The Afghan National Army has experienced certain positive changes under Western military forces during the past 6 months, however evidence dictates that these changes remain superficial and temporary in effectiveness. With appalling attrition rates, continued 'crash-course' training for new recruits and corrupt leadership, it is quite apparent that the ANA stand as little chance of being a functioning, sustainable, legitimate enforcer of security today as they did two hundred years ago.
The Ministry of Interior has consistently failed to control and organise the forces under their command, especially the Afghan National Police who are much less respected than the ANA. The current police force receive such poor salaries that corruption is perceived as being the only way of survival. Many believe that the Upper House should take over responsibility of the ANP as transparent elections and promotions are more probable there, thus making non-corrupt and effective leadership of the ANP more achievable.
As we approach 2014 - the agreed departure date of Western forces from Afghanistan - it is hard to imagine that such thorough reforms of two broken security forces will ever occur at all, let alone in such a short time frame. Some propose that Afghanistan will be split - the North will be under Karzai control with subtle Western influence and the South will once again be under the Taliban. The expected conflict brought about by the separation will undoubtedly overwhelm security forces, possibly leaving the nation spiralling down at a much faster rate with less Western military supervision.
The other approach which attempts to ease the fragile Afghanistan into the 2014 transition is allocating more responsibility to local tribesmen. This would mean an Afghan Government that cooperates with former insurgents such as the Pashtuns and allows them a greater stake in their own country through financial incentives to secure and manage their own local region. The ANA could be organised into smaller divisions and placed in certain regions to oversee and offer support to the tribes. This analogy could also provide greater security to the porous and vulnerable Afghan-Pakistan border as many tribes operate there already and are at high risk of daily assassination. Through creating a strong network of regional security bodies and promoting a more self-determined nation of Afghan civilians with occassional input from a small but organised ANA, Afghanistan can hope to enjoy a better system of security and a more peaceful society.
Thursday, 2 June 2011
Monday, 16 May 2011
Afghanistan, crossroads of the Ancient World, British Museum. Extended until 17 July 2011
16-05-2011
It is always refreshing to hear something about Afghanistan that does not relate to war and violence. This is why the extension of the British Museum exhibition on Afghanistan until mid-July is good news for all those who wish to learn more about the immense cultural richness of this country. The exhibition displays some of its most beautiful treasures, dating back from the Bronze Age to the 1st century AD. It gathers over 200 objects, ranging from classical sculptures to inlaid gold ornaments, mainly coming from the collection of the National Museum of Afghanistan.
The fate of some of these treasures over the past decades reflects the troubled history of Afghanistan during the same period. Discovered by the Greco-Russian archaeologist Victor Sarigiannidis in six different tombs in the North of the country, in 1978, on the eve of the Soviet invasion, these objects were saved by the staff of the National Museum from the great turmoil that followed. While the National Museum was looted and bombed and most of its treasures lost forever, these objects survived in the safety boxes of the National Bank. It is only in 2003, while Afghanistan was in the middle of another conflict, that President Karzai announced that the treasures had resurfaced. The fragile destiny of Afghan treasures makes the present exhibition even more important.
There is another reason why this exhibition is worth noting. As suggested by the subtitle – Crossroads of the Ancient World – it is useful to remind us of the long history of the country, once opened to multiple cultural influences and trade exchanges, going against the common present perception of Afghanistan as an inherently closed and isolated country. The Museum’s director said it was part of the initial project to ‘demonstrate that [this is] a historically anomalous moment’[i] in the long history of Afghanistan. An opportunity to see another picture of Afghanistan is rare these days, it is better not to miss it!
http://www.britishmuseum.org/whats_on/future_exhibitions/afghanistan.aspx
[i] Quoted by The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2010/nov/29/afghanistan-treasure-british-museum
Saturday, 30 April 2011
2011 Media Awards, Oxford & Cambridge Club UK
Hanif Hangham won the Press Freedom Award - a special Award given to this brave Satterist who has risked his life for many years. The programme that he hosts is one that the people of Afghanisan tune into if they wish to know what is going on politically!
