UK pull out from Sangin

There has been much discussion in the press about the British pull out from Sangin in early July. It was the area in which the UK suffered its heaviest losses; around 100 deaths since 2001. Though only having a tenth of British troops in Afghanistan, it contributed almost a third of total British military losses.

In some ways, the move seems entirely logical – even routine. The US has recently increased troops in Afghanistan by 30,000 which means that the ratio of British to US troops has shifted and so the ratio of responsibilities should shift too. Furthermore, British troops need to consolidate the gains they have made in Central Helmand and freeing up troops from Sangin would help do that.

However, there are some worrying things to be noted from this episode. The first is the reaction from the military itself; they were insistent that it be called a re-deployment, and not a retreat. In some ways, by vehemently claiming it was not a retreat, the military actually made it look more like a retreat. The phrase “methinks he doth protest too much” really comes to mind!

Another area for concern is that many of the problems faced by British troops in Sangin are similar in other areas of Afghanistan. The volatile mix of clans around Sangin highlighted the lack of planning in Britain’s venture, as they did not have the adequate knowledge to deal effectively with these local tribes. The difficult terrain required more British helicopters, which never came. Local militants, who knew the lay of the land, were able to kill British troops through mastering two tactics, the use of the sniper rifle and the use of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Asked about the vulnerability of British troops in Sangin, Brigadier George Norton said: “We are all vulnerable to IEDs, but the insurgents are increasingly using long-distance small arms.” Major General Gordon Messenger, the Ministry of Defence’s chief military spokesman, said Taliban-led insurgents were resorting to what he described as an “increasing use of single shots at range”. The issue is, if British troops couldn’t think of adequate tactics to deal with this type of insurgency in Sangin, how can we have much hope for the rest of Afghanistan?

Finally, the reaction of the Taliban to this is absolute delight. Over and above the physical workings of the war, the war to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans is raging. Afghan support for coalition troops is already very strained, not helped by the “collateral damage” by which thousands of Afghans have been killed. Now, what the Taliban will portray as a coalition failure, will further encourage ordinary Afghans to switch their allegiance; why wouldn’t they if they think the Coalition forces are beginning their retreat?

Rory Stewart: Afghanistan & Western Policymaking

He was born in Hong Kong and raised in Malaysia. He recounts tales of ham and cheese sandwiches followed by raft building deep in the Malaysian wilderness - aged four years old. He served in the British Army as an officer and studied at Oxford University reading History and Philosophy. Since then he has enjoyed a prestigious career in the Foreign Office - working in places such as Kosovo and Indonesia. He has penned two critically acclaimed books. He has walked over 6000 miles in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India and Nepal. At the age of thirty he was made Deputy Governer in a province in Southern Iraq subsequent to the US-led invasion of Iraq. In academia he has excelled holding the distinguished Directorship of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. And in 2010 he was elected to the UK parliament.

His name, if you do not know yet, is Rory Stewart. And this is only a brief sketch of his career and life thus far. Incredibly he is only thirty-seven years old!

And his analysis of Western policymaking, in particular, the much heralded "Afpak Strategy" is at times powerful:

http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion