Afghanistan and US agree on long-awaited bilateral deal

Afghanistan and the US have finally agreed on a strategic deal defining their relationship after the withdrawal in 2014. Subject to parliamentary and Senate approval, the deal will be valid for ten years. The agreement tackles the issues of Afghan sovereignty such as control of prisons and night raids, whilst continuing to support governance, education and civil society. The US will have no military bases present in Afghanistan but this may change when a separate military agreement will be looked at a year after the strategic agreement comes in to force. The US will provide training to the security forces for a decade after the withdrawal. A similar strategic pact is likely to be agreed with Germany and Australia as well.

The bilateral agreement did concur that the US will not use Afghanistan to launch attacks on other countries, but will give support by economical, political and even military means should ‘any kind of interference in Afghan affairs’ occur.

The issue of aid was also discussed. World Bank has estimated that Afghanistan will face a $7bn hole in its annual budget after 2014. While the US and the international community has so far pledged $4bn a year in aid to Afghanistan, this has not been formally agreed and was indeed not part of the deal here. Karzai was reported as stating that he would much rather this pledge was as low as $2bn annually, but agreed in writing.

As part of the deal, the US is looking towards Muslim countries, including Pakistan, to contribute annually to the ‘Afghanistan Security Fund’ after 2014. The US clearly wants to spread its financial burden by getting the international community to assist in the security fund. The emphasis on Muslim countries is to appeal to Afghans, and potentially the Taliban.

For Pakistan, this poses a potential problem. Extremist groups within the country have been galvanised by Pakistan’s backing for the US in the ‘war on terror’, resulting in a worsening of their domestic security situation. Thousands have been killed in suicide attacks and the security forces’ fight in the lawless northwest region of Pakistan. Coupled with the mass public outcry at US drone attacks, the Pakistan government has a potential hot potato on their hands in the shape of this security fund. On the one hand, the fund will represent a good, open opportunity for Pakistan to influence matters in Afghanistan through legitimate means, while on the other hand there may be strong public resistance to the idea.

As noted, what is interesting is that the deal stipulates the use of force by the US, on agreement with the Afghan government, should there be any kind of ‘interference’ in the country. Given the clear threat coming from within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the porous border along the two neighbours, the likelihood of further US involvement after the withdrawal seems inevitable.

Meanwhile, the US administration distanced itself from a Congressional Delegation (CODEF) that met with the National Front last week. The delegation, led by Texan Republican Senator Louie Gohmert, demanded that the return of the Taliban should not be accepted and forcibly stated that the corruption that mires the country was due to the current ‘presidential regime’. The congressional delegation argued that a ‘rapid change’ to a parliamentary regime was needed to hold the Afghan government more accountable and provide a better alternative.

The US will be careful not to upset the apple cart since they endorsed the current presidential system in Afghanistan. It has gone to huge pains to convince Afghans that such a system can work. Such a delegation will raise further questions on the how Karzai’s government is viewed within the US and how the bilateral deal brokered last week will pan out after the withdrawal in 2014.

It is worth looking at this proposal, but also worth noting from the outset that such a shift is hugely unlikely to occur. Neither the US nor the current government will back such efforts, and if the Taliban have a legitimate political voice in the system they are also likely to oppose. The system allows Karzai to remain separate from the legislative branch of the government, to which he remains unanswerable to. He is also protected against the ‘vote of no confidence’ usually present in parliamentary systems. Although the presidential system was crucial to stabilise the country, it now arguably causes the corruption rife in the country. The separation of the executive and legislature branch in the government weakens the accountability to legislature.

The traditional Afghan political set up has much space for monarchs, tribal leaders and warlords, but little for participatory local governments. A presidential system allows Karzai to act as the national tribal leader, representative of the many ethnic groups present in the country. A centralisation of power under an executive president with wide reaching powers potentially creates a lack of accountability and inclusion of the minority political groups. Remember that the minorities were against the current presidential system enshrined in the Bonn agreement of 2001.

The strategic deal represents the initial steps towards a view of an Afghanistan post-2014. The international community will want to keep a close eye on and influence the troubled region, through economic and political means. Billions more will be pumped into the country to support institutions; the same institutions mired in weakness and corruption. Weary of a costly war spanning over a decade the international community will look on with anxious gazes, hopeful that the current system holds firm against further interference.