazed what a well operated action it was! The attackers, clad in suicide vests and armed with grenades and machine guns struck at dawn on the 28th. six UN staff died in the two hour fire fight that followed.

Orla Guerin was in South Wazaristan on news at 10 tonight and she was able to see the mountains where Hackney Mullah and the village of Kot Kai where he oversees the Taliban in the country. What can we possible do with such an organisation? What they are doing is playing through fear and suggesting that they do not allow the education of women.

Newspapers are running the story that Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali Karzai was on the CIA payroll for years a suspected player in the country's opium trade and was paid over 8 years for services including helping to recruit an Afghan paramilitary force as was reported in a US paper.
There was a warning that anyone working on the Nov 7th run off election was at risk.

Courage in Afghanistan

2009-10-23T12:40:00.002+01:00

A man that was injured 11 weeks ago was so inspirational and with such bad injuries that even the Duchess of Cornwall who visited Headley Court yesterday Oct 22nd, was overwhelmed. She saw Rifleman Craig Wood who was just 18 and had been blown up by the Taliban on his first patrol. Losing three limbs and having 27 pints of blood he was given only a 50% chance of survival but he is facing this horrendous injury with an awe inspiring determination. He is able to say to his girlfriend that sometimes he wakes up and starts crying. "I have to make the best of it! I have lost a number of good colleagues, I know how lucky I am, in a way"

That "in a way" resounds through that article. In this mad war, who is going to remember Craig Wood, but his family and friends and the celebreties that saw him.

Now Karsai has accepted the two man presidential battle so he will take on Abdullah Abdullah after the UN found that hundreds and thousands of votes were fake. The contest will be on Novenber 7th. One hopes that that will go off with not too much bloodshed. The same paper reveals that the US are undermining Pakistan's offensive against the Taliban abandoning border posts and allowing them through to South Waziristan.

These Afghan men and women are fighting for their existence. There are some who would like a "Loya Jurga" in Afghanistan or to bring Journalists over to the UK. It would be great to keep these doors of communication open, so that the population would not feel so marginilised.

Where do we go from here?

2009-10-04T18:44:00.005+01:00

This is a really muddling situation, which Obama is trying to see his way through, as Andrew Sullivan states in his article this Sunday October 4th will he send the extra troops? which some members of the senate are all for, but the American public is not certain of and there is a lot riding on this decision and a lot of lives that could be lost.

Now, with him just being awarded a Nobel peace prize very unexpectedly "what has he done" I hear you ask? It's just two months since he took over. Well I am sure that his stance about the nuclear issue has helped - and he is all for more countries to disarm, and he wants to distance himself from the Bush premiership. He calls for more countries to unite and made the pivotal speech to the Muslims in Cairo saying that the US were holding out a hand of friendship.

Now Leitifa (which is a pseudonym) has written "My Forbidden Face" about her growing up in Kabul unable to go to Kabul university as the Taliban did not agree with women being educated and to become a journalist and was able to publish her book. She comes from a well educated family with parents both working, her mother a doctor and her father running an export business.

I don't think we can know what she must have gone through to write this book, we from a "democratic" country without the fear of being arrested by the Taliban for being a woman walking about outside without being in the presence of a man either a husband or a relative.

Nadir gets the Turban

2009-09-26T17:27:00.005+01:00

The Pashtun tribe from which the Afghan royals come have chosen their leader. At a tribal gathering they placed the turban on HRH Prince Nadir Naim.

Is this the end of the Taliban?

2009-09-21T17:08:00.004+01:00

It was reported in The Independant on Mon Sept 21st from Islamabad that the infamous Sher Mohammed Qasab was captured in a raid at Mingora, he was wounded and his three sons were killed. A military spokesman said "He was severely wounded and succumbed to his wounds early this morning." Another Military Official said the death of Qasab who killed many civilians, policemen and troops would reassure the residents of the tourist valley that the "Taliban were finished!" Pakistani troops have made significent gains against the militants in their Swat offensive after Taliban advances raised fears for the nuclear armed Pakistan future and contributed to a slide in investor confidence.

Maybe the Taliban have just moved across the border into Afghanistan.

There is in the Helmand province a couple of buildings known as "Rose Cottage" here 60 soldiers are making the "final journey" home, as this has been the deadliest summer of the British forces time in Afghanistan. A couple of soldiers with decades of experience between them have been in charge of the army's morgue, this must have been one of the most depressing jobs.

Could this be because of the British soldier unlike the U. S. soldier does not have armour to cover their groin and neck. A senior surgeon said that "We have seen a lot of groin and neck injuries in U.K. not otherwise seen in US Marines because of this piece of equipment" Wheras the US Kevlar is a lighter body armour and has the important groin plate and they have modular neck and shoulder protection!!

It is not a lot to ask that in giving there lives for this cause they have the resouces to finish the job.

Helmand Province

2009-09-17T12:19:00.004+01:00

This troubled area with occasional Suicide bombers (though 80% of the deaths amongst allied armed forces are from IEDs) in fact on the 17th of Sept a member of our forces in the Gereshk district died in a blast on foot patrol in southern Afghanistan. The Afghans from this area have banded together and driven the Taliban out just as the British did in the Civil War in the fourteenth century. As in Northern Ireland and The Balkans it takes the people to say NO. Think of the children, mothers and fathers even in this country with the MPs etc taking a huge whack of bonuses as a golden handshake! Northern Rock and the Lehman Brothers - what did they ever do for humanity? I am sure they would say that they individually may have done a lot, but the public perception of them is dubious.

These families in the Hellman province just want recognition from the West, as there is life after Poppies. Unfortunately Kasai and his brother are implicated by this and Kasai has given prominent roles to members of his family.

A soldier who comes from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment died in Selly Oak Birmingham and I hear today that 16 were killed the in area today - they were the Italian soldiers who were killed.

Meanwhile, as Kasai says the elections were a success, the soft spoken Grant Kipper a Canadian working as a member of the UN, is not so sure.

NCF Afghanistan Working Group Report

2009-09-17T12:13:00.010+01:00

The Afghanistan Working Group has recently finished this policy paper after a meeting a few weeks ago. In this brief paper we address the central problem of state credibility (which Karzai has been complicit in destroying), call for better military and economic aid coordination and a re-thought strategy of governance that concentrates on local, rather than central, systems.

We hope you find our ideas interesting and we look forward to any feedback that you can provide.

