Recent events

Yesterday there was a blow to peace in Afghanistan as Burhanuddin Rabbani was killed. He was the man whom Karzia was trying to work with to stabalise the country, working towards a peaceful solution in Afghanistan. But the Taliban envoys look ready to tip the country into an even deeper crisis, and this must be what they want.
I have friends in the country, who are now preparing to leave. Sadly as they have made so many friends amongst the Afghans, who were sad to see them go.
A difficult time for any of us to go to the Afghanistan, but we should try for the sake of people there!

Taliban Attack in Kabul

On Tuesday 13th September, the US Embassy and NATO Headquarters in Kabul were the targets of Taliban suicide bombers and rocket- launched attacks. Four civilians and three police officers were reportedly killed in the preliminary attacks, and a further ten civilians and nine police officers were killed in three smaller incidents on the second day of the assault. It is significant in itself that it took Afghani forces two days to suppress the insurgents; this is the first time in the capital that an attack has lasted this length of time, and its implications are worrying.

The indication that the Taliban are growing in strength is particularly concerning in the aftermath of July’s ‘security transition’ from US to Afghan- led forces. Kabul and six other regions have now been taken over from foreign troops, in the build- up to complete US withdrawal in 2014. Despite President Karzai’s assurances that that this attack will not impact on the smooth running of the security transition, and will actually strengthen the resolve of people to fight the Taliban, the incident does pose a question in terms of the strength of the Afghan forces. Kabul is normally considered to be more secure than other parts of Afghanistan, but the recent concentration in raids on Western targets does, to some degree, represent the resentment felt towards the foreign occupation.

The fact that Taliban forces attacked a region where the US had largely relinquished control merely exposes the weakness of the Afghan army on their part, and it signals that as the US prepare to step- up their withdrawal, it may only be a matter of time before the Taliban gain more and more influence in Afghanistan. This attack on the US Embassy in Kabul questions whether the Afghan army are sufficiently equipped to reckon with the persistence of the Taliban, especially when the civilian death toll is taken into account. Indeed, questions have been raised in regard to the wounding of an RTA reporter in the attack; steps need to be taken to ensure that there are adequate safeguards in place in order to protect members of the press. Hillary Clinton vowed that they would continue to work for the safety of people at the US Embassy, whilst the Head of News National Television explicitly condemned the injuring of the RTA reporter. Combating the threat to the free press is of paramount importance to the overall stability of Afghanistan, and whilst President Karzai is limited in his capacity to stop the Taliban’s attacks, he does need to ensure that the freedom of the press is regulated.

BBC Reporter killed by NATO forces in Afghanistan

It has emerged that Nato forces shot dead BBC reporter Ahmed Omed Khpulwak in July, mistakenly believing that he was a suicide bomber. ISAF, the Nato- led International Security Assistant Forces were at the time responding to several suicide bombings at the offices of Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), in the town of Tarin Kowt, southern Uruzgan province.

Khpulwak’s body was discovered at the broadcasting offices, in the aftermath of two suicide bombings, which had injured US soldiers. He had been shot eleven times. ISAF claim that its soldiers acted in accordance with the laws of armed conflict under the circumstances, and soldiers maintain that Omed Khpulwak had ‘something clinched in one of his fists and [was] reaching for something on his person with his other hand’, fuelling fears that he was a suicide bomber.

Tarin Kowt has experienced a surge in violence in recent weeks; three suicide bombings in the town market led to air strikes and heavy fighting between NATO forces and the Taliban. Khpulwak was one of nineteen people initially believed to have been killed by the Taliban in this particular attack. However, NATO were prompted to launch an inquiry into the death of the BBC reporter, following the Taliban’s claim that they were not responsible for the shooting. The Taliban did assume responsibility for the earlier suicide bombings.

The death of Omed Khpulwak once again brings the safety of journalists into the spotlight. If the actions of ISAF forces really were in compliance with international standards and laws governing conflict, then we have to question whether the ‘safeguards’ put in place are adequate enough protection for the reporters on the front line.

Omed Khpulwak worked as a reporter for the BBC Pashto service, but some of his reports also reached English- speaking audiences. He has been described by colleagues as a ‘brave reporter’. The death of Khpulwak is the third casualty for the BBC in Afghanistan.

New NCF Report on Afghanistan

Last month (August) saw the highest level of US casualties since hostilities began (67 American dead out of a total of 81 Western forces killed in August in Afghanistan). The shooting down of the Chinook early in the month accounted for many of the dead but none the less things are not good.

The NCF have compiled the following report on the current situation in Afghanistan.

