Afghanistan and the US have finally agreed on a strategic
deal defining their relationship after the withdrawal in 2014. Subject to
parliamentary and Senate approval, the deal will be valid for ten years. The
agreement tackles the issues of Afghan sovereignty such as control of prisons
and night raids, whilst continuing to support governance, education and civil
society. The US will have no military bases present in Afghanistan but this may
change when a separate military agreement will be looked at a year after the
strategic agreement comes in to force. The US will provide training to the
security forces for a decade after the withdrawal. A similar strategic pact is
likely to be agreed with Germany and Australia as well.
The bilateral agreement did concur that the US will not use
Afghanistan to launch attacks on other countries, but will give support by
economical, political and even military means should ‘any kind of interference
in Afghan affairs’ occur.
The issue of aid was also discussed. World Bank has
estimated that Afghanistan will face a $7bn hole in its annual budget after
2014. While the US and the international community has so far pledged $4bn a
year in aid to Afghanistan, this has not been formally agreed and was indeed
not part of the deal here. Karzai was reported as stating that he would much
rather this pledge was as low as $2bn annually, but agreed in writing.
As part of the deal, the US is looking towards Muslim
countries, including Pakistan, to contribute annually to the ‘Afghanistan Security
Fund’ after 2014. The US clearly wants to spread its financial burden by getting
the international community to assist in the security fund. The emphasis on Muslim
countries is to appeal to Afghans, and potentially the Taliban.
For Pakistan, this poses a potential problem. Extremist
groups within the country have been galvanised by Pakistan’s backing for the US
in the ‘war on terror’, resulting in a worsening of their domestic security
situation. Thousands have been killed in suicide attacks and the security
forces’ fight in the lawless northwest region of Pakistan. Coupled with the
mass public outcry at US drone attacks, the Pakistan government has a potential
hot potato on their hands in the shape of this security fund. On the one hand,
the fund will represent a good, open opportunity for Pakistan to influence
matters in Afghanistan through legitimate means, while on the other hand there
may be strong public resistance to the idea.
As noted, what is interesting is that the deal stipulates
the use of force by the US, on agreement with the Afghan government, should
there be any kind of ‘interference’ in the country. Given the clear threat
coming from within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the porous border along
the two neighbours, the likelihood of further US involvement after the
withdrawal seems inevitable.
Meanwhile, the US administration distanced itself from a Congressional
Delegation (CODEF) that met with the National Front last week. The delegation,
led by Texan Republican Senator Louie Gohmert, demanded that the return of the
Taliban should not be accepted and forcibly stated that the corruption that
mires the country was due to the current ‘presidential regime’. The
congressional delegation argued that a ‘rapid change’ to a parliamentary regime
was needed to hold the Afghan government more accountable and provide a better
alternative.
The US will be careful not to upset the apple cart since
they endorsed the current presidential system in Afghanistan. It has gone to
huge pains to convince Afghans that such a system can work. Such a delegation
will raise further questions on the how Karzai’s government is viewed within
the US and how the bilateral deal brokered last week will pan out after the
withdrawal in 2014.
It is worth looking at this proposal, but also worth noting
from the outset that such a shift is hugely unlikely to occur. Neither the US nor
the current government will back such efforts, and if the Taliban have a
legitimate political voice in the system they are also likely to oppose. The
system allows Karzai to remain separate from the legislative branch of the
government, to which he remains unanswerable to. He is also protected against
the ‘vote of no confidence’ usually present in parliamentary systems. Although
the presidential system was crucial to stabilise the country, it now arguably
causes the corruption rife in the country. The separation of the executive and
legislature branch in the government weakens the accountability to legislature.
The traditional Afghan political set up has much space for monarchs,
tribal leaders and warlords, but little for participatory local governments. A
presidential system allows Karzai to act as the national tribal leader,
representative of the many ethnic groups present in the country. A
centralisation of power under an executive president with wide reaching powers potentially
creates a lack of accountability and inclusion of the minority political groups.
Remember that the minorities were against the current presidential system
enshrined in the Bonn agreement of 2001.
The strategic deal represents the initial steps towards a
view of an Afghanistan post-2014. The international community will want to keep
a close eye on and influence the troubled region, through economic and
political means. Billions more will be pumped into the country to support
institutions; the same institutions mired in weakness and corruption. Weary of
a costly war spanning over a decade the international community will look on
with anxious gazes, hopeful that the current system holds firm against further
interference.