He got as far as London, but a day late so we have this award for next year so 2012 we hope to see him here!
See you next year, Hanif, safe travelling!
Veronica Morris.
He got as far as London, but a day late so we have this award for next year so 2012 we hope to see him here!
See you next year, Hanif, safe travelling!
Veronica Morris.
Tuesday, 15 March 2011
Afghanistan: time to face reality
Ranj sent us his latest article - he's a prop up Karzai man:
Afghanistan continues to edge towards the precipice. State-building efforts in the country are still plagued with inefficiency, corruption and disorganisation, whilst international coalition forces in the form of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) find themselves at the losing end of a battle to dominate the public perception on the Afghan street: ongoing daily violence, coupled with increasing calls for a firm withdrawal among the international community has signaled to average Afghans that the West will soon pack up and go, whilst the resilient, unwavering Taliban are there to stay.
All is not yet lost though. The international community will have to soon start taking tough decisions and bring the conflict back to its basics if it is going to achieve the underlying objective that took it to the country in the first place.
The US and its international partners’ objectives in Afghanistan have generally fallen under three over-arching categories: stability, representative governance and the rule of law. The stability objective in specific terms means ensuring Afghanistan does not once again become a place from which extremist forces can attack the West and its interests. The narrative, as diplomats, analysts and academics alike, currently tell it is that this can only be achieved once the other objectives are met. In other words, Afghanistan cannot be secured until you have an efficient and legitimate government that can implement some respectful standard of democracy and human rights.
It is now clear that this argument and strategy is utterly flawed and unrealistic. What the nine-year conflict has shown is that the numerous over-arching objectives cannot be met in their entirety, will certainly not be achieved should the US begin its drawdown in July 2011 or within the five year troop withdrawal deadline being proposed by Prime Minister David Cameron, and will most certainly not be achieved within the next ten years – if the current record is anything to go by.
The realities on the ground justify this inconvenient truth.
Firstly, there is no political strategy in Afghanistan that can reconcile the Karzai-led government with other rival tribal and political factions, all vying for power and a serious stake in the country. The reality is that the current government is entrenched in a tribal and political web of patronage and corruption that has become impossible to remedy.
Beyond this, and secondly, there is no clear consensus on how, and whether, to negotiate and reconcile with the fragmented Taliban. The Taliban is not the cohesive, hierarchical and organised entity that they may come across as being. Three disparate entities are currently fighting in the country: the Taliban, which is led by Mullah Omar but whose whereabouts remains elusive; the Haqqani network, led by the former mujahideen warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj Haqqani and, finally, a collection of domestic and foreign fighters that includes al-Qaida. There is, therefore, no leadership to negotiate with.
Finally, even if a grand strategy was offered, elements within and beyond Afghanistan in neighbouring states have become convinced that the west will not be around long enough to enforce it. The now clear commitment to withdraw troops within a fixed deadline or, at the very, least reduce troops in the country justifies their concerns.
More importantly, what this means is that Kabul will have little incentive to carry out the reforms essential for any counter-insurgency initiative to work. The Afghan government, suffering from a legitimacy crisis, is not committed to maintaining stability. It is aware of the above limitations in the state-building process and thus individuals within its upper echelons will continue to maximise their political and financial gain while they are in a position to do so, convinced that an ISAF withdrawal and potential defeat lies on the horizon.
The west, unwilling to publicly repudiate the government and its shambolic elections, or advocate an alternative, has inadvertently consolidated their positions and is now unable to displace them and their obstructive networks of power, so that reform takes place. To remove them from power now would invite a violent backlash of epic and uncontrollable proportions.