REPORT 49 - Breaking New Ground -

A report on security and governance in Afghanistan

Key Recommendations

1. Security: ISAF would suggest that the ANA and ANP (Afghan National Army and Police) have improved not deteriorated. Sadly our Afghan interlocutors think otherwise (source 36 reports that the ANA now feels so insecure that it demands that when new camps are constructed they are built next to coalition bases so that the coalition will protect them if attacked). In response to the deterioration of the ANA and ANP, provinces would be better served if given control over their own security. This could be done through tribal levies in cooperation with the shuras: local initiatives for local security. This must not be confused with the troubling US policy of setting up localized paramilitary forces to bolster central government.
2. Governance: In the context of the upcoming presidential election and scheduled withdrawal of foreign troops in 2014, a Loya Jirga (grand assembly) should be called to provide a legitimate environment for political reform. A Loya Jirga would facilitate discussion of reform and the subsequent process of rearranging the Upper House (members should be appointed by a National Council representative of civil society and traditional structures of governance). The aim is to restructure the Afghan government as an Afghanized democracy.
3. Economy: Investment and productivity must be protected and developed within ‘secure zones of commerce’, as insecurity and corruption are the two biggest obstacles to development in Afghanistan. Drastic measures would be required to promote investment in Afghan business. The licensing of opium farming and trade in Afghanistan would allow the Afghan state, rather than the insurgents, to accumulate revenue from opium cultivation and further enable the channelling of poppy production into the fabrication of opium-based drugs. Any licensing system must be implemented under the surveillance of local shuras.
4. Situation of women and civil society: Empowering Afghan women and reinforcing their position in Afghan civil society is a powerful tool through which to deliver good governance at this late stage. A single forum is needed for a mix of modern aspirational civil society groups, i.e. women’s societies, trade unions, shopkeepers associations and professional associations, together with traditional structures such as tribal shuras. These would link into the political process, fostering key elements of civilized practice, e.g. accessible education for women and an independent judiciary. Afghanistan is fast becoming a failed state. Without the stability and continuity that the basic foundations of civil society provide, Afghanistan will slide swiftly into chaos.

The recent assassinations of Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, by one of his bodyguards, and Mayor Ghulam Haider Hamidi of Kandahar by a suicide attacker remind us of the level of instability that still exists in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai has again confirmed he will not stand for re-election. Western casualties remain high. This has been the deadliest month for American troops so far. Afghan casualties are far higher.

The recommendations in this report are controversial but it is the belief of the authors that whilst they may be difficult to implement, they are not merely the best, but the only solutions to the problems faced by Afghanistan today. The situation in Afghanistan remains desperate and it is vital that steps are taken to remedy the awful position the country now finds itself in.

The announcement by President Obama in June 2011 emphasizes comprehensive troop withdrawal by 2014 and though America’s recent decision to remain in Iraq beyond its long advertised deadline for withdrawal calls any statement of this kind into question, a considerable reduction in troop numbers by summer 2012 is almost inevitable. At present, much of the country is dominated by insurgents. If President Karzai follows through with his plan to step down as leader in 2014, a political vacuum may be created. Afghans fear civil war in the aftermath of US disengagement. The perceived worst-case scenario is that the Taliban would be able to exploit the immature political system and underdeveloped national security forces that would remain once President Karzai had left. Sustainable alternatives for Afghanistan’s governance are needed post-2014. If they are to succeed, such alternatives must accommodate traditional Afghan structures of governance, whilst meeting the requirements of the contemporary world.

The absence of effective security is facilitating the downward spiral of the nation. Every fortnight 1400 Afghan troops graduate from the Kabul military training centre, where they have been provided with a crash course in basic artillery and military training. An estimated 25% of troops then go absent without leave, 98% of these deserting the army in the areas of most intense fighting. Few Afghans feel particular loyalty to the country. This fuels the popular perception that the ANA (Afghan National Army) is not a true ‘national force’. Encouraging reports showing improved security can be anticipated during the coming winter months when insurgent conflict decreases dramatically as a result of the bitterly cold temperatures. As the warmer season approaches in the Spring of 2012, insurgents, warlords and opposing criminal gangs will renew their aggressive activities and fatality rates increase once more.

The US has become the average Afghan’s enemy. Civilian deaths caused by Special Forces’ night raids are emphasized by local and international media, though in reality such night raids are generally highly surgical and collateral damage is minimal. The Afghan media adds further fuel to the fire, providing continuous propaganda comparing the US occupying forces to the Soviet forces that invaded during the 1980s. The Afghan government distances itself from the West and stresses the failings of Western troops, particularly the excessive use of military force, most noticeable in air-based operations such as the ‘Takhar incident’ (source 48). Those living in remote areas such as Nuristan and Kandahar claim that the US intentionally ‘levels villages’ (source 49). Afghans not only view this degree of force as unnecessary but as a weakness, implying the West is unable to fight hand to hand (source 50).

