Jonathon sent this: From The Times : December 4, 2009
Barack Obama’s plan is seriously flawed. We need more
By Paddy Ashdown
The Taleban’s favourite phrase in recent months has been: “The elephant is down, now all we have to do is slay it.” The best thing about this week’s Obama speech was that they now know the elephant is not down; it is engaging the fight with renewed strength, determination and vigour. The Taleban are now under real pressure in northern Pakistan and, with the right resources, the right leadership and the right military strategy on the ground, we now have a chance to begin to turn the military tide in Afghanistan. So is this enough for success (however limited your definition)? The answer is no. The Obama speech gave us was a military plan — but not yet a political one. It was, in short, necessary, but not sufficient.
When General Stanley McChrystal sent his proposal to the President, it included a carefully integrated plan for both the military (broadly, an extra 30,000 troops and a focus on protecting the people, not chasing the enemy) and the political aspect. The speech contained the first but was almost silent on the second. Perhaps this is still to come. But if it is not, then what we have heard so far will not be enough. What the President intended was for audiences in the US and Afghanistan to hear different things. His message to the domestic audience was supposed to be “troops home in 18 months” and to the Taleban, “30,000 extra troops”. My worry is that the wrong people got the wrong message. What the US heard was “30,000 more troops” while what the Taleban heard was “in 18 months, they’ll be gone”. The Taleban commander Mullah Omar once famously said: “They may have the watches, but we have the time.” I fear we may have inadvertently given volume to that message. I understand the temptation of timelines and exit strategies for those who have to win domestic support. But they also tell our enemies how long they have to wait before we give up. It is far better to deal with these things through milestones rather than timelines. For instance we could set milestones for the growth and professionalisation of the Afghan Army and police, set target times for them to be delivered and, as they are, hand over our functions to Afghan structures and pull out as we do so. In Bosnia, we formulated this into a Mission Implementation Plan, a public document that served not just to hold us to key tasks, but also to provide accountability to our political masters. A mission implementation plan for Afghanistan, capable of being debated in national parliaments at home and providing a visible road map of progress for Afghans as well, is a better way to gain public support than artificial deadlines that, in the case of July 2011, look to me almost undeliverable. It is not difficult to see why the President felt that he needed, for domestic purposes, to say that withdrawal would start in July 2011. But this does not make it right. Other elements of the strategy were also either missing or too lightly glossed over. First and foremost, there was nothing about the absolute necessity to ensure that, at last and after six damaging years of muddle, the tower of Babel that is the international community in Afghanistan will now work to a single plan, act on a single set of priorities and speak with a single voice. It is the absence of this, more than anything else that has caused our failures and cost us so many lives. The only person whose authority is powerful enough to bash international heads together and make this happen is the US President. Yet there was nothing of this in his speech. Second, what political element there was in the President's speech seemed to rely still on the belief that President Karzai is reformable and will reform. Some might think this a triumph of hope over experience. Of course we cannot change Afghanistan’s newly elected President; of course we have no option but to support him. But that does not mean we need to pile all our eggs into this rather rickety basket. One of the impediments to success in Afghanistan is that we have been trying to force a Western-style centralised constitution on to a country whose traditions have been tribal and local for 1,000 years. This is a golden opportunity to begin to shift the weight of our effort away from strengthening Kabul, to building up governance from the bottom. This would at once give us a political strategy that runs with, rather than against, the grain of Afghan society, while creating the best context for a serious programme of reconciliation with the tribally based Taleban. Taleban reconciliation was mentioned in the President's speech — but only with a single, almost off-hand, remark. Yet this was a main plank of the McChrystal strategy. We need to be clear here. Taleban reconciliation is not an easy option to hard fighting. It may always be possible to split the oddly low-level Taleban commander away with a bag of gold or the promise of a job. But serious negotiation with a Taleban prepared to put aside the gun in favour of pursuing constitutional means will never come while they think — with justification — that they are winning on the battlefield. But if in the next year or so we can begin to turn this around we will need a serious, thought-through, heavyweight programme to bring those Taleban who will lay aside the gun for the ballot box into the fold. And that needs to be much more clearly laid out now if it is to have significant impact and be properly prepared for — especially among non-Pashtun Afghans who regard such an approach with deep suspicion. I had also hoped to see, in the President’s speech a clear statement of a wider regional strategy that would include not just Pakistan but also Iran, India, and maybe even Russia and China. Without this, success will be much more difficult. One other thing struck me about this week’s speech. The old Obama so famously comfortable in his own skin, seemed distinctly uncomfortable in that of a war leader. Gordon Brown, too, looks especially miserable talking of conflict. I do not think either feels comfortable with this — and who would? We all understand that our Prime Minister will never be Henry V before Agincourt. But the US President has formidable gifts of oratory and he will need to deploy them more confidently, if he is to pull this one off. As my colleague Nick Clegg has said, you cannot win a war on half horsepower. Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon was the international community’s High Representative in Bosnia
Friday 4 December 2009
Thursday 3 December 2009
Four Ways to Fix Afghanistan Without Guns
Robin sent this in:
Once before, Clare Lockhart was charged with rebuilding Afghanistan. Now, as the new administration sends her — and 30,000 troops — back there, she has a new plan. Read more: http://www.esquire.com/features/best-and-brightest-2009/clare-lockhart-1209#ixzz0YfhrgRRU
Monday 30 November 2009
99th and counting!!
In the Independant this Monday 30th Nov the news stated that one more soldier had died in the Helmand provance and the army were fearing defeat at home. Today Obama promised
that the US would go from 68,000 to 100,000 and the President walked round Fort Hood shaking hands with the young soldiers as these would be going out, Cape Hood which was where the medic Psychiatrist suddenly turned his gun on 10 soldiers and himself as he was expected to go to Afghanistan the next day, and it was thought that he was a muslim and the presence of the US army in Afghanistan really insenced him, the true reason we shall never know.
General Stanley McCrystal the commanding officer said that it was not going to be easy and he hoped that their stay wouldn't be too long!!
that the US would go from 68,000 to 100,000 and the President walked round Fort Hood shaking hands with the young soldiers as these would be going out, Cape Hood which was where the medic Psychiatrist suddenly turned his gun on 10 soldiers and himself as he was expected to go to Afghanistan the next day, and it was thought that he was a muslim and the presence of the US army in Afghanistan really insenced him, the true reason we shall never know.
General Stanley McCrystal the commanding officer said that it was not going to be easy and he hoped that their stay wouldn't be too long!!
Thursday 19 November 2009
Afghan equivalent of "Pop Idol"
I was horrified to hear of the death of Sheema who it was alleged had 'committed suicide' or was it a mercy killing? I don't think her sister could bring herself to say what had happened although she was able to say that they were all pleased that she had taken her own life as it made it easier for the family!! I just wonder how much pressure she was under to make a statement like that
.
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The 98th this year
Do we we have to wait until we reach 100 of young men killed in Afghanistan, which the public are becoming insensed by, as they felt the war was never legitimate.
John Simpson and Menzies Campbell on Newsweek last night were quite disparaging about the way things were going, but they felt that still the public were behind them, but is this only the milatary families? As in Babaji again an area of Helmand province, I have heard that the Afghans find it a very disquieting area. This area is as large as Northern Ireland, and to look for suicide bombers would be a time consuming job, I saw in the Metro on the 11th that 2 TA's were still waiting for their body armour Rifleman Andrew Fentiman and Cpl Loren Marlton-Thomas both died in a bomb blast, his commanding Officer said that Fentman was one of the most irrepressable and positive junior commanders that he had met.
Amidst this milatary furore the Afghans have not lost their sense of humour and glued to ther sets to see "Zang- e- Khatar" "The Alarm Bell" a show about the Political tribulations going on in Afghanistan!! "The Daily Show" is trying to show Hamid Karzi being inaugerated today (19th) in front of foreign dignitories. The incessant bickering is too much for Karzi, it would appear that he is trying to strangle the US ambassador!
"Alarm Bell" is shown every Weds and Ahmad Fawad, a shop keeper, says it's our custom to watch it every week,
and he says "Our Goverment is weak and Alarm Bell tells the people what is going on!"
A young female MP said Politicians ignore the programme but they should pay more attention!!
John Simpson and Menzies Campbell on Newsweek last night were quite disparaging about the way things were going, but they felt that still the public were behind them, but is this only the milatary families? As in Babaji again an area of Helmand province, I have heard that the Afghans find it a very disquieting area. This area is as large as Northern Ireland, and to look for suicide bombers would be a time consuming job, I saw in the Metro on the 11th that 2 TA's were still waiting for their body armour Rifleman Andrew Fentiman and Cpl Loren Marlton-Thomas both died in a bomb blast, his commanding Officer said that Fentman was one of the most irrepressable and positive junior commanders that he had met.