The international community must accept that a stable and representative government is no longer feasible, and certainly not one able to adequately implement the rule of law and enforce human rights. These are values that may have to be sacrificed. Sadly, Afghans never had such luxuries in the first place, at least not in recent times, and in truth the west is unlikely to ever be in a position to provide them with it.
To carry on in denial and futility will be a waste of human lives (civilian and military), resources and in essence unfair on the Afghan people. Instead, the west must go back to what it does best: make do with what it has and pursue its historic policy of supporting suspect regimes in the middle east, Asia and Latin America.
Karzai and his government may have to be propped up; heavily supported (financially and militarily) and assured, so that it becomes the West’s bulwark against the insurgency and extremists – the ultimate objective. The West would therefore leave Afghanistan to Afghans but without handing the state back to the Taliban and al-Qaida.
To make this effective and rewarding, focus must continue to be on the Afghan security forces, ensuring they are up to the task of countering the insurgency. Defeating them may not be an option, at least according to on-the-ground observers. Containing and reducing them to sporadic attacks is though.
That requires maintaining, beyond any withdrawal, an international force of military and police advisors, engaged in non-combat duties and comprised of the renowned EU police training missions. At present there are some 3,600 trainers on the ground. There is still a shortfall of nearly 500 trainers, but once the focus turns from combat to training that can be rectified by states who may have previously been reluctant.
More challenging is keeping at bay Afghanistan’s neighbours. The proxy conflict between the Pakistani intelligence service (the ISI) and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) suggests that Pakistan will not cooperate with the west in Afghanistan, despite pretences to the contrary. In reality, Pakistan seeks instability in Afghanistan since a stable Afghanistan will likely be pro-India. India has a vested interest in the current government, possibly more so than the West, because it is a means of containing Pakistan.
China feels that NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is an effort at securing a strategic base in the region whilst securing access to energy resources and encircling China. Iran, meanwhile, will be ill at ease with a stable NATO ally on its Eastern border. Keeping NATO resources tied up in Afghanistan means the probability of war against Iran is reduced.
All this renders it even more imperative to ensure the current government is consolidated, lest the withdrawal of ISAF leads to a civil war intensified by regional neighbours and which leads to the collapse of the Karzai government, much like the 1992 collapse of the Najabullah government three years after the Soviet withdrawal.
Pursuant to this, it is also an option to maintain the above-mentioned international force of advisors for at least another twenty-years. There is no reason why these non-combat personnel cannot be deployed alongside Afghan forces in the most extreme and unlikely of cases, upon the request of the Afghan government and in the event the government does edge towards the brink.
In short, the strategy in Afghanistan must revolve around what is viable and sustainable. Propping up Karzai is not the ideal choice to take but it is perhaps the only realistic option amidst what is a complex political, security and geopolitical environment.
Afghanistan continues to edge towards the precipice. State-building efforts in the country are still plagued with inefficiency, corruption and disorganisation, whilst international coalition forces in the form of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) find themselves at the losing end of a battle to dominate the public perception on the Afghan street: ongoing daily violence, coupled with increasing calls for a firm withdrawal among the international community has signaled to average Afghans that the West will soon pack up and go, whilst the resilient, unwavering Taliban are there to stay.
All is not yet lost though. The international community will have to soon start taking tough decisions and bring the conflict back to its basics if it is going to achieve the underlying objective that took it to the country in the first place.
The US and its international partners’ objectives in Afghanistan have generally fallen under three over-arching categories: stability, representative governance and the rule of law. The stability objective in specific terms means ensuring Afghanistan does not once again become a place from which extremist forces can attack the West and its interests. The narrative, as diplomats, analysts and academics alike, currently tell it is that this can only be achieved once the other objectives are met. In other words, Afghanistan cannot be secured until you have an efficient and legitimate government that can implement some respectful standard of democracy and human rights.