The view of US troops as an occupying force is exacerbated by the rhetoric of countries such as Iran, which have a strong influence in Afghanistan. The Kill-Capture strategy which was increasingly utilized by General Petraeus leads to a feeling of increased alienation and persecution (Petraeus’ successor General Allen has just taken over and has yet to place his own stamp on operations). The strategy has undermined political engagement with the more moderate insurgent commanders, as these have often been easier to target and therefore targeted first (source 21). This enables more fundamentalist Afghans to gain disproportionate influence. None-the-less, many Afghans still equate the departure of ISAF/NATO with a return to chaos.

One possible outcome for Afghanistan is de facto partition (though the semblance of national unity would remain). The South would once more be under Taliban rule. For obvious humanitarian reasons, a Taliban ruled province is not an ideal solution despite the existence of some more moderate voices within the Taliban (source 50). Whilst this outcome is favoured by some Western representatives, it is a solution that would be regarded as unthinkable by many Afghans and a sure path to greater civil unrest.

A stable and secure Afghanistan will be difficult to achieve with an exit strategy based on the mere repair of existing structures of governance. Genuine reform is required to enable a politically sophisticated, democratic, peaceful, sustainable future for Afghanistan. Most importantly, Afghanistan needs security. Many neighbouring countries and local actors are not interested in a stable Afghanistan and members of the international community have differing agendas and strategies. Improvement thus requires an Afghanization of the currently imposed structures. The key to stability and progress is finding the most appropriate balance of power between devolved political bodies and the central government.
Security Sector Reform

Just as an Iranian/Saudi proxy war takes place in Iraq, so too a RAW/ISI proxy war takes place in Afghanistan, i.e. India's Secret Service (the Research and Analysis Wing) versus Pakistan's Secret Service (Inter-Services Intelligence). Pakistan cannot allow itself to be encircled by enemies (Afghanistan’s present government is India's ally).

China is becoming increasingly involved in Afghanistan, particularly with resource exploration activities, which could be a partial solution to Afghanistan’s economic underdevelopment. Other neighbours, including Western countries, compete for influence in the ‘Afghan playground’. All actors contribute significantly to the enormous troubles facing the country, for this reason, many progressive security efforts are repeatedly undermined.

Security deliverance in Afghanistan also includes the protection of schools and villages from insurgent hostilities. The ANA and ANP suffer high levels of corruption, drug abuse, illiteracy and desertion. Control of the ANA is divided between political and criminal parties who fight for influence (source 49). The ANA is largely composed of people whose allegiance is not to the government or the country, but to a party, group or warlord and, in some cases, even to a neighbouring country.

With a 90% illiteracy rate in the ANA, 15% higher than that of the nation, troops are failing to carry out the most basic tasks, including tracking weapons from serial numbers and understanding their payment receipts. Those who are literate are often promoted to NCO rank, despite lacking the necessary leadership skills. Experienced senior NCOs, who should be the backbone of the army, are in dangerously short supply which, as well as being a problem in terms of operation, contributes to low morale.

Afghans often prefer to turn to the Taliban for protection and local conflict resolution. The weakened state the ANA finds itself in is reminiscent of the poorly trained militias set up by the Soviets in the 1980s. Both the ANA and ANP lack the strength to protect civilians from the Taliban (source 49). A complete reform of structure is needed.

(I) Reform of the ANA and ANP

Promoting devolved responsibility for a locally recruited army and police force would entail a similar relationship between local and national forces to that which exists in the United States. The ANA and ANP must serve locally, and be locally accountable and recruited. Training resources/policy would still be a central government provision. This would ensure a guaranteed minimum standard. Shuras and/or tribal authorities must be involved in order to increase pressure on recruits who currently lack the commitment required for acceptable performance in the ANA and ANP.

A traditional Arbakai system (a security force made up of local tribesmen) was introduced by the MOI (Ministry of Interior), and has been successful in some areas, though back-fired in others. Higher pay is a popular method to increase commitment and reduce desertion. A smaller but better paid and thus more reliable standing army/police force would be infinitely preferable to the current situation. Careful implementation is required:

• The current ANA platoons should be reorganised into local platoons allocated to their home regions (operating much like a civil defence force) and tasked with maintaining security, rolling out an improved safe area in the current ‘inkspot’ fashion. The proximity to home is important, as being based in the local area would inspire the commitment that is lacking when recruits serve away from home. They should be answerable to and controlled by the regional governor, working alongside tribesmen (even when those tribesmen were former insurgents). The emphasis must be on the ‘tribes’ rather than the ‘mullahs’. Those loyal to ‘mullahs’ must not be excluded, but the objective would be to reinforce traditional tribal structures rather than the more recent ‘Taliban’ structures of governance. The MOI should relinquish control over regional security forces, and regional governors should answer to a committee of the Upper House (transparently appointed), which should both manage and monitor the ANA’s and ANP’s overall activities, leadership and interaction with civilians.