Amidst this milatary furore the Afghans have not lost their sense of humour and glued to ther sets to see "Zang- e- Khatar" "The Alarm Bell" a show about the Political tribulations going on in Afghanistan!! "The Daily Show" is trying to show Hamid Karzi being inaugerated today (19th) in front of foreign dignitories. The incessant bickering is too much for Karzi, it would appear that he is trying to strangle the US ambassador!
"Alarm Bell" is shown every Weds and Ahmad Fawad, a shop keeper, says it's our custom to watch it every week,
and he says "Our Goverment is weak and Alarm Bell tells the people what is going on!"
A young female MP said Politicians ignore the programme but they should pay more attention!!
Tuesday 17 November 2009
Princess Zohra praises Nato
Our friend Princess Zohra has been speaking on the 60th anniversary of Nato. She said:
My name is Zohra Mahmoud Ghazi and Afghanistan is my homeland.
I hold no personal nor political ambition.
My contribution tonight is inspired by my grandfather, Sardar Naim Khan, (brother of Sardar Daoud Khan, the first President of Afghanistan) who’s thoughts and beliefs have motivated me through my whole life.
Being one of four daughters and a son, not once did I feel like a second class citizen to my brother. Education and aspirations for our futures were of equal importance.
Thirty years ago, Afghanistan was a functioning State evolving but the roots were cut from under us. Even in our state of chaos today, the determination of the young to be a part of the world community is thriving.
Nato’s contribution in Afghanistan can bring the stability to unify the country. This can also be achieved whilst recognising its tribal history and the ability of its women, who are resilient, proud and a valuable asset for the county’s future development.
Afghans as a whole understand good motives;
No Afghan family has escaped tragedy, and so no Afghan underestimates the importance of Nato’s commitment to long-term peace.
My name is Zohra Mahmoud Ghazi and Afghanistan is my homeland.
I hold no personal nor political ambition.
My contribution tonight is inspired by my grandfather, Sardar Naim Khan, (brother of Sardar Daoud Khan, the first President of Afghanistan) who’s thoughts and beliefs have motivated me through my whole life.
Being one of four daughters and a son, not once did I feel like a second class citizen to my brother. Education and aspirations for our futures were of equal importance.
Thirty years ago, Afghanistan was a functioning State evolving but the roots were cut from under us. Even in our state of chaos today, the determination of the young to be a part of the world community is thriving.
Nato’s contribution in Afghanistan can bring the stability to unify the country. This can also be achieved whilst recognising its tribal history and the ability of its women, who are resilient, proud and a valuable asset for the county’s future development.
Afghans as a whole understand good motives;
No Afghan family has escaped tragedy, and so no Afghan underestimates the importance of Nato’s commitment to long-term peace.
Friday 6 November 2009
Gordon Brown takes on Karzi
Gordon Brown met Karzi yesterday the 6th Nov, and said that his government was too corrupt and would loose international support if he failed to improve it's performance, this I would suggest as his brother is a major figure in the drugs trade it was suggested in a news paper this October and a position was held for him in this government, now Brown is tightening the screws and telling him to clear up the parliament. General Aminullah Amarkhail, the former head of security at Kabul airport was sacked for his succsess in arresting heroin smugglers he says you have to pay £6,000 in bribes to get a job as a chief of police any where on the border! Between 10,000 and 15,000 Afghan Police have been killed in the past 5 years 4 times more likely to be killed than their military counterparts, not surprising that recruitment is at a whole time low. Curruptiom is rife and Nadine Ghouri says in the Guardian on 7th Nov senior officers commonly pay a fee to secure promotions, the more senior the post the higher the upfront fee.
It is difficult with this scale of corruption going on what possibily can Karsi do? Abdullah Abdullah has pulled out of the run as he felt the initial election was fraudulent, does this have an echo of Iran about it and I believe an individual took on Ayatollah Kamini and with a telephone conversation.
It is difficult with this scale of corruption going on what possibily can Karsi do? Abdullah Abdullah has pulled out of the run as he felt the initial election was fraudulent, does this have an echo of Iran about it and I believe an individual took on Ayatollah Kamini and with a telephone conversation.
Thursday 29 October 2009
Taliban moves to terrorise guests in suicide attack
On Oct 28th it was reported that The Taliban struck in Kabul, friends that we know living there were amazed what a well operated action it was! The attackers, clad in suicide vests and armed with grenades and machine guns struck at dawn on the 28th. six UN staff died in the two hour fire fight that followed.
Orla Guerin was in South Wazaristan on news at 10 tonight and she was able to see the mountains where Hackney Mullah and the village of Kot Kai where he oversees the Taliban in the country. What can we possible do with such an organisation? What they are doing is playing through fear and suggesting that they do not allow the education of women.
Newspapers are running the story that Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali Karzai was on the CIA payroll for years a suspected player in the country's opium trade and was paid over 8 years for services including helping to recruit an Afghan paramilitary force as was reported in a US paper.
There was a warning that anyone working on the Nov 7th run off election was at risk.
Orla Guerin was in South Wazaristan on news at 10 tonight and she was able to see the mountains where Hackney Mullah and the village of Kot Kai where he oversees the Taliban in the country. What can we possible do with such an organisation? What they are doing is playing through fear and suggesting that they do not allow the education of women.
Newspapers are running the story that Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali Karzai was on the CIA payroll for years a suspected player in the country's opium trade and was paid over 8 years for services including helping to recruit an Afghan paramilitary force as was reported in a US paper.
There was a warning that anyone working on the Nov 7th run off election was at risk.
Friday 23 October 2009
Courage in Afghanistan
A man that was injured 11 weeks ago was so inspirational and with such bad injuries that even the Duchess of Cornwall who visited Headley Court yesterday Oct 22nd, was overwhelmed. She saw Rifleman Craig Wood who was just 18 and had been blown up by the Taliban on his first patrol. Losing three limbs and having 27 pints of blood he was given only a 50% chance of survival but he is facing this horrendous injury with an awe inspiring determination. He is able to say to his girlfriend that sometimes he wakes up and starts crying. "I have to make the best of it! I have lost a number of good colleagues, I know how lucky I am, in a way"
That "in a way" resounds through that article. In this mad war, who is going to remember Craig Wood, but his family and friends and the celebreties that saw him.
Now Karsai has accepted the two man presidential battle so he will take on Abdullah Abdullah after the UN found that hundreds and thousands of votes were fake. The contest will be on Novenber 7th. One hopes that that will go off with not too much bloodshed. The same paper reveals that the US are undermining Pakistan's offensive against the Taliban abandoning border posts and allowing them through to South Waziristan.
These Afghan men and women are fighting for their existence. There are some who would like a "Loya Jurga" in Afghanistan or to bring Journalists over to the UK. It would be great to keep these doors of communication open, so that the population would not feel so marginilised.
That "in a way" resounds through that article. In this mad war, who is going to remember Craig Wood, but his family and friends and the celebreties that saw him.
Now Karsai has accepted the two man presidential battle so he will take on Abdullah Abdullah after the UN found that hundreds and thousands of votes were fake. The contest will be on Novenber 7th. One hopes that that will go off with not too much bloodshed. The same paper reveals that the US are undermining Pakistan's offensive against the Taliban abandoning border posts and allowing them through to South Waziristan.
These Afghan men and women are fighting for their existence. There are some who would like a "Loya Jurga" in Afghanistan or to bring Journalists over to the UK. It would be great to keep these doors of communication open, so that the population would not feel so marginilised.
Sunday 4 October 2009
Where do we go from here?
This is a really muddling situation, which Obama is trying to see his way through, as Andrew Sullivan states in his article this Sunday October 4th will he send the extra troops? which some members of the senate are all for, but the American public is not certain of and there is a lot riding on this decision and a lot of lives that could be lost.
Now, with him just being awarded a Nobel peace prize very unexpectedly "what has he done" I hear you ask? It's just two months since he took over. Well I am sure that his stance about the nuclear issue has helped - and he is all for more countries to disarm, and he wants to distance himself from the Bush premiership. He calls for more countries to unite and made the pivotal speech to the Muslims in Cairo saying that the US were holding out a hand of friendship.