Afghanistan:

Forging Credibility

The fundamental aim of Western intervention in Afghanistan is to establish long-term stability and pave the way for economic and human development.

Corruption is the most pressing issue in Afghanistan. Endemic corruption invalidates state credibility. In order for Afghanistan to move towards stability and peace, the state must gain the faith of its citizens. This requires urgent reform of the political and bureaucratic leadership.

Western policy in Afghanistan should focus on developing a credible government that reverses corruption and captures the faith of the Afghan people and foreign investors. This credibility will provide a foundation:

(1) For an Afghan security strategy that delivers safety and stability at a local level

(2) For a co-ordinated national economic development strategy delivered at grassroots level.

By a coordinated effort, the US and UK governments could steer a reformed Afghan administration towards combating corruption rather than proliferating it.

This paper is divided into four parts that provide recommended guidelines for Western policy

Part 1: Diplomatic Leverage to develop Afghan state credibility

I. Development of a strategy, supported by a unified international community, of diplomatic leverage to co-opt the existing Afghan state to clear out its corrupt leaders.

A. Convene a national loya jirga to select replacement ministers that fit agreed criteria of transparency and credibility.

B. “Sticks”: Hard-line measures to force the Afghan administration into action.

1. Threaten to withhold all international community donations from the Afghan government.

2. Threaten to place the ANSF under direct ISAF command.

3. Threaten to withdraw the support which organisations such as OPIC currently give to private sector investors in Afghanistan.[1]

4. Raise the possibility of terminating all reconstruction efforts currently administered through governmental organizations (USAID, NATO, UN, etc.)

C. “Carrots”: Strong incentives for investment in Afghanistan as it becomes increasingly credible.

1. Technical and other assistance in the development of markets and financial institutions

2. Provide contracts to Afghan firms on a preferential basis if they can provide transparent accounting and results

Part 2: Localized governance to play to Afghanistan’s strengths

I. Afghanistan’s strong tradition of local governance should be better supported as a governance development strategy.

A. The Taliban initially gained, and is gaining, support because it offers “justice” with an alacrity that Western courts cannot within a familiar socio-religious context.

B. Local governance allows the population to better monitor its officials and reduces the potential of corruption by middlemen.

C. Local security should increasingly be put into the hands of local people, in coordination with the ANSF, similar to the lashkar model in Pakistan.

Part 3: International coordination to maximize military effectiveness

I. NATO and non-NATO troop contributing countries should formally agree upon one unified chain of command. This should include US forces who currently operate within a parallel command structure as Operation Enduring Freedom.

II. Concurrent with the streamlining of the ISAF command structure, a coherent and clear nationwide counter-insurgency strategy should be developed. This strategy must increase the prevalence of “clear-hold-build” provincial reconstruction teams and emphasize reconstruction and development.

III. The performance of private contractors in training the ANSF should be completely re-evaluated company by company on the basis of results achieved.

Part 4: Economic frameworks for sustainable development

I. Aid Coordination

A. All aid should be channelled by means of an “Aid Council for Afghanistan” which will co-ordinate the work of both government and non-governmental organizations.

B. Donors should work with local governments to develop a long-term strategy for aid application.

II. More use could be made of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the “clear-hold-build” strategy as a tool for economic development. Potentially, PRTs could operate in a role essentially subordinate to local Afghan government, creating a more joined-up approach to reconstruction.

III. Using ISAF and ANSF resources, secure commercial hubs to encourage growth. This is in parallel to, but separate from PRT activities.

IV. Consider using opium licensing and export strategies, such as the Senlis Council’s Poppy for Medicine proposal, to allow farmers to transition smoothly into a licit economy.

[1] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an agency of the U.S. government. OPIC helps U.S. businesses invest overseas, fosters economic development in new and emerging markets, complements the private sector in managing risks associated with foreign direct investment, and supports U.S. foreign policy.

A million and a half fraudulent votes

2009-09-15T17:43:00.003+01:00

The local Afghan UN people are under presssure from UN New York not to make too much of a fuss over the Karzai vote fraud. Makes you sick the way those nasty little UN people are about to manipulate democracy for their own ends again. They did it in Iraq. Now Afghanistan. The UN are part of the problem not the solution - but at least in this instance they are honorable at grass roots level.

Ballots from 10% of polling stations in Afghanistan's presidential vote need to be recounted because of indications of fraud, a top election official says.

Taliban now controls Afghanistan

2009-09-12T18:34:00.000+01:00

The support for more war in Afghanistan is waning fast amongst the democrats. House speaker Nancy Pelosi said, "I don't think there's a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan in the country or in the Congress."

Meanwhile, an organisation which Rupert was closely involved with at one time says the Taliban have a significant presence in almost every corner of Afghanistan, as the country lurches into political uncertainty after a disputed presidential election. A political standoff has deepened since the August 20 poll, with a U.N.-backed election watchdog invalidating some votes and ordering a partial recount amid widespread accusations of fraud. The uncertainty coincides with the most violent period since the Taliban were toppled by U.S.-backed Afghan forces in 2001, with record military and civilian deaths testing the resolve of U.S. and European leaders.

The Taliban now has a permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, according to a new map released today by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS). According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity. Taken together, these figures show that the Taliban has a significant presence in virtually all of Afghanistan.

Are the elections making ethnic divides more entrenched?

2009-09-01T11:05:00.000+01:00

Afghanistan’s elections were clearly far from free and fair. The biggest consequence of this largely symbolic act of “democracy” is the construction of a wider barrier between ethnic groups.

As the new government comes in nobody will really know if the results actually reflect the choices of voters. Furthermore, the scores of people who stayed home due to threats from insurgents had no say in the new government either. No administration that has been elected in such a fashion can enjoy the faith of the people.

The victor, mired in an environment of fraud and illegitimacy, will have a significant credibility problem. As a Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/world_agenda/article6810814.ece) article explains, no result coming from these elections will be seen as legitimate.

Karzai’s campaign has been accused of massive corruption in the electoral process and will be seen as completely fraudulent, diminishing any credibility Karzai’s government has acquired with non-Pashtuns in the north.

Karzai has diminished support from Pashtuns as well, thus, he has alienated both ethnic groups. Thus, a Karzai government will not only lack ethnic support from any group, it will be even weaker and illegitimate than it is now and therefore clearly unable to reconcile ethnic issues.