It is now clear that this argument and strategy is utterly flawed and unrealistic. What the nine-year conflict has shown is that the numerous over-arching objectives cannot be met in their entirety, will certainly not be achieved should the US begin its drawdown in July 2011 or within the five year troop withdrawal deadline being proposed by Prime Minister David Cameron, and will most certainly not be achieved within the next ten years – if the current record is anything to go by.
The realities on the ground justify this inconvenient truth.
Firstly, there is no political strategy in Afghanistan that can reconcile the Karzai-led government with other rival tribal and political factions, all vying for power and a serious stake in the country. The reality is that the current government is entrenched in a tribal and political web of patronage and corruption that has become impossible to remedy.
Beyond this, and secondly, there is no clear consensus on how, and whether, to negotiate and reconcile with the fragmented Taliban. The Taliban is not the cohesive, hierarchical and organised entity that they may come across as being. Three disparate entities are currently fighting in the country: the Taliban, which is led by Mullah Omar but whose whereabouts remains elusive; the Haqqani network, led by the former mujahideen warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj Haqqani and, finally, a collection of domestic and foreign fighters that includes al-Qaida. There is, therefore, no leadership to negotiate with.
Finally, even if a grand strategy was offered, elements within and beyond Afghanistan in neighbouring states have become convinced that the west will not be around long enough to enforce it. The now clear commitment to withdraw troops within a fixed deadline or, at the very, least reduce troops in the country justifies their concerns.
More importantly, what this means is that Kabul will have little incentive to carry out the reforms essential for any counter-insurgency initiative to work. The Afghan government, suffering from a legitimacy crisis, is not committed to maintaining stability. It is aware of the above limitations in the state-building process and thus individuals within its upper echelons will continue to maximise their political and financial gain while they are in a position to do so, convinced that an ISAF withdrawal and potential defeat lies on the horizon.
The west, unwilling to publicly repudiate the government and its shambolic elections, or advocate an alternative, has inadvertently consolidated their positions and is now unable to displace them and their obstructive networks of power, so that reform takes place. To remove them from power now would invite a violent backlash of epic and uncontrollable proportions.
The international community must accept that a stable and representative government is no longer feasible, and certainly not one able to adequately implement the rule of law and enforce human rights. These are values that may have to be sacrificed. Sadly, Afghans never had such luxuries in the first place, at least not in recent times, and in truth the west is unlikely to ever be in a position to provide them with it.
To carry on in denial and futility will be a waste of human lives (civilian and military), resources and in essence unfair on the Afghan people. Instead, the west must go back to what it does best: make do with what it has and pursue its historic policy of supporting suspect regimes in the middle east, Asia and Latin America.
Karzai and his government may have to be propped up; heavily supported (financially and militarily) and assured, so that it becomes the West’s bulwark against the insurgency and extremists – the ultimate objective. The West would therefore leave Afghanistan to Afghans but without handing the state back to the Taliban and al-Qaida.
To make this effective and rewarding, focus must continue to be on the Afghan security forces, ensuring they are up to the task of countering the insurgency. Defeating them may not be an option, at least according to on-the-ground observers. Containing and reducing them to sporadic attacks is though.
That requires maintaining, beyond any withdrawal, an international force of military and police advisors, engaged in non-combat duties and comprised of the renowned EU police training missions. At present there are some 3,600 trainers on the ground. There is still a shortfall of nearly 500 trainers, but once the focus turns from combat to training that can be rectified by states who may have previously been reluctant.
More challenging is keeping at bay Afghanistan’s neighbours. The proxy conflict between the Pakistani intelligence service (the ISI) and the Indian intelligence service (RAW) suggests that Pakistan will not cooperate with the west in Afghanistan, despite pretences to the contrary. In reality, Pakistan seeks instability in Afghanistan since a stable Afghanistan will likely be pro-India. India has a vested interest in the current government, possibly more so than the West, because it is a means of containing Pakistan.