Now Leitifa (which is a pseudonym) has written "My Forbidden Face" about her growing up in Kabul unable to go to Kabul university as the Taliban did not agree with women being educated and to become a journalist and was able to publish her book. She comes from a well educated family with parents both working, her mother a doctor and her father running an export business.
I don't think we can know what she must have gone through to write this book, we from a "democratic" country without the fear of being arrested by the Taliban for being a woman walking about outside without being in the presence of a man either a husband or a relative.
Now, with him just being awarded a Nobel peace prize very unexpectedly "what has he done" I hear you ask? It's just two months since he took over. Well I am sure that his stance about the nuclear issue has helped - and he is all for more countries to disarm, and he wants to distance himself from the Bush premiership. He calls for more countries to unite and made the pivotal speech to the Muslims in Cairo saying that the US were holding out a hand of friendship.
Now Leitifa (which is a pseudonym) has written "My Forbidden Face" about her growing up in Kabul unable to go to Kabul university as the Taliban did not agree with women being educated and to become a journalist and was able to publish her book. She comes from a well educated family with parents both working, her mother a doctor and her father running an export business.
I don't think we can know what she must have gone through to write this book, we from a "democratic" country without the fear of being arrested by the Taliban for being a woman walking about outside without being in the presence of a man either a husband or a relative.
Saturday 26 September 2009
Nadir gets the Turban
The Pashtun tribe from which the Afghan royals come have chosen their leader. At a tribal gathering they placed the turban on HRH Prince Nadir Naim.
Monday 21 September 2009
Is this the end of the Taliban?
It was reported in The Independant on Mon Sept 21st from Islamabad that the infamous Sher Mohammed Qasab was captured in a raid at Mingora, he was wounded and his three sons were killed. A military spokesman said "He was severely wounded and succumbed to his wounds early this morning." Another Military Official said the death of Qasab who killed many civilians, policemen and troops would reassure the residents of the tourist valley that the "Taliban were finished!" Pakistani troops have made significent gains against the militants in their Swat offensive after Taliban advances raised fears for the nuclear armed Pakistan future and contributed to a slide in investor confidence.
Maybe the Taliban have just moved across the border into Afghanistan.
There is in the Helmand province a couple of buildings known as "Rose Cottage" here 60 soldiers are making the "final journey" home, as this has been the deadliest summer of the British forces time in Afghanistan. A couple of soldiers with decades of experience between them have been in charge of the army's morgue, this must have been one of the most depressing jobs.
Could this be because of the British soldier unlike the U. S. soldier does not have armour to cover their groin and neck. A senior surgeon said that "We have seen a lot of groin and neck injuries in U.K. not otherwise seen in US Marines because of this piece of equipment" Wheras the US Kevlar is a lighter body armour and has the important groin plate and they have modular neck and shoulder protection!!
It is not a lot to ask that in giving there lives for this cause they have the resouces to finish the job.
Maybe the Taliban have just moved across the border into Afghanistan.
There is in the Helmand province a couple of buildings known as "Rose Cottage" here 60 soldiers are making the "final journey" home, as this has been the deadliest summer of the British forces time in Afghanistan. A couple of soldiers with decades of experience between them have been in charge of the army's morgue, this must have been one of the most depressing jobs.
Could this be because of the British soldier unlike the U. S. soldier does not have armour to cover their groin and neck. A senior surgeon said that "We have seen a lot of groin and neck injuries in U.K. not otherwise seen in US Marines because of this piece of equipment" Wheras the US Kevlar is a lighter body armour and has the important groin plate and they have modular neck and shoulder protection!!
It is not a lot to ask that in giving there lives for this cause they have the resouces to finish the job.
Thursday 17 September 2009
Helmand Province
This troubled area with occasional Suicide bombers (though 80% of the deaths amongst allied armed forces are from IEDs) in fact on the 17th of Sept a member of our forces in the Gereshk district died in a blast on foot patrol in southern Afghanistan. The Afghans from this area have banded together and driven the Taliban out just as the British did in the Civil War in the fourteenth century. As in Northern Ireland and The Balkans it takes the people to say NO. Think of the children, mothers and fathers even in this country with the MPs etc taking a huge whack of bonuses as a golden handshake! Northern Rock and the Lehman Brothers - what did they ever do for humanity? I am sure they would say that they individually may have done a lot, but the public perception of them is dubious.
These families in the Hellman province just want recognition from the West, as there is life after Poppies. Unfortunately Kasai and his brother are implicated by this and Kasai has given prominent roles to members of his family.
A soldier who comes from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment died in Selly Oak Birmingham and I hear today that 16 were killed the in area today - they were the Italian soldiers who were killed.
Meanwhile, as Kasai says the elections were a success, the soft spoken Grant Kipper a Canadian working as a member of the UN, is not so sure.
These families in the Hellman province just want recognition from the West, as there is life after Poppies. Unfortunately Kasai and his brother are implicated by this and Kasai has given prominent roles to members of his family.
A soldier who comes from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment died in Selly Oak Birmingham and I hear today that 16 were killed the in area today - they were the Italian soldiers who were killed.
Meanwhile, as Kasai says the elections were a success, the soft spoken Grant Kipper a Canadian working as a member of the UN, is not so sure.
NCF Afghanistan Working Group Report
The Afghanistan Working Group has recently finished this policy paper after a meeting a few weeks ago. In this brief paper we address the central problem of state credibility (which Karzai has been complicit in destroying), call for better military and economic aid coordination and a re-thought strategy of governance that concentrates on local, rather than central, systems.
We hope you find our ideas interesting and we look forward to any feedback that you can provide.
Afghanistan:
Forging Credibility
The fundamental aim of Western intervention in Afghanistan is to establish long-term stability and pave the way for economic and human development.
Corruption is the most pressing issue in Afghanistan. Endemic corruption invalidates state credibility. In order for Afghanistan to move towards stability and peace, the state must gain the faith of its citizens. This requires urgent reform of the political and bureaucratic leadership.
Western policy in Afghanistan should focus on developing a credible government that reverses corruption and captures the faith of the Afghan people and foreign investors. This credibility will provide a foundation:
(1) For an Afghan security strategy that delivers safety and stability at a local level
(2) For a co-ordinated national economic development strategy delivered at grassroots level.
By a coordinated effort, the US and UK governments could steer a reformed Afghan administration towards combating corruption rather than proliferating it.
This paper is divided into four parts that provide recommended guidelines for Western policy
Part 1: Diplomatic Leverage to develop Afghan state credibility
I. Development of a strategy, supported by a unified international community, of diplomatic leverage to co-opt the existing Afghan state to clear out its corrupt leaders.
A. Convene a national loya jirga to select replacement ministers that fit agreed criteria of transparency and credibility.
B. “Sticks”: Hard-line measures to force the Afghan administration into action.
1. Threaten to withhold all international community donations from the Afghan government.
2. Threaten to place the ANSF under direct ISAF command.
3. Threaten to withdraw the support which organisations such as OPIC currently give to private sector investors in Afghanistan.[1]
4. Raise the possibility of terminating all reconstruction efforts currently administered through governmental organizations (USAID, NATO, UN, etc.)
C. “Carrots”: Strong incentives for investment in Afghanistan as it becomes increasingly credible.
1. Technical and other assistance in the development of markets and financial institutions
2. Provide contracts to Afghan firms on a preferential basis if they can provide transparent accounting and results
Part 2: Localized governance to play to Afghanistan’s strengths
I. Afghanistan’s strong tradition of local governance should be better supported as a governance development strategy.
A. The Taliban initially gained, and is gaining, support because it offers “justice” with an alacrity that Western courts cannot within a familiar socio-religious context.
B. Local governance allows the population to better monitor its officials and reduces the potential of corruption by middlemen.
C. Local security should increasingly be put into the hands of local people, in coordination with the ANSF, similar to the lashkar model in Pakistan.
Part 3: International coordination to maximize military effectiveness
I. NATO and non-NATO troop contributing countries should formally agree upon one unified chain of command. This should include US forces who currently operate within a parallel command structure as Operation Enduring Freedom.
II. Concurrent with the streamlining of the ISAF command structure, a coherent and clear nationwide counter-insurgency strategy should be developed. This strategy must increase the prevalence of “clear-hold-build” provincial reconstruction teams and emphasize reconstruction and development.
III. The performance of private contractors in training the ANSF should be completely re-evaluated company by company on the basis of results achieved.
Part 4: Economic frameworks for sustainable development
I. Aid Coordination
A. All aid should be channelled by means of an “Aid Council for Afghanistan” which will co-ordinate the work of both government and non-governmental organizations.