On the other hand, if the election monitors find evidence of widespread fraud, the numbers may turn out in Abdullah’s favor. Again, this resulting government will have minimal legitimacy among ethnic Pashtuns, leaving them feeling relatively deprived of a say in government.

Historically, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, governments unable to make credible commitments to the population as a whole tend to fall into a system where only specific elites from certain sectors of the population enjoy commitments, or benefits, from the government. Some portions of the population will then be relatively excluded from state services than others – the victor’s supporters will be reaping the benefits while the opposition will see little to no benefits from the new administration.

Before this occurs, the new administration will be presented with a very difficult choice. It will have to renege on any campaign promises it may have made in order to enter into new commitments with opposition parties to build the faith of other certain ethnic groups in the state.

If the new administration does not happen, any work to blur the lines of sectarian division done to date will be erased by further mobilization along ethnic lines. This may not spell the end for Afghanistan, but it will certainly be a step backwards in the nation-building process.

The West loses the elections

2009-08-22T15:41:00.000+01:00

The Pashtun insurgency in Southern Pakistan and Afghanistan is gathering force and the Western forces suffer blow after blow. The Pashtuns are even attacking Nato convoys now. Meanwhile the elections are a catastrophe. Turnout is 5% in Southern Afghanistan. Only the Northern Alliance are voting and they are all voting for Abdulleh Abdullah (a.k.a. Abdullah Rockety for his own exploits as an insurgent when the invaders were the Russians rather than the Anglo-Americans). Having said which Karzai, arguably the most corrupt man on the planet and the West's puppet, will undoubtedly win. He'll fix it. Which means that unless someone shoots him the West is doomed because he's proved incompetent. Corrupt we don't mind. Incompetent is intollerable.

The War We Can't Win

2009-08-11T21:47:00.000+01:00

Jonathan writes:

The problems with Bacevich’s article start with the premise of his title – that wars like Afghanistan and Iraq can be won. They can be lost, but they cannot be won – however, prudent use of military force can make it possible to resolve the conflicts by other means. Britain did not win in Northern Ireland, but the Army did ultimately make possible a settlement, once large parts of both communities were tired enough of war to accept the solution on offer. There are lots of Afghans who are equally tired of war.

The ‘graveyard of empires’ story is a common story about Afghanistan, but it is just a story, and one that tells as much about the teller as the subject. By repeating it, Bacevich is engaging in a selective reading of history which ignores both most of the history of counter-insurgency operations and the differences between the Anglo-American presence in Afghanistan and earlier invaders. If we are seen as occupiers today, it is a self-inflicted wound, and one that can be healed. Much of Afghanistan welcomed us as liberators in 2001 and even today Pashtun tribal chiefs tell me they don’t want American troops to leave: ‘We trust you more than Karzai.’

Like Bacevich, I opposed the Iraq invasion before the fact, but now it is hard to put the toothpaste back in the tube. When it was announced, I thought the surge was too little, too late, but I was overly pessimistic. Changes in operating doctrine and the Sunni awakening did bring results out of proportion to the modest increase in U.S. troops. One consequence of the surge was that we gained leverage with Maliki, and were able to moderate his Shia particularism. With the announcement of our departure, that leverage has been lost. All parties in Iraq are jockeying for position in life after the Americans. Since we will not be there they no longer listen to us. In 2006 I thought that partition, or at best a loose confederacy, might be the only way to deal with Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions. In 12 to 18 months partition might be looking attractive again.

Bacevich argues for relying on Afghanistan’s tribal leadership to keep out terrorists. ‘Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. ‘ In fact, this is exactly what the ethno-counter-insurgents (Kilcullen, Nagl, Malkasian, et al) propose, and it also at the foundation of my own proposals for building an Afghan state locality-province-nation. It is not clear, though, when Bacevich talks about ‘…who actually run Afghanistan…’ he actually means the tribal chiefs, or the warlords. The warlords may not run the country, but, empowered by Karzai, who depends on them for support, and to some extent by various coalition powers, they do run (and rob) the government. While sampling of Afghan public opinion is uncertain, the evidence we have is that the warlords are deeply unpopular and a large majority of Afghans want them not just removed from power, but brought to justice.

It is true that in many areas tribal leaders do exercise considerable power on a local level, and it is possible to work with them to rid their communities of insurgents and foreign terrorists, the incentives to get them to do that usually begin with a western security presence to keep them alive and continue on to rural development programmes (which can only be implemented with a security presence). Nevertheless, realise that tribal chiefs have much less authority to make unilateral decisions than do their counterparts in Iraq, and the tribes in many regions have been weakened by a generation of war, destruction, and displacement, and have lost a lot of power to the warlords.

