A strategic snub, and a fall-guy

Pakistan's President Zardari was snubbed. He should have been meeting President Obama at the G8 summit in Chicago to discuss the reopening of the NATO supply route through Pakistan into Afghanistan. Instead Obama was too ‘busy’ to meet with Zardari, leaving him to be attended to by US secretary of state, Hilary Clinton.

How times have changed between the two nations. Under Bush, Pakistan was cajoled and caressed with $billions in foreign aid for their part in assisting the ‘war on terror’. Over time, relations have deteriorated to an agitating extent as the role of certain hands within Pakistan has left the US frustrated and angry. Finding Osama Bin Laden hiding away in a safe haven a few miles from a military compound hasn’t helped, neither have the 2008 attacks by Lashkar-e-Taiba on Mumbai, nor finding Ilyas Kashmiri – one of the top al-Qaeda commanders – in South Waziristan. President Karzai had always insisted that the real insurgency was coming from Pakistan; the US now believes him slightly more than before.

Inversely, Pakistan is frustrated and angry at the US – angry for their covert Bin Laden operation, angry for the continuous use of drone strikes that kill innocent civilians, and angry for the Americans implying a link between the state, the security services and various terrorist groups. Pakistanis feel frustrated, perhaps rightly so, that they have suffered from terrorism a lot more than the international community is willing to recognise.

The latest in frustrations between the two countries surrounds disagreement over the NATO supply routes. The supply route was closed following furious backlash to US drone attacks in November last year which killed 26 Pakistani soldiers along the Afghan border. NATO has had to move the supply route to the north of Afghanistan, costing them more time and money. Discussions to reopen the route looked potentially fruitful earlier last month, as the Deputy Secretary of State, Thomas Nides, travelled to Islamabad to eke out a new agreement. However, the Pakistan Parliament and the religious right guaranteed that the reopening would face resistance.

Pakistan wants to increase the transit charges from $250 to as much as $2000. The US has responded by threatening to freeze the $655m in payments to the Coalition Support Fund until Pakistan reopens the routes. The US clearly has had enough.

But Zardari is stuck between a tough rock and a very hard place. He does not want to concede the supply routes to NATO without a fight, especially considering the ever growing opposition to drone attacks within Pakistan. His party, the Pakistan People’s Party, has lost substantial support inside the country amidst continuing allegations of corruption, ineptitude, a crumbling economy, and worsening security. Zardari is almost likely to lose.

However, the crumbling economy needs investment and US aid is a major part of that. Zardari also does not want to isolate Pakistan; political and diplomatic isolation means a weak bargaining power apropos Afghanistan. The US and Afghanistan have already laid out a post-2014 plan which includes stipulations such as American use of Afghan military bases should any ‘interference’ occur. Interference occurs in Afghanistan on a daily basis of course, through the porous border with Pakistan. In defence of the Pakistani army a bloody battle has been fought in the lawless North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP), and some headway has been made on security in the region, but much to the cost of many lives. The Pakistan forces have lost over 3,000 personnel since the war on the extremist groups in the NWFP started in 2005.

Even worse for Zardari is Afghanistan’s strong relationship with India; late last year Karzai travelled to New Delhi to formalise a strategic deal that would allow arms transfers, military training and direct foreign investment from India. This is not to mention the huge $billion deals already in place for Indian companies to mine minerals and iron ore in Afghanistan. Pakistan must feel squashed as India squeezes pressure from both sides. This is probably the reason why Pakistan finally afforded India a ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status; it needs to reopen trade with its neighbour in order to survive.

But this is all just a diplomatic chess game. From the American side, the Obama administration would not want an isolated Pakistan; isolation will leave Pakistan with a crippling social-economic fabric that is dangerous for the region. True that much of the terrorism inside Pakistan has been in reaction to the US presence in the region, but the Kashmiri issue and rampaging corruption has allowed extremist groups to create instability.

From the Afghan side, the real problem is likely to occur after NATO troops begin pulling out; the Afghan army and police forces will be severely tested as insurgents pour in from the lawless Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Much will depend on whether the Taliban can be integrated politically. If they can, then Pakistan may once again become an ally. If they cannot, then the insurgency is likely to intensify.

Obama’s snub on Zardari was probably done with all these factors in mind, aside from just personal annoyance. Zardari will be indebted for the invitation to the NATO summit and humiliated at the snub; it will leave him with little bargaining power. Concessions will be made on the supply routes for the guarantee of US aid, and someone will be fall-guy for the unpopular decision. Chances are it could well be Zardari himself. 

The future for Afghanistan looks increasingly bleak

On the 2nd of May the United States and Afghanistan finally signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement.  A deal that will shape the future relationship between the two countries as the US withdraws from the region, and give additional stability to the Afghan government. However despite the US pledging to support its ally beyond the 2014 withdrawal date, and even talk of a negotiated peace with the Taliban, there is still real concern that the country is again descending into chaos.


President Hamid Karzai’s government is weak, and regarded as untrustworthy and corrupt by the Afghan people and their neighbours. The people of Afghanistan cannot identify with the current government; increasingly the Taliban have more control over the country outside of urban centres.  The scope of the Taliban’s influence is only going to spread further as the NATO troops withdraw; despite the rhetoric from the various coalition armed forces, the Afghan Security Forces are nowhere near ready to take over policing the country.


Reports leaked to the BBC suggested that many Afghan people prefer the Taliban to the Western forces and the Afghan authorities.  The Taliban have more presence across the country than the American led coalition and are seen as less corrupt than the Afghan authorities.  For a largely illiterate and deeply religious populace, the swift harsh justice the Taliban provide is preferable to the inconsistent, poorly administered rule that Karzai’s government offers.  In addition the Taliban are increasingly organised, and more responsive than the central government. The Taliban officials make regular visits to small towns and villages, and even administer a system of taxation, justice and social support to areas they control.


Sources inside the country told the NCF of their concern for the future of Afghanistan. They highlight the failure of the Afghan security services to provide stability to the country as their chief reason to worry. There is the principle fear of the spread of the Taliban’s influence across the country but also of a failure of the intelligence services to prevent attacks from insurgents.


Leaked security reports detail that security services in Afghanistan had prior warning of many of the attacks that took place during April this year. The documents give details of who the Taliban planned to attack as well the locations that they targeted. These oversights are often put down to ‘intelligence failures’; principally because the sources informing the intelligence services are not properly assessed and verified, and the warnings are ignored.


Furthermore our sources stressed the problems they faced as investors in Afghanistan. The withdrawal of American troops also means a withdrawal of American funding, and with that comes a large drop off in foreign investment, scared that the country may disintegrate into a state of civil war. This means that Afghanistan’s small, fragile economy is certain to falter. Additionally, beyond the dangers of attacks from insurgent groups, the sheer weight of corporate bureaucracy and institutional corruption paralyzes progress.


All in all the future for Afghanistan beyond 2014 is bleak. The Taliban’s influence across the country spreads, and Karzai’s unpopular government looks unsustainable without backing from NATO. The Strategic Partnership Agreement brings a modicum of stability to the country short term, but in reality it is little more than a means of covering the West’s strategic withdrawal from Afghanistan. For those who hoped the Afghanistan could be a progressive integrated nation, these are dark times indeed.

      T. J. Callingham