B. Donors should work with local governments to develop a long-term strategy for aid application.
II. More use could be made of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the “clear-hold-build” strategy as a tool for economic development. Potentially, PRTs could operate in a role essentially subordinate to local Afghan government, creating a more joined-up approach to reconstruction.
III. Using ISAF and ANSF resources, secure commercial hubs to encourage growth. This is in parallel to, but separate from PRT activities.
IV. Consider using opium licensing and export strategies, such as the Senlis Council’s Poppy for Medicine proposal, to allow farmers to transition smoothly into a licit economy.
[1] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an agency of the U.S. government. OPIC helps U.S. businesses invest overseas, fosters economic development in new and emerging markets, complements the private sector in managing risks associated with foreign direct investment, and supports U.S. foreign policy.
Tuesday 15 September 2009
A million and a half fraudulent votes
The local Afghan UN people are under presssure from UN New York not to make too much of a fuss over the Karzai vote fraud. Makes you sick the way those nasty little UN people are about to manipulate democracy for their own ends again. They did it in Iraq. Now Afghanistan. The UN are part of the problem not the solution - but at least in this instance they are honorable at grass roots level.Saturday 12 September 2009
Taliban now controls Afghanistan
The support for more war in Afghanistan is waning fast amongst the democrats. House speaker Nancy Pelosi said, "I don't think there's a great deal of support for sending more troops to Afghanistan in the country or in the Congress."
Meanwhile, an organisation which Rupert was closely involved with at one time says the Taliban have a significant presence in almost every corner of Afghanistan, as the country lurches into political uncertainty after a disputed presidential election. A political standoff has deepened since the August 20 poll, with a U.N.-backed election watchdog invalidating some votes and ordering a partial recount amid widespread accusations of fraud. The uncertainty coincides with the most violent period since the Taliban were toppled by U.S.-backed Afghan forces in 2001, with record military and civilian deaths testing the resolve of U.S. and European leaders.
The Taliban now has a permanent presence in 80% of Afghanistan, up from 72% in November 2008, according to a new map released today by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS). According to ICOS, another 17% of Afghanistan is seeing ‘substantial’ Taliban activity. Taken together, these figures show that the Taliban has a significant presence in virtually all of Afghanistan.
Tuesday 1 September 2009
Are the elections making ethnic divides more entrenched?
Afghanistan’s elections were clearly far from free and fair. The biggest consequence of this largely symbolic act of “democracy” is the construction of a wider barrier between ethnic groups.
As the new government comes in nobody will really know if the results actually reflect the choices of voters. Furthermore, the scores of people who stayed home due to threats from insurgents had no say in the new government either. No administration that has been elected in such a fashion can enjoy the faith of the people.
The victor, mired in an environment of fraud and illegitimacy, will have a significant credibility problem. As a Times Online (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/world_agenda/article6810814.ece) article explains, no result coming from these elections will be seen as legitimate.
Karzai’s campaign has been accused of massive corruption in the electoral process and will be seen as completely fraudulent, diminishing any credibility Karzai’s government has acquired with non-Pashtuns in the north.
Karzai has diminished support from Pashtuns as well, thus, he has alienated both ethnic groups. Thus, a Karzai government will not only lack ethnic support from any group, it will be even weaker and illegitimate than it is now and therefore clearly unable to reconcile ethnic issues.
On the other hand, if the election monitors find evidence of widespread fraud, the numbers may turn out in Abdullah’s favor. Again, this resulting government will have minimal legitimacy among ethnic Pashtuns, leaving them feeling relatively deprived of a say in government.
Historically, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, governments unable to make credible commitments to the population as a whole tend to fall into a system where only specific elites from certain sectors of the population enjoy commitments, or benefits, from the government. Some portions of the population will then be relatively excluded from state services than others – the victor’s supporters will be reaping the benefits while the opposition will see little to no benefits from the new administration.
Before this occurs, the new administration will be presented with a very difficult choice. It will have to renege on any campaign promises it may have made in order to enter into new commitments with opposition parties to build the faith of other certain ethnic groups in the state.
If the new administration does not happen, any work to blur the lines of sectarian division done to date will be erased by further mobilization along ethnic lines. This may not spell the end for Afghanistan, but it will certainly be a step backwards in the nation-building process.
Saturday 22 August 2009
The West loses the elections
The Pashtun insurgency in Southern Pakistan and Afghanistan is gathering force and the Western forces suffer blow after blow. The Pashtuns are even attacking Nato convoys now. Meanwhile the elections are a catastrophe. Turnout is 5% in Southern Afghanistan. Only the Northern Alliance are voting and they are all voting for Abdulleh Abdullah (a.k.a. Abdullah Rockety for his own exploits as an insurgent when the invaders were the Russians rather than the Anglo-Americans). Having said which Karzai, arguably the most corrupt man on the planet and the West's puppet, will undoubtedly win. He'll fix it. Which means that unless someone shoots him the West is doomed because he's proved incompetent. Corrupt we don't mind. Incompetent is intollerable.
Tuesday 11 August 2009
The War We Can't Win
Jonathan writes:
The problems with Bacevich’s article start with the premise of his title – that wars like Afghanistan and Iraq can be won. They can be lost, but they cannot be won – however, prudent use of military force can make it possible to resolve the conflicts by other means. Britain did not win in Northern Ireland, but the Army did ultimately make possible a settlement, once large parts of both communities were tired enough of war to accept the solution on offer. There are lots of Afghans who are equally tired of war.
The ‘graveyard of empires’ story is a common story about Afghanistan, but it is just a story, and one that tells as much about the teller as the subject. By repeating it, Bacevich is engaging in a selective reading of history which ignores both most of the history of counter-insurgency operations and the differences between the Anglo-American presence in Afghanistan and earlier invaders. If we are seen as occupiers today, it is a self-inflicted wound, and one that can be healed. Much of Afghanistan welcomed us as liberators in 2001 and even today Pashtun tribal chiefs tell me they don’t want American troops to leave: ‘We trust you more than Karzai.’
Like Bacevich, I opposed the Iraq invasion before the fact, but now it is hard to put the toothpaste back in the tube. When it was announced, I thought the surge was too little, too late, but I was overly pessimistic. Changes in operating doctrine and the Sunni awakening did bring results out of proportion to the modest increase in U.S. troops. One consequence of the surge was that we gained leverage with Maliki, and were able to moderate his Shia particularism. With the announcement of our departure, that leverage has been lost. All parties in Iraq are jockeying for position in life after the Americans. Since we will not be there they no longer listen to us. In 2006 I thought that partition, or at best a loose confederacy, might be the only way to deal with Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions. In 12 to 18 months partition might be looking attractive again.
Bacevich argues for relying on Afghanistan’s tribal leadership to keep out terrorists. ‘Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. ‘ In fact, this is exactly what the ethno-counter-insurgents (Kilcullen, Nagl, Malkasian, et al) propose, and it also at the foundation of my own proposals for building an Afghan state locality-province-nation. It is not clear, though, when Bacevich talks about ‘…who actually run Afghanistan…’ he actually means the tribal chiefs, or the warlords. The warlords may not run the country, but, empowered by Karzai, who depends on them for support, and to some extent by various coalition powers, they do run (and rob) the government. While sampling of Afghan public opinion is uncertain, the evidence we have is that the warlords are deeply unpopular and a large majority of Afghans want them not just removed from power, but brought to justice.
It is true that in many areas tribal leaders do exercise considerable power on a local level, and it is possible to work with them to rid their communities of insurgents and foreign terrorists, the incentives to get them to do that usually begin with a western security presence to keep them alive and continue on to rural development programmes (which can only be implemented with a security presence). Nevertheless, realise that tribal chiefs have much less authority to make unilateral decisions than do their counterparts in Iraq, and the tribes in many regions have been weakened by a generation of war, destruction, and displacement, and have lost a lot of power to the warlords.
The real question about Iraq and Afghanistan is not what the U.S. Army has learned about counter-insurgency, but what it has learned about learning. If the lessons of Iraq about the relevance of classical counter-insurgency doctrine to our post-9/11 conflicts in the Middle East become a new orthodoxy, a recipe which can be used again and again at different times in different places, then we have learned nothing about learning ande we will fail in Afghanistan. But if we treat the lessons as a set of principles which must be adapted and applied in light of local conditions (the message of the ethno-counter-insurgents), then we have a way forward.