The real question about Iraq and Afghanistan is not what the U.S. Army has learned about counter-insurgency, but what it has learned about learning. If the lessons of Iraq about the relevance of classical counter-insurgency doctrine to our post-9/11 conflicts in the Middle East become a new orthodoxy, a recipe which can be used again and again at different times in different places, then we have learned nothing about learning ande we will fail in Afghanistan. But if we treat the lessons as a set of principles which must be adapted and applied in light of local conditions (the message of the ethno-counter-insurgents), then we have a way forward.
The War We Can't Win
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:22:51 -0400
CommonwealVolume CXXXVI, Number 14 The War We Can’t Win
Afghanistan & the Limits of American Power
Andrew J. Bacevich
History deals rudely with the pretensions of those who presume to determine its course. In an American context, this describes the fate of those falling prey to the Wilsonian Conceit. Yet the damage done by that conceit outlives its perpetrators.From time to time, in some moment of peril or anxiety, a statesman appears on the scene promising to eliminate tyranny, ensure the triumph of liberty, and achieve permanent peace. For a moment, the statesman achieves the status of prophet, one who in his own person seemingly embodies the essence of the American purpose. Then reality intrudes, exposing the promises as costly fantasies. The prophet’s followers abandon him. Mocked and reviled, he is eventually banished—perhaps to some gated community in Dallas.Yet however brief his ascendancy, the discredited prophet leaves behind a legacy. Most obvious are the problems created and left unresolved, commitments made and left unfulfilled, debts accrued and left unpaid. Less obvious, but for that reason more important, are the changes in perception.The prophet recasts our image of reality. Long after his departure, remnants of that image linger and retain their capacity to beguile: consider how the Wilsonian vision of the United States as crusader state called upon to redeem the world in World War I has periodically resurfaced despite Woodrow Wilson’s own manifest failure to make good on that expectation. The prophet declaims and departs. Yet traces of his testimony, however at odds with the facts, remain lodged in our consciousness.So it is today with Afghanistan, the conflict that George W. Bush began, then ignored, and finally bequeathed to his successor. Barack Obama has embraced that conflict as “the war we must win.” Those who celebrated Bush’s militancy back in the intoxicating days when he was promising to rid the world of evil see Obama’s enthusiasm for pressing on in Afghanistan as a vindication of sorts. They are right to do so.The misguided and mismanaged global war on terror reduced Bush’s presidency to ruin. The candidate whose run for high office derived its energy from an implicit promise to repudiate all that Bush had wrought now seems intent on salvaging something useful from that failed enterprise—even if that means putting his own presidency at risk. When it comes to Afghanistan, Obama may be singing in a different key, but to anyone with an ear for music—especially for military marches—the melody remains intact.Candidate Obama once derided the notion that the United States is called upon to determine the fate of Iraq. President Obama expresses a willingness to expend untold billions—not to mention who knows how many lives—in order to determine the fate of Afghanistan. Liberals may have interpreted Obama’s campaign pledge to ramp up the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan as calculated to insulate himself from the charge of being a national-security wimp. Events have exposed that interpretation as incorrect. It turns out—apparently—that the president genuinely views this remote, landlocked, primitive Central Asian country as a vital U.S. national-security interest.What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny.Tune in to the Sunday talk shows or consult the op-ed pages and you might conclude otherwise. Those who profess to be in the know insist that the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. The events of September 11, 2001, ostensibly occurred because we ignored Afghanistan. Preventing the recurrence of those events, therefore, requires that we fix the place.Yet this widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures in the nation’s airports. The national-security apparatus wasn’t paying attention—indeed, it ignored or downplayed all sorts of warning signs, not least of all Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States. Consumed with its ABC agenda—“anything but Clinton” was the Bush administration’s watchword in those days—the people at the top didn’t have their eye on the ball. So we let ourselves get sucker-punched. Averting a recurrence of that awful day does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries like Afghanistan. Rather, it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses.Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary, it’s also likely to prove impossible. Not for nothing has the place acquired the nickname Graveyard of Empires. Of course, Americans, insistent that the dominion over which they preside does not meet the definition of empire, evince little interest in how Brits, Russians, or other foreigners have fared in attempting to impose their will on the Afghans. As General David McKiernan, until just recently the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, put it, “There’s always an inclination to relate what we’re doing with previous nations,” adding, “I think that’s a very unhealthy comparison.” McKiernan was expressing a view common among the ranks of the political and military elite: We’re Americans. We’re different. Therefore, the experience of others does not apply.Of course, Americans like McKiernan who reject as irrelevant the experience of others might at least be willing to contemplate the experience of the United States itself. Take the case of Iraq, now bizarrely trumpeted in some quarters as a “success” and even more bizarrely seen as offering a template for how to turn Afghanistan around.Much has been made of the United States Army’s rediscovery of (and growing infatuation with) counterinsurgency doctrine, applied in Iraq beginning in late 2006 when President Bush announced his so-called surge and anointed General David Petraeus as the senior U.S. commander in Baghdad. Yet technique is no substitute for strategy. Violence in Iraq may be down, but evidence of the promised political reconciliation that the surge was intended to produce remains elusive. America’s Mesopotamian misadventure continues.Pretending that the surge has redeemed the Iraq war is akin to claiming that when Andy Jackson “caught the bloody British in the town of New Orleans” he thereby enabled the United States to emerge victorious from the War of 1812. Such a judgment works well as folklore but ignores an abundance of contrary evidence.Six-plus years after it began, Operation Iraqi Freedom has consumed something like a trillion dollars—with the meter still running—and has taken the lives of more than forty-three hundred American soldiers. Meanwhile, in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities, car bombs continue to detonate at regular intervals, killing and maiming dozens. Anyone inclined to put Iraq in the nation’s rearview mirror is simply deluded. Not long ago General Raymond Odierno, Petraeus’s successor and the fifth U.S. commander in Baghdad, expressed the view that the insurgency in Iraq is likely to drag on for an-other five, ten, or fifteen years. Events may well show that Odierno is an optimist.Given the embarrassing yet indisputable fact that this was an utterly needless war—no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found, no ties between Saddam Hussein and the jihadists established, no democratic transformation of the Islamic world set in motion, no road to peace in Jerusalem discovered in downtown Baghdad—to describe Iraq as a success, and as a model for application elsewhere, is nothing short of obscene. The great unacknowledged lesson of Iraq is the one that the writer Norman Mailer identified decades ago: “Fighting a war to fix something works about as good as going to a whorehouse to get rid of a clap.”For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude.If one believes that moral considerations rather than self-interest should inform foreign policy, Mexico still qualifies for priority attention. Consider the theft of California. Or consider more recently how the American appetite for illicit drugs and our liberal gun laws have corroded Mexican institutions and produced an epidemic of violence afflicting ordinary Mexicans. We owe these people, big-time.Yet any politician calling for the commitment of sixty thousand U.S. troops to Mexico to secure those interests or acquit those moral obligations would be laughed out of Washington—and rightly so. Any pundit proposing that the United States assume responsibility for eliminating the corruption that is endemic in Mexican politics while establishing in Mexico City effective mechanisms of governance would have his license to pontificate revoked. Anyone suggesting that the United States possesses the wisdom and the wherewithal to solve the problem of Mexican drug trafficking, to endow Mexico with competent security forces, and to reform the Mexican school system (while protecting the rights of Mexican women) would be dismissed as a lunatic. Meanwhile, those who promote such programs for Afghanistan, ignoring questions of cost and ignoring as well the corruption and ineffectiveness that pervade our own institutions, are treated like sages.The contrast between Washington’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and its relative indifference to Mexico testifies to the distortion of U.S. national security priorities induced by George W. Bush in his post-9/11 prophetic mode—distortions now being endorsed by Bush’s successor. It also testifies to a vast failure of imagination to which our governing classes have succumbed.This failure of imagination makes it literally impossible for those who possess either authority or influence in Washington to consider the possibility (a) that the solution to America’s problems is to be found not out there—where “there” in this case is Central Asia-but here at home; (b) that the people out there, rather than requiring our ministrations, may well be capable of managing their own affairs relying on their own methods; and (c) that to disregard (a) and (b) is to open the door to great mischief and in all likelihood to perpetrate no small amount of evil. Needless to say, when mischief or evil does occur—when a stray American bomb kills a few dozen Afghan civilians, for instance—the costs of this failure of imagination are not borne by the people who inhabit the leafy neighborhoods of northwest Washington, who lunch at the Palm or the Metropolitan Club, and school their kids at Sidwell Friends.So the answer to the question of the hour—What should the United States do about Afghanistan?—comes down to this: A sense of realism and a sense of proportion should oblige us to take a minimalist approach. As with Uruguay or Fiji or Estonia or other countries where U.S. interests are limited, the United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest cost possible.What might this mean in practice? General Petraeus, now commanding United States Central Command, recently commented that “the mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other transnational extremists,” in effect “to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.”The mission statement is a sound one. The current approach to accomplishing the mission is not sound and, indeed, qualifies as counterproductive. Note that denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan hasn’t required U.S. forces to occupy the frontier regions of that country. Similarly, denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan shouldn’t require military occupation by the United States and its allies.It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes (assuming we can manage to kill the right people) will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda’s plans. Certainly, that approach offers a cheaper and more efficient alter-native to establishing a large-scale and long-term U.S. ground presence—which, as the U.S. campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, has the unintended effect of handing jihadists a recruiting tool that they are quick to exploit.In the immediate wake of 9/11, all the talk—much of it emanating from neoconservative quarters—was about achieving a “decisive victory” over terror. The reality is that we can’t eliminate every last armed militant harboring a grudge against the West. Nor do we need to. As long as we maintain adequate defenses, Al Qaeda operatives, hunkered down in their caves, pose no more than a modest threat. As for the Taliban, unless they manage to establish enclaves in places like New Jersey or Miami, the danger they pose to the United States falls several notches below the threat posed by Cuba, which is no threat at all.As for the putatively existential challenge posed by Islamic radicalism, that project will prove ultimately to be a self-defeating one. What violent Islamists have on offer-a rejection of modernity that aims to restore the caliphate and unify the ummah [community]—doesn’t sell. In this regard, Iran—its nuclear aspirations the subject of much hand-wringing—offers considerable cause for hope. Much like the Castro revolution that once elicited so much angst in Washington, the Islamic revolution launched in 1979 has failed resoundingly. Observers once feared that the revolution inspired and led by the Ayatollah Khomeini would sweep across the Persian Gulf. In fact, it has accomplished precious little. Within Iran itself, the Islamic republic no longer represents the hopes and aspirations of the Iranian people, as the tens of thousands of protesters who recently filled the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities made evident. Here we see foretold the fate awaiting the revolutionary cause that Osama bin Laden purports to promote.In short, time is on our side, not on the side of those who proclaim their intention of turning back the clock to the fifteenth century. The ethos of consumption and individual autonomy, privileging the here and now over the eternal, will conquer the Muslim world as surely as it is conquering East Asia and as surely as it has already conquered what was once known as Christendom. It’s the wreckage left in the wake of that conquest that demands our attention. If the United States today has a saving mission, it is to save itself. Speaking in the midst of another unnecessary war back in 1967, Martin Luther King got it exactly right: “Come home, America.” The prophet of that era urged his countrymen to take on “the triple evils of racism, economic exploitation, and militarism.”Dr. King’s list of evils may need a bit of tweaking—in our own day, the sins requiring expiation number more than three. Yet in his insistence that we first heal ourselves, King remains today the prophet we ignore at our peril. That Barack Obama should fail to realize this qualifies as not only ironic but inexplicable.