• The best trained elements of the existing armed forces should be retained as a centrally accountable force. This force would be used to reinforce and support local units struggling to deal with insurgent activities (as well as being a deterrent against regional rivalry). This force must be broadly representative of all regions, unlike the current armed forces. The force must be exceptionally trained and equipped with heavy weapons as well as having access to specialist kit such as drones / surveillance / aviation / support weaponry, which the regional commands lack. Their overall aim would be to maintain stability within the districts and provinces.

• Poor health care provision in the ANA is a problem. Soldier health care provision must be radically improved in order to encourage commitment.

(II) Unleash education security initiatives

Improvement of school security can be achieved through civil society and ANP initiatives by:

• Parents’ groups could help safeguard schools by undertaking initiatives to engage with local tribal elders and moderate Taliban. This may foster a sense of responsibility for the next generation of former insurgents. Fears that education is being used to propagate Western belief systems should be ameliorated with the help of local shuras.

• Community based one-teacher Primary Schools should be established with the help of educational civil society groups that analyse the potential for the establishment of a school by registering adults with adequate teaching skills. Setting up these informal schools would give children living in isolated parts of Afghanistan an opportunity to get primary education without being subjected to long-distance travel through dangerous areas. Where long-distance travel cannot be avoided, attention should be given to developing transport schemes in order to secure long-distance roads leading to schools, either by shifts of adults accompanying children, or by the use of cars and vans.

Governance

The Afghan parliament includes the advisory (veto empowered in some instances) Upper House (Meshrano Jirga) and the law making Lower House (Wolesi Jirga). President Karzai appoints one third (34) of Upper House members, the other 68 members being decided by the 34 Provincial and 398 District Councils (unfortunately there were no District Council elections in 2005 and all current Upper House members are Provincial Council nominees).
Sadly, governorship of the provinces is purchasable for several million dollars. Upper House members have often been placed into power by questionably motivated individuals. Although the Lower House is theoretically a more democratic sector of the Afghan Parliament, it remains at the mercy of the President, the Upper House and the Supreme Court (the last parliamentary elections were tainted with as much corruption as the presidential elections, and the majority of more legitimate candidates failed to win seats). The Lower House is unable to pass any remarkable or progressive laws as a result of the inertia that exist in the executive.

Corruption is rampant. $180 will allow a civilian to receive a driving license within hours and $60,000 will get one out of jail immediately. Public positions are purchasable, notably in the courts, the provincial government and the police force. 63% of civilians believe that filing complaints against corrupt officials is a waste of time. The low level of popular faith in the government and political process is clearly illustrated by the low turnout in the latest presidential and parliamentary elections.

During the transition process in the aftermath of the 2001 liberation of Afghanistan, the West ignored calls by Afghans to implement a system of transitional justice so as to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses, warlords and criminals to account. The high level of impunity granted to those who would have been brought before the ICC in alternative circumstances has enabled these strongmen to penetrate Afghan state structures. This has facilitated the infiltration of organized crime into Afghan politics.

Afghanistan must have a system of governance that is built with an understanding of what the Afghan people perceive as just and representative. The government must be capable of providing the rule of law in accordance with a reformed Afghan constitution and the will of the Afghan people. The state must be one in which citizens have confidence, and that offers a better future than that offered by the Taliban and other criminal insurgent groups.

In the Absence of Reform

A semblance of order is only maintained, at present, by the sheer scale of Western engagement. Continued instability is likely in the absence of reform. This report envisages two phases in Afghanistan’s future:

1. The de-facto partition of Afghanistan into:
a. A rump presidential state in the North, quasi Northern Alliance in character, supported by India, China and the USA.
b. A quasi-Taliban state in the South with the covert support of Pakistan.

2. A civil war for dominance in Afghanistan conducted over a prolonged period in which the North will dominate in the short term (if only because of the predominance of Northern soldiers and sparse numbers of Pashtun in Afghanistan’s immense army). In the long term however, the South will assert itself (though it is by no means certain that the Pashtun would prevail). Afghans regard the possibility of civil war as ‘unthinkable’ (source 51) but the risk that the nation will ‘slide’ into civil war remains considerable.

These two phases are just one possible future for Afghanistan. At various points there will clearly be opportunities to rewrite this scenario. One such seminal moment is in the aftermath of the forthcoming Presidential elections (2014). This report therefore suggests a second scenario as an alternative to the two phase scenario described above:

Alternative: To foster a ‘national unity group’ with grass root support, backed by the West as well as regional powers, in an effort to turn Afghanistan back in the right direction. Most of the country is now Taliban dominated. There will not be effective security in Afghanistan under current plans and strategies for the ANA and ANP. Arms have been assembled in Logar and West Nangahar provinces (source 36). The current model of governance is no longer repairable. The necessary seeds for progress and cohesion can be planted now.

Regional Council for Afghanistan and her Neighbours

Recognising the importance of the regional actors, it may be beneficial to form a regional council at a second-track, unofficial level, in order to facilitate a more confidential, open and idea-oriented process of dialogue.

