Jonathan writes:
It is fairly easy to see why the British Army is taking so many casualties in Helmand: they have abandoned their clear-hold-build strategy and returned to a search-and-destroy campaign against the Taliban. In clear-hold-build one principle is to never occupy territory you cannot hold, but the British have returned to patrolling and raiding across territory they do not have the troops to hold.
Why they have done this is less clear. British commanders have every reason to know that while clear-hold-build has some hope of success, search and destroy draws on a long record of failure for this kind of operation.
The Labour government deserves all the lumps it is getting for its failure to provide adequate resources for the Army in Afghanistan, but the debate is going down a blind alley. Search and destroy tactics may make it look like the Army needs more helicopters and mine-proof vehicles, but that is an illusion based on tactics that will fail even with more resources.
What the Army needs in Afghanistan and in general is more infantry. In clear-hold-build your defence against IEDs and other attacks is your ability to persuade the local population that you are there to stay and your presence is good for them. Show them that their bread is buttered on your side and they will show you the IEDs. In search and destroy they cannot help you because as soon as you leave the Taliban will return and kill them. Holding ground, in particular, is a labour-intensive task which cannot be done without more infantry.
This morning on Radio 4 General Dannatt was quite tactful about DfID, but I will be less so. In Afghanistan DfID has always been part of the problem. They have never been on the same page as the Army, always reluctant to work together with the Army in combined action against the Taliban.
Under clear-hold-build it should be obvious that the building is to be done by DfID. This means moving in behind the Army to implement quick-implementing local programmes for rural development. Instead DfID is concentrating on capacity-building with the central government. If you want to build a house, do you start with the roof? The British have the example of the Westminster Process, the stately but time-tested process by which they divested themselves of an empire, which built from locality to province to nation. The time is now for DfID to get with the programme and join with the Army in putting all possible resources into combined action against the Taliban. That this has not already been done speaks poorly of DfID’s grasp of British objectives in Afghanistan, as well as of the government’s effectiveness in directing the efforts of its agencies.
Classical counter-insurgency doctrine is a hard slog and by no means fool-proof, but it provides the best hope of success in Afghanistan. The Army needs to return to the doctrine it developed, and the government needs to provide leadership, discipline, and the necessary resources for the necessary combined action programme.