ABOUT THE WRITERAndrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University.

Strategy Change

2009-07-20T17:15:00.000+01:00

Jonathan writes:

It is fairly easy to see why the British Army is taking so many casualties in Helmand: they have abandoned their clear-hold-build strategy and returned to a search-and-destroy campaign against the Taliban. In clear-hold-build one principle is to never occupy territory you cannot hold, but the British have returned to patrolling and raiding across territory they do not have the troops to hold.

Why they have done this is less clear. British commanders have every reason to know that while clear-hold-build has some hope of success, search and destroy draws on a long record of failure for this kind of operation.

The Labour government deserves all the lumps it is getting for its failure to provide adequate resources for the Army in Afghanistan, but the debate is going down a blind alley. Search and destroy tactics may make it look like the Army needs more helicopters and mine-proof vehicles, but that is an illusion based on tactics that will fail even with more resources.

What the Army needs in Afghanistan and in general is more infantry. In clear-hold-build your defence against IEDs and other attacks is your ability to persuade the local population that you are there to stay and your presence is good for them. Show them that their bread is buttered on your side and they will show you the IEDs. In search and destroy they cannot help you because as soon as you leave the Taliban will return and kill them. Holding ground, in particular, is a labour-intensive task which cannot be done without more infantry.

This morning on Radio 4 General Dannatt was quite tactful about DfID, but I will be less so. In Afghanistan DfID has always been part of the problem. They have never been on the same page as the Army, always reluctant to work together with the Army in combined action against the Taliban.

Under clear-hold-build it should be obvious that the building is to be done by DfID. This means moving in behind the Army to implement quick-implementing local programmes for rural development. Instead DfID is concentrating on capacity-building with the central government. If you want to build a house, do you start with the roof? The British have the example of the Westminster Process, the stately but time-tested process by which they divested themselves of an empire, which built from locality to province to nation. The time is now for DfID to get with the programme and join with the Army in putting all possible resources into combined action against the Taliban. That this has not already been done speaks poorly of DfID’s grasp of British objectives in Afghanistan, as well as of the government’s effectiveness in directing the efforts of its agencies.

Classical counter-insurgency doctrine is a hard slog and by no means fool-proof, but it provides the best hope of success in Afghanistan. The Army needs to return to the doctrine it developed, and the government needs to provide leadership, discipline, and the necessary resources for the necessary combined action programme.