China feels that NATO’s presence in Afghanistan is an effort at securing a strategic base in the region whilst securing access to energy resources and encircling China. Iran, meanwhile, will be ill at ease with a stable NATO ally on its Eastern border. Keeping NATO resources tied up in Afghanistan means the probability of war against Iran is reduced.
All this renders it even more imperative to ensure the current government is consolidated, lest the withdrawal of ISAF leads to a civil war intensified by regional neighbours and which leads to the collapse of the Karzai government, much like the 1992 collapse of the Najabullah government three years after the Soviet withdrawal.
Pursuant to this, it is also an option to maintain the above-mentioned international force of advisors for at least another twenty-years. There is no reason why these non-combat personnel cannot be deployed alongside Afghan forces in the most extreme and unlikely of cases, upon the request of the Afghan government and in the event the government does edge towards the brink.
In short, the strategy in Afghanistan must revolve around what is viable and sustainable. Propping up Karzai is not the ideal choice to take but it is perhaps the only realistic option amidst what is a complex political, security and geopolitical environment.
Tuesday, 1 March 2011
Conference on Afghanistan- Saturday 9th April 2011
The NCF is holding a conference on Afghanistan on Saturday 9th April 2011 from 9:30am - 4:00pm.
If you would like to attend this, please email Joanna Lewis at ncfmepp@aol.com.
Details of the conference are below:
The Next Century Foundation working in cooperation with Innovation Arts have convened a conference on Afghanistan:
Emerging from Crisis
A spotlight on the difficulties facing the people of Afghanistan
9:30 am: Registration and coffee
10:00 am: Opening remarks
Policy working groups in cooperation with Innovation Arts.
Working discussion groups 10:30am – 4:00pm (working lunch 1:00pm).
1. Traditional Governance Issues
2. Corruption and the Judiciary
3. The Ongoing Battle Against the Illegal Narcotics Trade
4. Afghan Civil Society: Woman, Education, Human Rights and Press Freedom
5. The Future of Security Policy and International Involvement in Afghanistan
6. Transition: Prospects for the Transfer of Power
7. Afghanistan and her Neighbours
An informal, creative atmosphere will allow you as participants, the main actors in the session, to work together as peers. Discussion leaders will encourage participation and share their experiences. The discussion in the groups will be used as the basis on which to formulate the proceedings of the day.
If you would like to attend this, please email Joanna Lewis at ncfmepp@aol.com.
Details of the conference are below:
The Next Century Foundation working in cooperation with Innovation Arts have convened a conference on Afghanistan:
Emerging from Crisis
A spotlight on the difficulties facing the people of Afghanistan
9:30 am: Registration and coffee
10:00 am: Opening remarks
Policy working groups in cooperation with Innovation Arts.
Working discussion groups 10:30am – 4:00pm (working lunch 1:00pm).
1. Traditional Governance Issues
2. Corruption and the Judiciary
3. The Ongoing Battle Against the Illegal Narcotics Trade
4. Afghan Civil Society: Woman, Education, Human Rights and Press Freedom
5. The Future of Security Policy and International Involvement in Afghanistan
6. Transition: Prospects for the Transfer of Power
7. Afghanistan and her Neighbours
An informal, creative atmosphere will allow you as participants, the main actors in the session, to work together as peers. Discussion leaders will encourage participation and share their experiences. The discussion in the groups will be used as the basis on which to formulate the proceedings of the day.
Sunday, 27 February 2011
New Speaker
From Saad Mohseni today: Raoof Ibrahimi, an ethnic Uzbek from Kunduz, becomes Afghanistan's Speaker (Lower House of Parliament)
Friday, 11 February 2011
Hanif Hangam
Hanif Hangam has now been shortlisted for a media award by the NCF. The scripts that he writes for this satirical political show, by which the population of Kabul is able to see what is going on in the city "Alarm Bell" is a show that lampoons Taliban rebels, warlords, UN diplomats and pilgrims to Mecca. He treads a narrow path with threats of being beaten up, it's amazing he's still alive!
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