The participants should be people with close links to relevant governments (e.g. China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and the USA) and to other influential actors such as the Pashtun tribes. It would be important to involve all major actors that have a significant stake or interest in the outcome of the conflict.

The convenor of a regional council would ideally be a third-party which is trusted and independent.

National Council

Democracy in Afghanistan must underpin traditional decision-making processes by including tribal groups, local shuras and civil society associations. The best way in which to do this is via an independent National Council. Such a council would gain cross-generational support. The younger generation, who have not known traditional governance, would view such an approach as a fresh start, whereas the older generation would remember the pre-1973 ‘golden age’ of Afghanistan (note that though a traditional form of governance with some role for the royal family is supported in Afghanistan, this is unlikely to be translated into support for a return of a constitutional monarchy).

Without access to the state, the opportunities for civil society to impact policy formulation are limited. Any such council should gain international recognition as a representative body for Afghan civil society, via support from UNAMA. Its role in domestic politics should be further promoted by garnering support in the Lower House. This would increase the possibility of a call for a Loya Jirga pre-2014 and 2015 elections.

Cohesion and ownership

Even among higher state officials, commitments are to factions rather than to the future stability of the nation as a whole. Measures needed to promote increased cohesion and ownership include developing regional and district shuras facilitated by the aforementioned National Council.

Loya Jirga

The best and simplest way to deliver reform in Afghanistan would be to recreate the opportunity previously available in June 2002 and call a credible Loya Jirga. Anti-government forces such as the disenchanted Pashtun paramount chiefs (and those of the moderate Taliban who have not been assassinated) would have to be included in the talks. All voices must be welcomed.

The aim would be to accumulate enough support to generate a substantial call for a Loya Jirga prior to the 2014 and 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively; a Loya Jirga which could provide the required circumstances for constitutional reform and restructure the Afghan government as an Afghanized democracy.

The Loya Jirga would facilitate reform and initiate the subsequent rearrangement of the Upper House. Members would thereafter be appointed by the National Council.

The Loya Jirga would determine the form of the future governance of Afghanistan.

There need be no rigid timescale for this process. The Loya Jirga itself could (and perhaps should) even act as the pro-tem government of Afghanistan for up to three years. This would be sufficiently supported by all, if the alternative was believed to be continuance of the present system.

This process requires a Loya Jirga that can facilitate the repair of today’s government via constitutional reform. A Loya Jirga is arranged in accordance with Article 111 of the constitution:

‘Grand Council [Loya Jirga]' is convened in the following situations: To take decision
on the issues related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and supreme interests of the country’

The Loya Jirga would:

• Amend the constitution and approve necessary changes. This would lead to a suspension of the existing senate and parliament, putting restraints on Presidential power in favour of a more Prime Ministerial system. Such a move would ideally require the support of the incumbent president, which may prove difficult to obtain.

• Establish independent control commissions to provide a mechanism of checks and balances on the workings of the reformed government.

• Order the exemplary arrest of a few significant warlords and criminals (some of whom have positions in government) and hold them to account for atrocities they have committed. This should enhance the population’s confidence in the legitimacy of the system of governance. The families of many warlords are already privately expressing the view that their fathers should legitimize their activities, with an eye on the day that Western forces depart Afghanistan. These families have significant business that could be legitimized. The second and third order consequences of making an example of one or two warlords are likely to be positive.

• Address and aim for a reconciliatory approach towards tribal leaders (and where appropriate the Taliban, recognising that the ‘Taliban’ are composed of many different factions).

• Contribute to the appointment of district governors, in close co-operation with the ‘National Council’.

It is important that those involved do not attempt to manipulate the outcome of the Loya Jirga. Rather, the process must be indigenously driven and shaped in order that the outcomes garner the support of the population as a whole.

Upper House

Initially, the Upper House should be Loya Jirga appointed. Subsequently it would be partly ‘National Council’ appointed.

The National Council would, in 2015, have sole responsibility for the appointment of one third of the members to the Upper House (currently the prerogative of the President). The National Council would facilitate appointments in accordance with the potential members’ political and vocational competence (rather than their bank balances or relations to the president).

The appointments would be made via votes in the National Council, not by the head of state. The remaining two thirds in the Upper House would be elected via the provincial and district councils - checks and balances on the Lower House would, in this way, be coordinated by a legitimate set of members protecting the Afghan people from clientelist policies.

The Speaker of the Upper House should be elected (as at present) by the House itself or alternatively by the nation, but given the title and trappings (though not the power) currently associated with the President. This new President would be Head of State.

As at present, the role of the Upper House would primarily be advisory, with some limited legislative veto powers. It would have substantive power in three arenas however:


1. Foreign Policy: In addition to its advisory role, it would appoint all ambassadors.

2. Judicial: In addition to its advisory role, it would appoint all judges.

3. National Army: The Commander in Chief would report to the Prime Minister, but would be appointed by the Upper House.

4. Local Tribal Commands / Police Force: Local law enforcement bodies, both civil and military, should report to regional Governors. Governors would be appointed by the Upper House. Considerable political power would thus be devolved to Provincial Governors around the country.