The Rule of Law

2009-05-21T23:20:00.000+01:00

Hilde writes: one of my contacts in Washington is the US Institute for Peace who are doing a lot of work in Afghanistan. Although this report is from 2007, it gives a good background to the current trends in Afghan public op, especially in view of the importance of building a viable judicial system whoich build on existing mechanisms of conflict transformation and for implementing the rule of law: http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0816_afghan_opinion.html

Going pear shaped

2009-05-17T19:24:00.000+01:00

Things are going from bad to worse in Afghaistan. Anti government elements (AGE in local spook speak) are in control in the East, the West and the South - and are getting pretty strong in Kabul. Only the Northern region is moderately safe. Meanwhile there are two threads to policy. Policy a is let the elections proceed and let Karzai rig the.

Policy A is overthrow Karzai and establish a new grand Khan.

Policy B is allowing Karzai to continue cocking things up and make the best of it.

Policy A comes with getting rid of Karzai before the elections of course. Interesting times.

Supplying a War

2009-04-13T00:17:00.001+01:00

The US face a plethora of challenges in Afghanistan; getting stuff there is a big one.

From the Peloponnesian War to Operation Enduring Freedom, the words of Sun Tzu ring true; ‘the line between disorder and order lies in logistics’.

It is, as such, troubling for US and NATO forces in Afghanistan that supply problems are beginning to dog their already faltering efforts.

The planned closure of Manas Air Base, on the back of promised Russian aid to Kyrgyzstan (although the link is rejected by Bishkek) is the latest major setback for the US. The politics behind the closure no doubt has more to do with the SCOs concerns about US military presence in the larger Central Asian region, yet the impact will be felt in Afghanistan.

This is not the only problem. Earlier in the year concerns were raised over the killing of contract drivers bringing American supplies though the infamous Khyber Pass and growing attacks on oil, weapons, and food convoys in the region.

With a promised 17,000 further US troops due to the region supply demands are set to skyrocket. New routes are being looked at, and tentatively used, though Russia (ironically considering their role in the Manas closure), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and there is even talk about possible routes through Iran (ironic considering the situation period).

The problems in Afghanistan are mounting. It is widely understood that getting out of such situations is a tricky business but for now getting in, day after day, is proving a bigger headache.

Iran is trying to back Kabul into a corner

2009-04-01T16:09:00.000+01:00

Iran’s long and complicated relations with Afghanistan are of growing concern for the Obama Administration, as it sends more troops to reinforce its military campaign in the south of Afghanistan against the Al-Qaida and the Taliban insurgency.

Afghanistan is in a tough spot. The country is reliant on the U.S. and NATO for its security and, at the same time, shares its longest land border with Iran.

Afghanistan has long pleaded with the U.S. and Iran not to carry out their longstanding strategic rivalry on its soil. For several years that request has been largely honoured.

Iran has also helped more than any other neighbouring countries with the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Since 2002, Iran has pumped millions of dollars into Afghanistan's western provinces to build roads, electrical grids, schools and health clinics.

The last thing President Karzai wants is to be forced into making a choice between Iran and the U.S.

Iran, a long-time supporter of the Northern Alliance, was instrumental in bringing about the fall of the Taliban in 2001. However, “Iran has become a more and more hostile power” according to the Afghanistan's ambassador, Said Tayeb Jawad. Iran was doing more than just bringing western Afghanistan into its sphere of influence. Iran has played both a constructive and destructive role in Afghanistan.

It has been reported that Tehran was financing and providing weaponry to Afghanistan's militant groups, specifically those groups fighting against the U.S. presence in the country. These new developments show that Iran has been increasing its operations in Afghanistan in an effort to gain influence with the contending insurgent factions and to hasten the departure of U.S. troops from the country.

On top of this, Iranian agents are dumping bags of cash in the laps of tribal leaders in Afghanistan's west, clearly intended to purchase influence and remind them: The Americans may be here for 10 or 20 years, but we will be here forever.

A call for a Cease-fire

2009-03-16T23:46:00.000Z

The internment will begin on Monday with Royal family members and then on Tuesday the first President Daoud Khan in a State funeral, the following has come from Prince Nadir tonight, that was announced in the Afghan media today.

We, the surviving family members of Shaied Mohammad Daoud Khan, the first president of Afghanistan, call for an immediate weeklong ceasefire throughout our beloved country to remember and honor the memory of eighteen members of our family and the million and a half Afghan martyrs who have since lost their lives for the protection of the holy religion of Islam and for the freedom of Afghanistan. We pray for their souls.

We believe that the sacrifices made by all Afghans and their families should be recognized, honored and respected. We call upon all Afghans and the international community to show goodwill and to commit to our request.

Let us put our guns to the side, honor those who have suffered the loss of their loved ones during this painful thirty year struggle, and pray for the souls of our brothers and sisters who have made us proud to be Afghan.

Shaied Daoud Khan and countless other brave Afghans gave up their precious lives for a better future for the next generation.. As we pray for their souls, let us stand together to fulfill their hopes and dreams of a peaceful, united and prosperous Afghanistan.

On the eve of this new year (1388), as we mourn and release our family and all our martyrs back into the ground of this soil from which they’ve come and to which they return, let us bury with them the seeds of an intention; that this cease-fire be turned into the flowering of a lasting peace. In so doing, may they rest at peace and bring peace upon us all, at last.
A statement from the families of Shaied Daoud Khan and his brother Shaied Naim Khan.

Sentenced for 20 years for downloading a human rights article

2009-03-12T16:27:00.000Z

A 23 year old reporter for a local newspaper (Jahaan Naw) and a journalism student from Afghanistan has been sentenced for 20 years in prison for allegedly circulating an article about women's rights.

Sayed Pervez Kambaksh, had hoped that Afghanistan's top judges would quash his conviction for lack of evidence, or because he was tried in secret and convicted without a defense lawyer, Afzal Nooristani, to submit so much as a word in his defense.

Since he was arrested, Sayed Pervez Kambaksh has spent almost 18 months in prison. During this time, he was sentenced to death in 5 minutes by Enayatullah Baleegh for allegedly downloading and distributing a report criticizing the treatment of women under Islamic Law. The motion was later withdrawn due to international pressure, giving Kambaksh the right to appeal the sentence.

That appeal however was quashed and Mr Kambaksh's case has been passed to the prosecutors' office for "execution of the sentence", which means he could be moved to Kabul's notorious Pul-e Charkhi prison, or north to Mazar-i-Sharif, where he was first found guilty. Mr Kambaksh’s lawer has even been threatened with murder.