The War We Can't Win
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:22:51 -0400
CommonwealVolume CXXXVI, Number 14 The War We Can’t Win
Afghanistan & the Limits of American Power
Andrew J. Bacevich
History deals rudely with the pretensions of those who presume to determine its course. In an American context, this describes the fate of those falling prey to the Wilsonian Conceit. Yet the damage done by that conceit outlives its perpetrators.From time to time, in some moment of peril or anxiety, a statesman appears on the scene promising to eliminate tyranny, ensure the triumph of liberty, and achieve permanent peace. For a moment, the statesman achieves the status of prophet, one who in his own person seemingly embodies the essence of the American purpose. Then reality intrudes, exposing the promises as costly fantasies. The prophet’s followers abandon him. Mocked and reviled, he is eventually banished—perhaps to some gated community in Dallas.Yet however brief his ascendancy, the discredited prophet leaves behind a legacy. Most obvious are the problems created and left unresolved, commitments made and left unfulfilled, debts accrued and left unpaid. Less obvious, but for that reason more important, are the changes in perception.The prophet recasts our image of reality. Long after his departure, remnants of that image linger and retain their capacity to beguile: consider how the Wilsonian vision of the United States as crusader state called upon to redeem the world in World War I has periodically resurfaced despite Woodrow Wilson’s own manifest failure to make good on that expectation. The prophet declaims and departs. Yet traces of his testimony, however at odds with the facts, remain lodged in our consciousness.So it is today with Afghanistan, the conflict that George W. Bush began, then ignored, and finally bequeathed to his successor. Barack Obama has embraced that conflict as “the war we must win.” Those who celebrated Bush’s militancy back in the intoxicating days when he was promising to rid the world of evil see Obama’s enthusiasm for pressing on in Afghanistan as a vindication of sorts. They are right to do so.The misguided and mismanaged global war on terror reduced Bush’s presidency to ruin. The candidate whose run for high office derived its energy from an implicit promise to repudiate all that Bush had wrought now seems intent on salvaging something useful from that failed enterprise—even if that means putting his own presidency at risk. When it comes to Afghanistan, Obama may be singing in a different key, but to anyone with an ear for music—especially for military marches—the melody remains intact.Candidate Obama once derided the notion that the United States is called upon to determine the fate of Iraq. President Obama expresses a willingness to expend untold billions—not to mention who knows how many lives—in order to determine the fate of Afghanistan. Liberals may have interpreted Obama’s campaign pledge to ramp up the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan as calculated to insulate himself from the charge of being a national-security wimp. Events have exposed that interpretation as incorrect. It turns out—apparently—that the president genuinely views this remote, landlocked, primitive Central Asian country as a vital U.S. national-security interest.What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny.Tune in to the Sunday talk shows or consult the op-ed pages and you might conclude otherwise. Those who profess to be in the know insist that the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. The events of September 11, 2001, ostensibly occurred because we ignored Afghanistan. Preventing the recurrence of those events, therefore, requires that we fix the place.Yet this widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures in the nation’s airports. The national-security apparatus wasn’t paying attention—indeed, it ignored or downplayed all sorts of warning signs, not least of all Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States. Consumed with its ABC agenda—“anything but Clinton” was the Bush administration’s watchword in those days—the people at the top didn’t have their eye on the ball. So we let ourselves get sucker-punched. Averting a recurrence of that awful day does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries like Afghanistan. Rather, it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses.Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary, it’s also likely to prove impossible. Not for nothing has the place acquired the nickname Graveyard of Empires. Of course, Americans, insistent that the dominion over which they preside does not meet the definition of empire, evince little interest in how Brits, Russians, or other foreigners have fared in attempting to impose their will on the Afghans. As General David McKiernan, until just recently the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, put it, “There’s always an inclination to relate what we’re doing with previous nations,” adding, “I think that’s a very unhealthy comparison.” McKiernan was expressing a view common among the ranks of the political and military elite: We’re Americans. We’re different. Therefore, the experience of others does not apply.Of course, Americans like McKiernan who reject as irrelevant the experience of others might at least be willing to contemplate the experience of the United States itself. Take the case of Iraq, now bizarrely trumpeted in some quarters as a “success” and even more bizarrely seen as offering a template for how to turn Afghanistan around.Much has been made of the United States Army’s rediscovery of (and growing infatuation with) counterinsurgency doctrine, applied in Iraq beginning in late 2006 when President Bush announced his so-called surge and anointed General David Petraeus as the senior U.S. commander in Baghdad. Yet technique is no substitute for strategy. Violence in Iraq may be down, but evidence of the promised political reconciliation that the surge was intended to produce remains elusive. America’s Mesopotamian misadventure continues.Pretending that the surge has redeemed the Iraq war is akin to claiming that when Andy Jackson “caught the bloody British in the town of New Orleans” he thereby enabled the United States to emerge victorious from the War of 1812. Such a judgment works well as folklore but ignores an abundance of contrary evidence.Six-plus years after it began, Operation Iraqi Freedom has consumed something like a trillion dollars—with the meter still running—and has taken the lives of more than forty-three hundred American soldiers. Meanwhile, in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities, car bombs continue to detonate at regular intervals, killing and maiming dozens. Anyone inclined to put Iraq in the nation’s rearview mirror is simply deluded. Not long ago General Raymond Odierno, Petraeus’s successor and the fifth U.S. commander in Baghdad, expressed the view that the insurgency in Iraq is likely to drag on for an-other five, ten, or fifteen years. Events may well show that Odierno is an optimist.Given the embarrassing yet indisputable fact that this was an utterly needless war—no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found, no ties between Saddam Hussein and the jihadists established, no democratic transformation of the Islamic world set in motion, no road to peace in Jerusalem discovered in downtown Baghdad—to describe Iraq as a success, and as a model for application elsewhere, is nothing short of obscene. The great unacknowledged lesson of Iraq is the one that the writer Norman Mailer identified decades ago: “Fighting a war to fix something works about as good as going to a whorehouse to get rid of a clap.”For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude.If one believes that moral considerations rather than self-interest should inform foreign policy, Mexico still qualifies for priority attention. Consider the theft of California. Or consider more recently how the American appetite for illicit drugs and our liberal gun laws have corroded Mexican institutions and produced an epidemic of violence afflicting ordinary Mexicans. We owe these people, big-time.Yet any politician calling for the commitment of sixty thousand U.S. troops to Mexico to secure those interests or acquit those moral obligations would be laughed out of Washington—and rightly so. Any pundit proposing that the United States assume responsibility for eliminating the corruption that is endemic in Mexican politics while establishing in Mexico City effective mechanisms of governance would have his license to pontificate revoked. Anyone suggesting that the United States possesses the wisdom and the wherewithal to solve the problem of Mexican drug trafficking, to endow Mexico with competent security forces, and to reform the Mexican school system (while protecting the rights of Mexican women) would be dismissed as a lunatic. Meanwhile, those who promote such programs for Afghanistan, ignoring questions of cost and ignoring as well the corruption and ineffectiveness that pervade our own institutions, are treated like sages.The contrast between Washington’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and its relative indifference to Mexico testifies to the distortion of U.S. national security priorities induced by George W. Bush in his post-9/11 prophetic mode—distortions now being endorsed by Bush’s successor. It also testifies to a vast failure of imagination to which our governing classes have succumbed.This failure of imagination makes it literally impossible for those who possess either authority or influence in Washington to consider the possibility (a) that the solution to America’s problems is to be found not out there—where “there” in this case is Central Asia-but here at home; (b) that the people out there, rather than requiring our ministrations, may well be capable of managing their own affairs relying on their own methods; and (c) that to disregard (a) and (b) is to open the door to great mischief and in all likelihood to perpetrate no small amount of evil. Needless to say, when mischief or evil does occur—when a stray American bomb kills a few dozen Afghan civilians, for instance—the costs of this failure of imagination are not borne by the people who inhabit the leafy neighborhoods of northwest Washington, who lunch at the Palm or the Metropolitan Club, and school their kids at Sidwell Friends.So the answer to the question of the hour—What should the United States do about Afghanistan?—comes down to this: A sense of realism and a sense of proportion should oblige us to take a minimalist approach. As with Uruguay or Fiji or Estonia or other countries where U.S. interests are limited, the United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest cost possible.What might this mean in practice? General Petraeus, now commanding United States Central Command, recently commented that “the mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other transnational extremists,” in effect “to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.”The mission statement is a sound one. The current approach to accomplishing the mission is not sound and, indeed, qualifies as counterproductive. Note that denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan hasn’t required U.S. forces to occupy the frontier regions of that country. Similarly, denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan shouldn’t require military occupation by the United States and its allies.It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes (assuming we can manage to kill the right people) will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda’s plans. Certainly, that approach offers a cheaper and more efficient alter-native to establishing a large-scale and long-term U.S. ground presence—which, as the U.S. campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, has the unintended effect of handing jihadists a recruiting tool that they are quick to exploit.In the immediate wake of 9/11, all the talk—much of it emanating from neoconservative quarters—was about achieving a “decisive victory” over terror. The reality is that we can’t eliminate every last armed militant harboring a grudge against the West. Nor do we need to. As long as we maintain adequate defenses, Al Qaeda operatives, hunkered down in their caves, pose no more than a modest threat. As for the Taliban, unless they manage to establish enclaves in places like New Jersey or Miami, the danger they pose to the United States falls several notches below the threat posed by Cuba, which is no threat at all.As for the putatively existential challenge posed by Islamic radicalism, that project will prove ultimately to be a self-defeating one. What violent Islamists have on offer-a rejection of modernity that aims to restore the caliphate and unify the ummah [community]—doesn’t sell. In this regard, Iran—its nuclear aspirations the subject of much hand-wringing—offers considerable cause for hope. Much like the Castro revolution that once elicited so much angst in Washington, the Islamic revolution launched in 1979 has failed resoundingly. Observers once feared that the revolution inspired and led by the Ayatollah Khomeini would sweep across the Persian Gulf. In fact, it has accomplished precious little. Within Iran itself, the Islamic republic no longer represents the hopes and aspirations of the Iranian people, as the tens of thousands of protesters who recently filled the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities made evident. Here we see foretold the fate awaiting the revolutionary cause that Osama bin Laden purports to promote.In short, time is on our side, not on the side of those who proclaim their intention of turning back the clock to the fifteenth century. The ethos of consumption and individual autonomy, privileging the here and now over the eternal, will conquer the Muslim world as surely as it is conquering East Asia and as surely as it has already conquered what was once known as Christendom. It’s the wreckage left in the wake of that conquest that demands our attention. If the United States today has a saving mission, it is to save itself. Speaking in the midst of another unnecessary war back in 1967, Martin Luther King got it exactly right: “Come home, America.” The prophet of that era urged his countrymen to take on “the triple evils of racism, economic exploitation, and militarism.”Dr. King’s list of evils may need a bit of tweaking—in our own day, the sins requiring expiation number more than three. Yet in his insistence that we first heal ourselves, King remains today the prophet we ignore at our peril. That Barack Obama should fail to realize this qualifies as not only ironic but inexplicable.