This must be a gradual course of action to avoid the risk of having powerful warlords running independent personal fiefdoms. In the initial transitional stage, these governors would be appointed by the National Council in close co-operation with the original Loya Jirga. This would ensure recruitment of governors on the basis of talent and capacity, not personal relationships or political ideologies, as is the situation today.

5. Elections: The independent electoral commission would be answerable to the judiciary but appointed by the Upper House.

Lower House

The Lower House should be elected, as at present, but with greater transparency and significantly more independent oversight of the electoral process. New electoral legislation should also be introduced, allowing candidates to run under the banner of a political party on the actual ballot slip, hence improving the electoral process and ensuring a broader base of candidates. This is vital.

The Prime Minister would be selected (for a fixed term) by the Lower House, and he/she would appoint all Ministers. Principal power would lie with this Prime Ministerial post and the cabinet in a central government. The Lower House itself would have budgetary and law-making powers.

Ceremonial Head of State

The head of state should have substantially limited influence in comparison to the power currently executed by the Afghan President – the new president would have to be a neutral figure that would be acceptable to the majority of all Afghans. Acting beyond everyday politics, not possessing significant political power and serving as a unifying figure for the Afghan people, his main official tasks would be:

a) To call elections
b) To give advice and be kept informed by the Prime Minster of the affairs of the State
c) To swear in the new Prime Minister on his/her assumption of office
d) To swear in the chief justice
e) To convene the Loya Jirga on the advice of the Upper House and the Prime Minister, or following a decision of the Wolesi Jirga to that effect
f) To inaugurate the National Assembly and the Loya Jirga
g) To award Honours
h) To accept the credentials of ambassadors
i) The prerogative of mercy
j) To appoint one third of the Meshrano Jirga members on the advice of the National Council

Economy

Due to the conflict, and the levels of control exercised by mafias and opium traffickers, economic environment is insecure. There are three main tracks that should be prioritized to foster economic improvements.

(1) Create secure, stable, ‘corruption-free’ zones of commerce

Corruption (i.e. bribery), poor rule of law and low levels of security hinder investment and reduce productivity in Afghanistan. This report recommends the development of local initiatives based on ‘secure zones of commerce’. The crucial characteristic of these zones are that they are less bureaucratic and are corruption free.

Some suggest it would be more pragmatic to merely make such zones ‘less corrupt’. They ask what the incentives to reduce this corruption might be, and suggest that corruption is ‘the Afghan way’. We would dispute that. Most Afghans are exhausted by current corruption levels, fostered by the international community’s practices of paying bribes for co-operation, e.g. for safe passage of goods and services through hostile areas by road. They now desire to work in a corruption free zone.

The absence of corruption is a pre-requisite if such economic zones are to promote international engagement. One possible approach would be to establish them from the outset in cooperation with Transparency International, applying strict law enforcement mechanisms. It would be preferable if anti-corruption surveillance were performed by an Afghan team, but the initial phase of development might require close monitoring by the international community. These zones would trigger further diversification of Afghanistan’s agriculture-oriented economy. Dynamic business ‘hubs’ would be created in Afghanistan which would enable the state to reduce the business risk for national and foreign investors, as well as attract entrepreneurial skills.

The establishment of these zones requires practical measures. First, their complete security would have to be assured. A stable government must be in place, and they must make promises such that foreign investors are guaranteed business security. A guarantee of property rights is particularly imperative, though not the only necessary measure that must be taken by government.

The zones must each be connected to one of the major cities in Afghanistan (and, where possible, adjoining countries), through secured lines of transportation. This is difficult to achieve, but functional, reliable communications are critical to the successful promotion of investment.

Negotiations for special trade relationships would also be desirable; for example, preferential trading quotas with the European Union. Border controls, tariffs and duty levies are all critical to reducing the risk to foreign business. To attract investment, these zones must be free-trade zones. In 2002 the government tried to establish Afghanistan as a free trade zone, to encourage foreign investment, but the initiative was not successful. At present academics (Pain and Goodhead) identify three functioning Afghan economies: the warlord economy, the black market economy and the subsistence economy.
Economic/agricultural development must be stimulated both top down and bottom up. Small business enterprises must be encouraged to participate in these new zones. Some Community Development Councils (CDC) or CDC clusters could serve as local entry points to establish these zones and foster local participation in their development.

Afghanistan’s relationship with Iran must be addressed as a source for stability. India’s investment in Iranian ports could be used to secure an Indian-Iranian-Afghan secure trade route, without the involvement of Pakistan.

This does not mean that Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan should be of less importance; rather, a balanced relationship should be maintained whereby Indian rapprochement with the Kabul government is not perceived as a threat by Pakistan. (Indeed were this report’s recommendations on governance adopted, much of the tension that creates the RAW – ISA proxy war would be diffused).