Mr Kambaksh's case has highlighted the tension between the voices of conservative Islam in Afghanistan and the liberal international backers of President Karzai. Mr Karzai is left in a difficult position - not wanting to appear to bow to international pressure in what is a strongly Islamic country. Mr Kambaksh's best hope is now a presidential pardon, which will force president Hamid Karzai to choose between fundamentalists in his government and the rule of law.

The Need To Win

2009-02-04T14:54:00.000Z

Tim Pendry sends his personal reflections on Afghanistan which are of interest.

YOU CAN FIND THEM ON THIS LINK

Reading.

2008-12-09T21:27:00.000Z

Recommended reading.

While this issue focuses primarily on Iraq, the thoughts on Afghanistan are of upmost interest.

We shall post updates as new reports come out.

SWISH REPORT.

2008-11-06T12:24:00.000Z

A Taliban 'spokesperson' has called on Obama to 'respect his mandate and spend taxpayers money on social welfare rather than weapons and war'....

This is....hilarious.

Obama declared in his speech in Chicago that he will destroy those who 'aim to tear down the world'.

The Taliban should take note.

While we advocate changes in strategy on a host of issues around the region, withdrawal is not on the table and should not be for some years to come. At least in Afghanistan.

Vom Kriege

2008-10-31T22:55:00.000Z

'War is merely a continuation of politics by other means' and far too important 'to be left to the generals'.

These words from a Prussian General and a French Prime Minister respectively are still apt today.

However it is the new man leading the US Central Command, General David Patraeus, who promises change and progress in Afghanistan. He has shown his steel in Iraq and has uttered welcoming comments on a new approach in one of his new theaters of operation.

It is up to the politicians to start wars, it is up to the politicians to end wars, but it is up to those like Patreaues to conduct them day-to-day.

Afghanistan is not a country that welcomes foreign intervention, and immense challenges remain, but this is a start of a new period and one that promises hope.

It can't come soon enough.

The US to talk...finally...

2008-10-14T11:02:00.000+01:00

Welcome words here from Gates but why does this always take so many years? That is the realization that if you are going to 'win' somewhere you need to talk to everyone, not just those you want to,

This needs to be step one in all future conflicts; diplomatic engagement with all key entities; like it or not,

Obama on the other hand seems to be backing down on the idea that he will talk to leaders of Iran and other 'terrorist' backing states; this is a mistake. He needs to follow Gates on this one and realize that the public back home is not going to be offended by this fact; people realize that to solve issues people need to talk.

It does not happen enough.

All change.

2008-09-11T05:44:00.000+01:00

Be it due to the upcoming US elections, the perceived successes in Iraq, or purely the deterioration of security in Afghanistan itself, politicians and military types alike seem to have finally woken up to the fact that things need to change and the West needs to take Afghanistan seriously.

Admiral Mike Mullen told congress he was ‘not convinced we’re winning it in Afghanistan’; such words to those who have been following Afghanistan for longer than the last month or so are as infuriating as they are welcome. This shift in priority is vital, but long overdue.

So it’s all change, on all fronts.

Both presidential candidates in the US are calling for troop increases and the Bush administration is now talking about a ‘quiet’ surge supposedly meant to quell the cacophony of violence taking over Afghanistan and creeping towards Kabul.

And it’s emphases once again on the US public enemy number one - Osama himself - with armed predator drones increasingly operating and engaging over autonomous militant regions of Pakistan.

There have also been recent stories of US ground incursions in Pakistan in line with a ‘more holistic approach’ which looks at both sides of the border. Throw into the mix a new President in Asif Ali Zardari and a new Chief of Army Staff in General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani and the US has yet another minefield to navigate.

This shift in focus is a good thing but it needs to be real, it need to happen soon, and we can all only pray that it is more than an attempt to save Bush’s legacy and to ensure the continuity of the Republican dream in Mr. McCain.

Of course even if all of this is so the dream of an ‘end game’ in Afghanistan for the West is a long, long way off.

Conclusion...

2008-09-02T14:09:00.000+01:00

The results of the investigation discussed below.

One assumes it matters little what actually happened however.

*Edit*

To clarify; it matters little in relation to how 'Western Forces' are perceived by the local populous - these findings are unlikely to alleviate the feelings of distrust and hostility held by many.

Victory from the ground up...

2008-08-31T11:36:00.000+01:00

This week sees the launch of a joint investigation between the UN, the Afghan Government and NATO into the possibility of an air strike having killing 91 civilians.

What the investigation unearths is, however, beside the salient point that victory can not be attained from 10,000 feet (or 500 for that matter).

Airpower itself works best in conventional wars where the enemy is easily identifiable and its centre of gravity is its hardware and troop numbers; this is no longer the case in Afghanistan and arguably never was.

The defining characteristics of fast movement, heavy weaponry and vertical detachment from the 'action' means that many of the challenges presented in this theatre marginalize airpower’s role.

Airpower has a limited shelf life, and its time is running out in Afghanistan.

If the war in Afghanistan is to be won, it will be on the ground, and even then by political means, and not force. Direct airpower is the epitome of force and can do little in actually helping to achieve ‘victory’ for ISAF in Afghanistan.

100 Taliban Killed- Hundreds Displaced

2008-08-29T14:08:00.000+01:00

US and Afghan forces report that more than 100 Taliban members have been killed in the Southern province of Helmand. Three days of fierce fighting began after patrols came under attack from Taliban forces. The exact number of casualties is still not known.

However the attack has meant that more people have had to flee their homes in search of refuge in other parts of the country. The growing number of refugees in Kabul further highlights the deepening conflict between Taliban and foreign forces. Many people originally fled their homes in Helmand in search of temporary shelter in the Southern provincial capitals of Kandahar and Lashkar Gar, but now more are moving further into Kabul because of incresed instability and security dangers in the South.

The fighting has made it impossible for civilians to remain in their villages, which are used by Taliban as covers for attacking NATO and US forces. This is followed then by further airstrikes by allied forces on the villages where civilians are living. People are accused of co-operating with Taliban by the police, government and foreign forces and then further interegated by Taliban who claim that they are spies. As one man put it "We are under the feet of two powers."

Stopping insurgent forces is essential but the deaths of civilians and the uprooting of Afghan peoples lives must not be part of the process.

