UK pull out from Sangin

There has been much discussion in the press about the British pull out from Sangin in early July. It was the area in which the UK suffered its heaviest losses; around 100 deaths since 2001. Though only having a tenth of British troops in Afghanistan, it contributed almost a third of total British military losses.

In some ways, the move seems entirely logical – even routine. The US has recently increased troops in Afghanistan by 30,000 which means that the ratio of British to US troops has shifted and so the ratio of responsibilities should shift too. Furthermore, British troops need to consolidate the gains they have made in Central Helmand and freeing up troops from Sangin would help do that.

However, there are some worrying things to be noted from this episode. The first is the reaction from the military itself; they were insistent that it be called a re-deployment, and not a retreat. In some ways, by vehemently claiming it was not a retreat, the military actually made it look more like a retreat. The phrase “methinks he doth protest too much” really comes to mind!

Another area for concern is that many of the problems faced by British troops in Sangin are similar in other areas of Afghanistan. The volatile mix of clans around Sangin highlighted the lack of planning in Britain’s venture, as they did not have the adequate knowledge to deal effectively with these local tribes. The difficult terrain required more British helicopters, which never came. Local militants, who knew the lay of the land, were able to kill British troops through mastering two tactics, the use of the sniper rifle and the use of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Asked about the vulnerability of British troops in Sangin, Brigadier George Norton said: “We are all vulnerable to IEDs, but the insurgents are increasingly using long-distance small arms.” Major General Gordon Messenger, the Ministry of Defence’s chief military spokesman, said Taliban-led insurgents were resorting to what he described as an “increasing use of single shots at range”. The issue is, if British troops couldn’t think of adequate tactics to deal with this type of insurgency in Sangin, how can we have much hope for the rest of Afghanistan?

Finally, the reaction of the Taliban to this is absolute delight. Over and above the physical workings of the war, the war to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Afghans is raging. Afghan support for coalition troops is already very strained, not helped by the “collateral damage” by which thousands of Afghans have been killed. Now, what the Taliban will portray as a coalition failure, will further encourage ordinary Afghans to switch their allegiance; why wouldn’t they if they think the Coalition forces are beginning their retreat?