ABOUT THE WRITERAndrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
The problems with Bacevich’s article start with the premise of his title – that wars like Afghanistan and Iraq can be won. They can be lost, but they cannot be won – however, prudent use of military force can make it possible to resolve the conflicts by other means. Britain did not win in Northern Ireland, but the Army did ultimately make possible a settlement, once large parts of both communities were tired enough of war to accept the solution on offer. There are lots of Afghans who are equally tired of war.
The ‘graveyard of empires’ story is a common story about Afghanistan, but it is just a story, and one that tells as much about the teller as the subject. By repeating it, Bacevich is engaging in a selective reading of history which ignores both most of the history of counter-insurgency operations and the differences between the Anglo-American presence in Afghanistan and earlier invaders. If we are seen as occupiers today, it is a self-inflicted wound, and one that can be healed. Much of Afghanistan welcomed us as liberators in 2001 and even today Pashtun tribal chiefs tell me they don’t want American troops to leave: ‘We trust you more than Karzai.’
Like Bacevich, I opposed the Iraq invasion before the fact, but now it is hard to put the toothpaste back in the tube. When it was announced, I thought the surge was too little, too late, but I was overly pessimistic. Changes in operating doctrine and the Sunni awakening did bring results out of proportion to the modest increase in U.S. troops. One consequence of the surge was that we gained leverage with Maliki, and were able to moderate his Shia particularism. With the announcement of our departure, that leverage has been lost. All parties in Iraq are jockeying for position in life after the Americans. Since we will not be there they no longer listen to us. In 2006 I thought that partition, or at best a loose confederacy, might be the only way to deal with Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic divisions. In 12 to 18 months partition might be looking attractive again.
Bacevich argues for relying on Afghanistan’s tribal leadership to keep out terrorists. ‘Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. ‘ In fact, this is exactly what the ethno-counter-insurgents (Kilcullen, Nagl, Malkasian, et al) propose, and it also at the foundation of my own proposals for building an Afghan state locality-province-nation. It is not clear, though, when Bacevich talks about ‘…who actually run Afghanistan…’ he actually means the tribal chiefs, or the warlords. The warlords may not run the country, but, empowered by Karzai, who depends on them for support, and to some extent by various coalition powers, they do run (and rob) the government. While sampling of Afghan public opinion is uncertain, the evidence we have is that the warlords are deeply unpopular and a large majority of Afghans want them not just removed from power, but brought to justice.
It is true that in many areas tribal leaders do exercise considerable power on a local level, and it is possible to work with them to rid their communities of insurgents and foreign terrorists, the incentives to get them to do that usually begin with a western security presence to keep them alive and continue on to rural development programmes (which can only be implemented with a security presence). Nevertheless, realise that tribal chiefs have much less authority to make unilateral decisions than do their counterparts in Iraq, and the tribes in many regions have been weakened by a generation of war, destruction, and displacement, and have lost a lot of power to the warlords.
The real question about Iraq and Afghanistan is not what the U.S. Army has learned about counter-insurgency, but what it has learned about learning. If the lessons of Iraq about the relevance of classical counter-insurgency doctrine to our post-9/11 conflicts in the Middle East become a new orthodoxy, a recipe which can be used again and again at different times in different places, then we have learned nothing about learning ande we will fail in Afghanistan. But if we treat the lessons as a set of principles which must be adapted and applied in light of local conditions (the message of the ethno-counter-insurgents), then we have a way forward.
The War We Can't Win
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 13:22:51 -0400
CommonwealVolume CXXXVI, Number 14 The War We Can’t Win
Afghanistan & the Limits of American Power
Andrew J. Bacevich
History deals rudely with the pretensions of those who presume to determine its course. In an American context, this describes the fate of those falling prey to the Wilsonian Conceit. Yet the damage done by that conceit outlives its perpetrators.From time to time, in some moment of peril or anxiety, a statesman appears on the scene promising to eliminate tyranny, ensure the triumph of liberty, and achieve permanent peace. For a moment, the statesman achieves the status of prophet, one who in his own person seemingly embodies the essence of the American purpose. Then reality intrudes, exposing the promises as costly fantasies. The prophet’s followers abandon him. Mocked and reviled, he is eventually banished—perhaps to some gated community in Dallas.Yet however brief his ascendancy, the discredited prophet leaves behind a legacy. Most obvious are the problems created and left unresolved, commitments made and left unfulfilled, debts accrued and left unpaid. Less obvious, but for that reason more important, are the changes in perception.The prophet recasts our image of reality. Long after his departure, remnants of that image linger and retain their capacity to beguile: consider how the Wilsonian vision of the United States as crusader state called upon to redeem the world in World War I has periodically resurfaced despite Woodrow Wilson’s own manifest failure to make good on that expectation. The prophet declaims and departs. Yet traces of his testimony, however at odds with the facts, remain lodged in our consciousness.So it is today with Afghanistan, the conflict that George W. Bush began, then ignored, and finally bequeathed to his successor. Barack Obama has embraced that conflict as “the war we must win.” Those who celebrated Bush’s militancy back in the intoxicating days when he was promising to rid the world of evil see Obama’s enthusiasm for pressing on in Afghanistan as a vindication of sorts. They are right to do so.The misguided and mismanaged global war on terror reduced Bush’s presidency to ruin. The candidate whose run for high office derived its energy from an implicit promise to repudiate all that Bush had wrought now seems intent on salvaging something useful from that failed enterprise—even if that means putting his own presidency at risk. When it comes to Afghanistan, Obama may be singing in a different key, but to anyone with an ear for music—especially for military marches—the melody remains intact.Candidate Obama once derided the notion that the United States is called upon to determine the fate of Iraq. President Obama expresses a willingness to expend untold billions—not to mention who knows how many lives—in order to determine the fate of Afghanistan. Liberals may have interpreted Obama’s campaign pledge to ramp up the U.S. military commitment to Afghanistan as calculated to insulate himself from the charge of being a national-security wimp. Events have exposed that interpretation as incorrect. It turns out—apparently—that the president genuinely views this remote, landlocked, primitive Central Asian country as a vital U.S. national-security interest.What is it about Afghanistan, possessing next to nothing that the United States requires, that justifies such lavish attention? In Washington, this question goes not only unanswered but unasked. Among Democrats and Republicans alike, with few exceptions, Afghanistan’s importance is simply assumed—much the way fifty years ago otherwise intelligent people simply assumed that the United States had a vital interest in ensuring the survival of South Vietnam. As then, so today, the assumption does not stand up to even casual scrutiny.Tune in to the Sunday talk shows or consult the op-ed pages and you might conclude otherwise. Those who profess to be in the know insist that the fight in Afghanistan is essential to keeping America safe. The events of September 11, 2001, ostensibly occurred because we ignored Afghanistan. Preventing the recurrence of those events, therefore, requires that we fix the place.Yet this widely accepted line of reasoning overlooks the primary reason why the 9/11 conspiracy succeeded: federal, state, and local agencies responsible for basic security fell down on the job, failing to install even minimally adequate security measures in the nation’s airports. The national-security apparatus wasn’t paying attention—indeed, it ignored or downplayed all sorts of warning signs, not least of all Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States. Consumed with its ABC agenda—“anything but Clinton” was the Bush administration’s watchword in those days—the people at the top didn’t have their eye on the ball. So we let ourselves get sucker-punched. Averting a recurrence of that awful day does not require the semipermanent occupation and pacification of distant countries like Afghanistan. Rather, it requires that the United States erect and maintain robust defenses.Fixing Afghanistan is not only unnecessary, it’s also likely to prove impossible. Not for nothing has the place acquired the nickname Graveyard of Empires. Of course, Americans, insistent that the dominion over which they preside does not meet the definition of empire, evince little interest in how Brits, Russians, or other foreigners have fared in attempting to impose their will on the Afghans. As General David McKiernan, until just recently the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, put it, “There’s always an inclination to relate what we’re doing with previous nations,” adding, “I think that’s a very unhealthy comparison.” McKiernan was expressing a view common among the ranks of the political