Furthermore, stimulating entrepreneurship through targeted programs and funds, for instance linked to specific shura projects, could be an important element of business development.

(2) The opium trade

Afghanistan is by far the world’s largest producer of illicit opium. This activity pervades every level of the Afghan economic system, from the poorest farmers in the country to the inner circles of the government. This is made possible through the exploitation of the hawala system, through which large sums of money are transferred anonymously.

The illegal trade in opium represents a major threat to sustainable Afghan development, undermining efforts to ensure security. A radical shift in anti-drug policy should be considered. Although controversial, we suggest that the implementation of pilot projects for legal poppy production should be accelerated.

Opium is a crop of high value, very well-suited to Afghanistan’s climatic conditions. Many rural livelihoods are dependent on its growth. Opium cultivation is highly labour-intensive and employs up to 480 persons per hectare per day during the harvesting period. A legal system of opium production would allow the Afghan state to tax the products of legitimate poppy cultivation and increase government revenue.

Legalisation would also enable the channelling of poppy production into the manufacture of opiate-based drugs, such as morphine. Demand for opiate-based medicine is not being met by current world production. The World Health Organization estimates that 80% of the world population has insufficient access to essential analgesics. Afghanistan would benefit from a legal framework to establish a national pharmaceutical industry.

The legalisation process should be based on a licensing system comparable to that already being implemented in India. This report would recommend keeping the processing of the opium within the rural community in which the poppy is grown. This has the advantage of both supporting rural employment and of promoting local ownership of the process.

The Indian experience shows that the village community can provide sufficient leverage against any attempts at illegal diversion of the product. The village control system means that if one farmer sells product illegally, the entire area loses the license. In Afghanistan, village license based production could be developed under the surveillance of village shura.

Naturally any attempt to licence poppy production requires a strong administrative system (one of Afghanistan’s main weaknesses). Yet with the appropriate level of international technical assistance, this programme could present an opportunity to develop a very successful, corruption-free, state agency.

Developing legal poppy production does not mean forgetting other strategies that have been deployed. Efforts to develop alternative livelihoods should continue hand in hand with the legalisation process. A legalisation scheme could not be effective if it was not complemented by a reinforcement of the anti-drug and anti-corruption policies which should involve the prosecution of corrupt officials.

(3) Support the development of Afghan agriculture

More than 80% of the population in Afghanistan derives its livelihood from agriculture. If Afghan agriculture is to develop, attention should be paid to the extent of feudal relations in rural societies. Economic prosperity must extend beyond landlords to the farmers and tenants, based on a realistic degree of equity. Whilst land reform seems unrealistic at this stage, there are practical steps that can foster agricultural modernization and transform the semi-feudal system that currently exists.

1. A greater effort is needed to achieve the effective registration of land ownership. The absence of official cadastral record impedes the determination of land ownership. It leads to multiple overlapping ownership claims, land grabbing and cumbersome land purchase and sale procedures, causing many land disputes. A cadastral survey should be associated with a strengthening of local structures addressing land disputes, such as Primary Courts. Inadequate land registration is not only bad for agricultural development but discourages foreign direct investment in the whole Afghan economy.

2. In order to reduce the striking inequalities in Afghan rural areas, the legal framework must be strengthened so as to offer better protection to tenant farmers. Legislative improvements are required to enhance tenure security through the development of legal contracting arrangements between tenants and landlords stating a clear distribution of revenues. A national minimum for the share of revenues allocated to tenants would be desirable.

There are three main lines of thinking which could be followed to accelerate the reconstruction of the Afghan agricultural sector and cultivate alternative products to opiates.

1. An agricultural policy should be developed, with some elements similar to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This report’s recommendations involve the implementation of two mechanisms:

a. A system of direct subsidy payments to farmers, which would target high value products such as watermelon, almonds, pomegranate, wheat and saffron.

b. This system would be complemented by a government decision to guarantee farmers a minimum price for their products. This would mean setting an intervention price. If the market prices fall below this intervention price, the Afghan state would buy up agricultural goods in order to raise prices to the minimum price.

A comprehensive system of support to agriculture would both create economic incentives to abandon the production of opiates and ensure peasants have a minimal livelihood. If Afghanistan’s application for accession to the WTO is approved, these subsidies will, of course, have to be in line with the WTO Agricultural Agreement and specified in Afghanistan’s list of commitments.

2. Investment in infrastructure and irrigation systems is also necessary. The destruction caused by years of conflict significantly impedes the rebuilding of Afghan agriculture. Water management is imperative when seeking to enable wide usage of agricultural land. Examples include Northern Africa and Central Spain.

Polyculture may be useful in this context (i.e. combining fish farming or reed bed water treatment with resources intended for irrigation). The potential development of organic farming should also be explored, in particular emphasizing a variety of local species that are adapted to drought (e.g. pomegranates, raisins).

