Tuesday, 24 August 2010

Thoughts on Afghanistan




The current state of Afghanistan is subject to perspective. General Petraeus believes that military operations in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan have begun to “reverse Taliban momentum”. However, some people believe that the Taliban are, in fact, gaining in strength, or at least holding off the British and American advances. Either way, there needs to be a strong Afghan government to support a counterinsurgency strategy and gain the trust of the Afghan people, which is likely to be complicated in the upcoming election of 18th September.


A major problem that has to be addressed by the government is the continuing recruitment and radicalisation of young people by the Taleban. There are three main reasons for the Taleban’s success. Firstly, the Afghanis tend to resent the West. Historically, Britain has had a turbulent military involvement in Afghanistan (the first in 1839), which may lead some Afghanis to believe that the invasion is some sort of vengeance. This resentment is strengthened by the American air-strikes and bombings, which often lead to civilian casualties, and consequently the villagers are likely to be more inclined to support the Taleban. Secondly, the Afghanis feel that there is a lack of human interaction with the American soldiers, who patrol the streets heavily armed and wearing sunglasses. Although this is a minor issue, it does have an effect on the allegiances of the people, who see the soldiers as a repressive and frightening force rather than one that could help. However, most importantly, it is a matter of demographics. The percentage of people under 25 is currently 65%, set to rise to 80% by 2015. Considering that there are very few jobs for young people, and that the Taleban pay better than the Afghan security forces (by $60), combined with the previous reasons, the Taleban seem to be a very attractive organisation. Furthermore, the Security Forces are pervaded by factionalism and tribal loyalties, effectively excluding a lot of potential recruits. Indeed, 90 of the first 100 generals appointed to the new army were Tajik, reigniting ethnic struggles. Thus, to slow the Taleban’s recruitment program, which would be a huge step in the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the government has to somehow address the jobs available to young people, the fractious nature of the Security Forces and work with the British and Americans to promote a positive image of the western troops.


However, it is doubtful whether President Karzai’s government has enough strength or legitimacy to enact any consequential change. The British and American influence can only go so far, and President Obama’s plan to make the Afghan Security Forces independent and self-reliant by 2011 depends on a strong and legitimate government, elected in a fair and non-fraudulent election. Indeed, this legitimacy was an important factor in General McChrystal’s assessment (August 2009), which suggested a counterinsurgency strategy to ‘protect the Afghan population’. Unfortunately, corruption is a major problem in the government. Indeed, a US report claims that up to $3 billion in funds has been embezzled by Afghan officials since 2005. Furthermore, a U. N report states that 59% of Afghans think corruption is more important than the security concern. Thus, Karzai evidently lacks the legitimacy or credibility needed from his people to create a strong government.


So, the upcoming election could go two ways, depending on the response of Karzai to western pressure to cut corruption and clean up the Security Forces. Firstly, if the troops pull out in 2011, as planned, then Karzai will not survive. Presently, the Security Forces are neither strong enough nor organised enough to pull off a successful counterinsurgency operation. If this happens, then it is likely that the Taleban will take control. Alternatively, some believe that if Karzai can be seen governing competently by the Afghans, and taking “measurable” steps against corruption, then there might be a way to regain his legitimacy and take the steps needed to effectively protect the Afghan people.

1 comment:

William said...

One of our members comments:

I found the last para of the recent posting Thoughts on Afghanistan (24 August)misleading. There is no intention to withdraw troops as a whole in 2011. Any withdrawals then will be part of a process which may well go on to 2014 or later. (Even by 2014 there must be some doubt as to whether the Afghan army and police will be capable of providing security for the whole country.)

Petraeus himself is not committed to beginning withdrawal in 2011. He has indicated that he will give his assessment of the situation then, make recommendations, and accept whatever Obama decides.