and military elite: We’re Americans. We’re different. Therefore, the experience of others does not apply.Of course, Americans like McKiernan who reject as irrelevant the experience of others might at least be willing to contemplate the experience of the United States itself. Take the case of Iraq, now bizarrely trumpeted in some quarters as a “success” and even more bizarrely seen as offering a template for how to turn Afghanistan around.Much has been made of the United States Army’s rediscovery of (and growing infatuation with) counterinsurgency doctrine, applied in Iraq beginning in late 2006 when President Bush announced his so-called surge and anointed General David Petraeus as the senior U.S. commander in Baghdad. Yet technique is no substitute for strategy. Violence in Iraq may be down, but evidence of the promised political reconciliation that the surge was intended to produce remains elusive. America’s Mesopotamian misadventure continues.Pretending that the surge has redeemed the Iraq war is akin to claiming that when Andy Jackson “caught the bloody British in the town of New Orleans” he thereby enabled the United States to emerge victorious from the War of 1812. Such a judgment works well as folklore but ignores an abundance of contrary evidence.Six-plus years after it began, Operation Iraqi Freedom has consumed something like a trillion dollars—with the meter still running—and has taken the lives of more than forty-three hundred American soldiers. Meanwhile, in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities, car bombs continue to detonate at regular intervals, killing and maiming dozens. Anyone inclined to put Iraq in the nation’s rearview mirror is simply deluded. Not long ago General Raymond Odierno, Petraeus’s successor and the fifth U.S. commander in Baghdad, expressed the view that the insurgency in Iraq is likely to drag on for an-other five, ten, or fifteen years. Events may well show that Odierno is an optimist.Given the embarrassing yet indisputable fact that this was an utterly needless war—no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction found, no ties between Saddam Hussein and the jihadists established, no democratic transformation of the Islamic world set in motion, no road to peace in Jerusalem discovered in downtown Baghdad—to describe Iraq as a success, and as a model for application elsewhere, is nothing short of obscene. The great unacknowledged lesson of Iraq is the one that the writer Norman Mailer identified decades ago: “Fighting a war to fix something works about as good as going to a whorehouse to get rid of a clap.”For those who, despite all this, still hanker to have a go at nation building, why start with Afghanistan? Why not first fix, say, Mexico? In terms of its importance to the United States, our southern neighbor—a major supplier of oil and drugs among other commodities deemed vital to the American way of life—outranks Afghanistan by several orders of magnitude.If one believes that moral considerations rather than self-interest should inform foreign policy, Mexico still qualifies for priority attention. Consider the theft of California. Or consider more recently how the American appetite for illicit drugs and our liberal gun laws have corroded Mexican institutions and produced an epidemic of violence afflicting ordinary Mexicans. We owe these people, big-time.Yet any politician calling for the commitment of sixty thousand U.S. troops to Mexico to secure those interests or acquit those moral obligations would be laughed out of Washington—and rightly so. Any pundit proposing that the United States assume responsibility for eliminating the corruption that is endemic in Mexican politics while establishing in Mexico City effective mechanisms of governance would have his license to pontificate revoked. Anyone suggesting that the United States possesses the wisdom and the wherewithal to solve the problem of Mexican drug trafficking, to endow Mexico with competent security forces, and to reform the Mexican school system (while protecting the rights of Mexican women) would be dismissed as a lunatic. Meanwhile, those who promote such programs for Afghanistan, ignoring questions of cost and ignoring as well the corruption and ineffectiveness that pervade our own institutions, are treated like sages.The contrast between Washington’s preoccupation with Afghanistan and its relative indifference to Mexico testifies to the distortion of U.S. national security priorities induced by George W. Bush in his post-9/11 prophetic mode—distortions now being endorsed by Bush’s successor. It also testifies to a vast failure of imagination to which our governing classes have succumbed.This failure of imagination makes it literally impossible for those who possess either authority or influence in Washington to consider the possibility (a) that the solution to America’s problems is to be found not out there—where “there” in this case is Central Asia-but here at home; (b) that the people out there, rather than requiring our ministrations, may well be capable of managing their own affairs relying on their own methods; and (c) that to disregard (a) and (b) is to open the door to great mischief and in all likelihood to perpetrate no small amount of evil. Needless to say, when mischief or evil does occur—when a stray American bomb kills a few dozen Afghan civilians, for instance—the costs of this failure of imagination are not borne by the people who inhabit the leafy neighborhoods of northwest Washington, who lunch at the Palm or the Metropolitan Club, and school their kids at Sidwell Friends.So the answer to the question of the hour—What should the United States do about Afghanistan?—comes down to this: A sense of realism and a sense of proportion should oblige us to take a minimalist approach. As with Uruguay or Fiji or Estonia or other countries where U.S. interests are limited, the United States should undertake to secure those interests at the lowest cost possible.What might this mean in practice? General Petraeus, now commanding United States Central Command, recently commented that “the mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and other transnational extremists,” in effect “to deny them safe havens in which they can plan and train for such attacks.”The mission statement is a sound one. The current approach to accomplishing the mission is not sound and, indeed, qualifies as counterproductive. Note that denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Pakistan hasn’t required U.S. forces to occupy the frontier regions of that country. Similarly, denying Al Qaeda safe havens in Afghanistan shouldn’t require military occupation by the United States and its allies.It would be much better to let local authorities do the heavy lifting. Provided appropriate incentives, the tribal chiefs who actually run Afghanistan are best positioned to prevent terrorist networks from establishing a large-scale presence. As a backup, intensive surveillance complemented with precision punitive strikes (assuming we can manage to kill the right people) will suffice to disrupt Al Qaeda’s plans. Certainly, that approach offers a cheaper and more efficient alter-native to establishing a large-scale and long-term U.S. ground presence—which, as the U.S. campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated, has the unintended effect of handing jihadists a recruiting tool that they are quick to exploit.In the immediate wake of 9/11, all the talk—much of it emanating from neoconservative quarters—was about achieving a “decisive victory” over terror. The reality is that we can’t eliminate every last armed militant harboring a grudge against the West. Nor do we need to. As long as we maintain adequate defenses, Al Qaeda operatives, hunkered down in their caves, pose no more than a modest threat. As for the Taliban, unless they manage to establish enclaves in places like New Jersey or Miami, the danger they pose to the United States falls several notches below the threat posed by Cuba, which is no threat at all.As for the putatively existential challenge posed by Islamic radicalism, that project will prove ultimately to be a self-defeating one. What violent Islamists have on offer-a rejection of modernity that aims to restore the caliphate and unify the ummah [community]—doesn’t sell. In this regard, Iran—its nuclear aspirations the subject of much hand-wringing—offers considerable cause for hope. Much like the Castro revolution that once elicited so much angst in Washington, the Islamic revolution launched in 1979 has failed resoundingly. Observers once feared that the revolution inspired and led by the Ayatollah Khomeini would sweep across the Persian Gulf. In fact, it has accomplished precious little. Within Iran itself, the Islamic republic no longer represents the hopes and aspirations of the Iranian people, as the tens of thousands of protesters who recently filled the streets of Tehran and other Iranian cities made evident. Here we see foretold the fate awaiting the revolutionary cause that Osama bin Laden purports to promote.In short, time is on our side, not on the side of those who proclaim their intention of turning back the clock to the fifteenth century. The ethos of consumption and individual autonomy, privileging the here and now over the eternal, will conquer the Muslim world as surely as it is conquering East Asia and as surely as it has already conquered what was once known as Christendom. It’s the wreckage left in the wake of that conquest that demands our attention. If the United States today has a saving mission, it is to save itself. Speaking in the midst of another unnecessary war back in 1967, Martin Luther King got it exactly right: “Come home, America.” The prophet of that era urged his countrymen to take on “the triple evils of racism, economic exploitation, and militarism.”Dr. King’s list of evils may need a bit of tweaking—in our own day, the sins requiring expiation number more than three. Yet in his insistence that we first heal ourselves, King remains today the prophet we ignore at our peril. That Barack Obama should fail to realize this qualifies as not only ironic but inexplicable.