3. The government must also increase their level of investment in university-level education of Afghanistan’s future agricultural professionals.

4. In-kind food aid from the international community should be reduced in order to stimulate greater indigenous production.

Women

Gender Equality:
With government reform, amendment of the penal code and the re-education of the Taliban generation, Afghanistan could see a better future for women.

• The Penal Code – the 1976 code in place today classifies adultery (or 'zina') as a punishable crime, whilst rape, sexual harassment, sex slavery and human trafficking are not. This needs amendment (particularly of Articles 422-433) which could take place at a Loya Jirga.

• Implementation of the law for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) – this would ensure equality, education and health care for women. At the same time abuse and violence against women, child and forced marriages and the buying and selling of women for marriage ('baad' and 'baadal') would all become punishable offences. Prohibiting the buying and selling of women could additionally reduce domestic abuse – many men are resentful of the high dowries that must be paid which in turn leave them with high levels of debt.

• Educated religious leaders are absent from the shuras where they are most needed – the presence of enlightened religious figures in the provincial tribes would mean that communities would be encouraged to treat women equally. This would also provide an advisor to be consulted on domestic issues that are brought before the shura.

• The creation of female shuras – women-only shuras should be introduced into provincial communities, giving women local, female support. Only 18% of women are aware that other females suffer abuse due to their enforced isolation. The implementation of all women shura structures would sharpen the focus on previously neglected issues such as women’s (and subsequently children’s) health. The long distance between homes and health centres, the widespread illiteracy that limits educational and employment aspirations of women and tribal customs that forbid women to work or be visited by male heath workers, compound difficulties faced by many Afghan women and children seeking health care. Only 40% of Afghan basic health facilities employ female health-care providers.

• National and local awareness programs and workshops – should be offered via local shuras, clergy and elders. This would empower local communities and eventually the long-term benefits of community education would show. A balance must be struck between the religious and modern curriculums, which would pave way for increased school attendance for girls in rural Afghanistan.

• Media outlets such as community radios should focus on women’s health, family and children to help counter excessive patriarchal control. Connecting women with one another will have a transformative effect.

Current Situation:

Afghanistan's post-Taliban reforms have little improved the lives of women. A 2010 report conducted by UNAMA found that in 29 out of the 34 Afghan provinces, abuse of women’s rights occurs on a daily basis. In Kabul, during the 1950s, women could be students, work on university faculties, hold respected office jobs and even labour on construction sites. In the 1920s, under King Amanulla, women first won the right to go to schools and under King Zahir Shah, they walked the streets safely without burqas. In the communist 1980s, women were finally viewed as having the right to be involved in policy formation. Many have died as martyrs in order to fight for women's rights over the years in Afghanistan: Malalai Kakar - a prominent policewoman, Safia Ama Jan - Director of Ministry of Women's Affairs in the Kandahar province and Zakia Zaki - journalist, to name but a few, have been murdered and tortured by Afghan men for their progressive ideals. Suraya Parlika is a veteran protestor, a widely respected Nobel Peace Prize Nominee and an Upper House member in the Afghan Parliament. She was imprisoned, beaten regularly and had her fingernails removed. If the Taliban were given an opportunity to return to power in Southern Afghanistan, it would seem that these women’s momentous sacrifices have been in vain.

Opposition to women’s rights not only exists among Taliban members but is also prevalent within the Afghan government itself. The high level of impunity imposed by the West during the transition process in 2001-2002 has facilitated the continued presence of fundamentalist forces in state structures. These extreme conservatives in government oppose reform in the educational sector, so crucial for the advancement of women’s rights.

President Karzai is currently negotiating with the Taliban. In 2009, the Afghan government reintroduced the Shia Family Law which curtailed women’s custody rights and their freedom of movement. President Karzai’s talks with the Taliban precede a possible division of the nation whereby the Taliban may (de facto) rule the South once more. This report recommends the decentralization of state power. The allocation of power and responsibility to provincial, traditional shuras would allow for a more optimistic future for women.

Conclusion

The problems caused by the current fragmentation of Afghan society form an inextricably interwoven web, each issue reliant on the other’s resolution. Whilst attempting to strengthen the basic societal structures, pre-existing traditional institutions must not be overlooked. The shuras, the jirgas and the mirabs are well-functioning local platforms for debate, conflict resolution and decision-making. Attempts to foster a greater civil society should stem from these.

Afghanistan has a strong chance of a stable and exciting future. We so often fail to remember that Afghanistan had a comparatively stable and prosperous period in the modern era, remembered by older Afghans as a near golden age under Kings Nadir and Zahir Shah (1929-1973). Problems existed that eventually allowed the possibility of Soviet interference and put an end to the traditional structures of governance. A reaffirmation of these traditional structures would provide stability and better standards of human rights, especially for women, as well as real hope for the future.