First Olympic Medal for Afghanistan

2008-08-26T15:01:00.000+01:00

Rohullah Nikpai, has won Afghanistan its first ever medal at the Olympic games in Beijing. He competed in the 58kg category, defeating Juan Antonio Ramos from Spain to win the bronze medal in Taekwondo. Nikpai, an ethnic Hazara, was a member of the Afghan refugee team, when he left Kabul after fighting in the city, to live in refugee camps set up in Iran. He returned and was able to train in the Olympic training facility provided by the government. Hamid Karzai immediately called Nikpai to congratule him on his victory and rewarded him with a brand new house in Kabul. He also recieved a new Toyota sedan and $20,000 from the owner of the countries main cellphone network. Many in Afghanistan were overjoyed with his success, with some reporting that Taliban also fired gunshots into the open sky in the district of Panjwai and some areas of Helmand province, in honour of his victory.

No Upgrade for British Troops

2008-08-22T15:35:00.000+01:00

The new British embassy in Kabul is going to have two olympic sized swimming pools for staff. The embassy, costing $120 million will provide this added bonus for its staff, while many Afghans still do not have access to a properly functioning water system. Meanwhile, British troops struggle with the security threat, being under equipped and short on man power.

Another unfortunate example of widespread corruption in Afghanistan.

On the Brink

2008-08-21T08:17:00.000+01:00

Sensational comments aside, this week has not been a good one for ISAF and the people of Afghanistan.

The media seems to agree.

ISAF casualties are coming thick and fast, with the devastating attack on French troops earlier in the week (possibly a case of ‘blue-on-b lue’), and news coming in of Polish and British casualties in the last couple of days.

The situation on the ground appears to be increasingly... fragile.

This piece, by Jon Hemming of Reuters, describes a ‘ride along’ through Kandahar; it does not make for pleasant reading.

Who is to blame? This interview with Amrullah Saleh, head of the National Directorate of Security (the Afghan domestic intelligence service), leaves little doubt.

Afghanistan is at a cross roads; only with strong resolve and a reconsidered approach shall this troubled state claw itself out of the abyss. Sensational comments aside.

They've really done it now

2008-08-19T16:29:00.000+01:00

The Taliban mounted their fiercest attack on Nato forces since 2002, killing 10 French soldiers and wounding Americans and and Afghan soldiers. "In response to the attack," according to The New York Times, "the French president announced that he would fly to Kabul on Tuesday."

Whether Mr. Sarkozy intends to take on the Taliban himself or not is not clear. It does signify the increasing resolve of Nato countries. It was partly the lack of commitment that allowed the Taliban to slowly regain strength.

But loud proclamations, if not met with action (and success) will backfire, and the pressure may be on Sarkozy and other leaders of nations in Afghanistan to leave.

Kudos Robert Gates

2008-08-08T14:02:00.000+01:00

The US Defense Secretary is a refreshing figure in the Bush administration. A recent op-ed by David Ignatius in the Washington Post commends Gates very highly, and rightly so.

"He is still firing on all cylinders, working to repair the damage done at the Pentagon by his arrogant and aloof predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. Gates has restored accountability in the military services by firing the secretaries of the Army and Air Force when they failed to respond forthrightly to problems. And he has been an early and persuasive internal administration critic of U.S. military action against Iran."

And this morning, Gates proposed a noble plan to resucitate the mission in Afghanistan. $20 billion for a three-year project to double the size of the Afghan army is commendable, as is the restructuring of command. Gates wants all but a few US troops to be under NATO command. At present they are split roughly between NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom, an obvious strategic stumbling block. Gates also wants more troops, but they won't be available in the short term.

What is missing is a strong stance on the poppy problem. Thomas Schneider, a former Pentagon official, in The New York Times Magazine, courageously and cogently argues for aerial eradication of poppy-crop.

In any case, the debate on Afghanistan seems to be converging to a coherent line between the current administration and the next. Everyone seems enthusiastic to redouble efforts in the "good war." And that is very good.

Afghanistan

In the UK Parliament

Parwan raises questions over Afghan sovereignty

A Kabul visit!

Recent events

Taliban Attack in Kabul

BBC Reporter killed by NATO forces in Afghanistan

New NCF Report on Afghanistan

Three More

Troubles in Afghanistan: the increasing brutality of the Taliban.

A Fashionable Spring

Another Afghan Official Murdered

Taliban to make peace?

Luck runs out for President Karzai’s half brother

Issues Raised by Journalists: Afghanistan: Freedom of Press? Only on certain (an...

IT'S NOT A WOMAN'S WORLD

The forgotten story about Abdul Haq

More Responsibility to be Allocated to Tribesmen

Afghanistan, crossroads of the Ancient World, British Museum. Extended until 17 July 2011

2011 Media Awards, Oxford & Cambridge Club UK

Afghanistan: time to face reality

Conference on Afghanistan- Saturday 9th April 2011

New Speaker

Hanif Hangam

News of what is going on in the UK about Afghanistan

Karzai Admits Cash Payments

Two Afghan Nominees for the International Media Awards

Succeeding in Afghanistan?

The Last Jew in Afghanistan

Thoughts on Afghanistan

So very sad

UK pull out from Sangin

Rory Stewart: Afghanistan & Western Policymaking

More and More die in lost war

Ajmal Attacked

Getting worse

The 256th soldier to die!!

The Insurgency

Carnage in Afghanistan-again.

The Total Mounts

The elephant is down

Four Ways to Fix Afghanistan Without Guns

99th and counting!!

Afghan equivalent of "Pop Idol"

The 98th this year

Princess Zohra praises Nato

Gordon Brown takes on Karzi

Taliban moves to terrorise guests in suicide attack

Courage in Afghanistan

Where do we go from here?

Nadir gets the Turban

Is this the end of the Taliban?

Helmand Province

NCF Afghanistan Working Group Report

A million and a half fraudulent votes

Taliban now controls Afghanistan

Are the elections making ethnic divides more entrenched?

The West loses the elections

The War We Can't Win

Strategy Change

The Rule of Law

Going pear shaped

Supplying a War

Iran is trying to back Kabul into a corner

A call for a Cease-fire

Sentenced for 20 years for downloading a human rights article

The Need To Win

Further Reading.

Reading.

Vom Kriege

The US to talk...finally...

All change.

Conclusion...

Victory from the ground up...

100 Taliban Killed- Hundreds Displaced

First Olympic Medal for Afghanistan

No Upgrade for British Troops

On the Brink

They've really done it now

Kudos Robert Gates