ABOUT THE WRITERAndrew J. Bacevich is professor of history and international relations at Boston University.
Monday 20 July 2009
Strategy Change
Jonathan writes:
It is fairly easy to see why the British Army is taking so many casualties in Helmand: they have abandoned their clear-hold-build strategy and returned to a search-and-destroy campaign against the Taliban. In clear-hold-build one principle is to never occupy territory you cannot hold, but the British have returned to patrolling and raiding across territory they do not have the troops to hold.
Why they have done this is less clear. British commanders have every reason to know that while clear-hold-build has some hope of success, search and destroy draws on a long record of failure for this kind of operation.
The Labour government deserves all the lumps it is getting for its failure to provide adequate resources for the Army in Afghanistan, but the debate is going down a blind alley. Search and destroy tactics may make it look like the Army needs more helicopters and mine-proof vehicles, but that is an illusion based on tactics that will fail even with more resources.
What the Army needs in Afghanistan and in general is more infantry. In clear-hold-build your defence against IEDs and other attacks is your ability to persuade the local population that you are there to stay and your presence is good for them. Show them that their bread is buttered on your side and they will show you the IEDs. In search and destroy they cannot help you because as soon as you leave the Taliban will return and kill them. Holding ground, in particular, is a labour-intensive task which cannot be done without more infantry.
This morning on Radio 4 General Dannatt was quite tactful about DfID, but I will be less so. In Afghanistan DfID has always been part of the problem. They have never been on the same page as the Army, always reluctant to work together with the Army in combined action against the Taliban.
Under clear-hold-build it should be obvious that the building is to be done by DfID. This means moving in behind the Army to implement quick-implementing local programmes for rural development. Instead DfID is concentrating on capacity-building with the central government. If you want to build a house, do you start with the roof? The British have the example of the Westminster Process, the stately but time-tested process by which they divested themselves of an empire, which built from locality to province to nation. The time is now for DfID to get with the programme and join with the Army in putting all possible resources into combined action against the Taliban. That this has not already been done speaks poorly of DfID’s grasp of British objectives in Afghanistan, as well as of the government’s effectiveness in directing the efforts of its agencies.
Classical counter-insurgency doctrine is a hard slog and by no means fool-proof, but it provides the best hope of success in Afghanistan. The Army needs to return to the doctrine it developed, and the government needs to provide leadership, discipline, and the necessary resources for the necessary combined action programme.
It is fairly easy to see why the British Army is taking so many casualties in Helmand: they have abandoned their clear-hold-build strategy and returned to a search-and-destroy campaign against the Taliban. In clear-hold-build one principle is to never occupy territory you cannot hold, but the British have returned to patrolling and raiding across territory they do not have the troops to hold.
Why they have done this is less clear. British commanders have every reason to know that while clear-hold-build has some hope of success, search and destroy draws on a long record of failure for this kind of operation.
The Labour government deserves all the lumps it is getting for its failure to provide adequate resources for the Army in Afghanistan, but the debate is going down a blind alley. Search and destroy tactics may make it look like the Army needs more helicopters and mine-proof vehicles, but that is an illusion based on tactics that will fail even with more resources.
What the Army needs in Afghanistan and in general is more infantry. In clear-hold-build your defence against IEDs and other attacks is your ability to persuade the local population that you are there to stay and your presence is good for them. Show them that their bread is buttered on your side and they will show you the IEDs. In search and destroy they cannot help you because as soon as you leave the Taliban will return and kill them. Holding ground, in particular, is a labour-intensive task which cannot be done without more infantry.
This morning on Radio 4 General Dannatt was quite tactful about DfID, but I will be less so. In Afghanistan DfID has always been part of the problem. They have never been on the same page as the Army, always reluctant to work together with the Army in combined action against the Taliban.
Under clear-hold-build it should be obvious that the building is to be done by DfID. This means moving in behind the Army to implement quick-implementing local programmes for rural development. Instead DfID is concentrating on capacity-building with the central government. If you want to build a house, do you start with the roof? The British have the example of the Westminster Process, the stately but time-tested process by which they divested themselves of an empire, which built from locality to province to nation. The time is now for DfID to get with the programme and join with the Army in putting all possible resources into combined action against the Taliban. That this has not already been done speaks poorly of DfID’s grasp of British objectives in Afghanistan, as well as of the government’s effectiveness in directing the efforts of its agencies.
Classical counter-insurgency doctrine is a hard slog and by no means fool-proof, but it provides the best hope of success in Afghanistan. The Army needs to return to the doctrine it developed, and the government needs to provide leadership, discipline, and the necessary resources for the necessary combined action programme.
Thursday 21 May 2009
The Rule of Law
Hilde writes: one of my contacts in Washington is the US Institute for Peace who are doing a lot of work in Afghanistan. Although this report is from 2007, it gives a good background to the current trends in Afghan public op, especially in view of the importance of building a viable judicial system whoich build on existing mechanisms of conflict transformation and for implementing the rule of law: http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2007/0816_afghan_opinion.html
Sunday 17 May 2009
Going pear shaped
Things are going from bad to worse in Afghaistan. Anti government elements (AGE in local spook speak) are in control in the East, the West and the South - and are getting pretty strong in Kabul. Only the Northern region is moderately safe. Meanwhile there are two threads to policy. Policy a is let the elections proceed and let Karzai rig the.
Policy A is overthrow Karzai and establish a new grand Khan.
Policy B is allowing Karzai to continue cocking things up and make the best of it.
Policy A comes with getting rid of Karzai before the elections of course. Interesting times.
Wednesday 1 April 2009
Iran is trying to back Kabul into a corner
Iran’s long and complicated relations with Afghanistan are of growing concern for the Obama Administration, as it sends more troops to reinforce its military campaign in the south of Afghanistan against the Al-Qaida and the Taliban insurgency.
Afghanistan is in a tough spot. The country is reliant on the U.S. and NATO for its security and, at the same time, shares its longest land border with Iran.
Afghanistan has long pleaded with the U.S. and Iran not to carry out their longstanding strategic rivalry on its soil. For several years that request has been largely honoured.
Iran has also helped more than any other neighbouring countries with the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Since 2002, Iran has pumped millions of dollars into Afghanistan's western provinces to build roads, electrical grids, schools and health clinics.
The last thing President Karzai wants is to be forced into making a choice between Iran and the U.S.
Iran, a long-time supporter of the Northern Alliance, was instrumental in bringing about the fall of the Taliban in 2001. However, “Iran has become a more and more hostile power” according to the Afghanistan's ambassador, Said Tayeb Jawad. Iran was doing more than just bringing western Afghanistan into its sphere of influence. Iran has played both a constructive and destructive role in Afghanistan.
It has been reported that Tehran was financing and providing weaponry to Afghanistan's militant groups, specifically those groups fighting against the U.S. presence in the country. These new developments show that Iran has been increasing its operations in Afghanistan in an effort to gain influence with the contending insurgent factions and to hasten the departure of U.S. troops from the country.
On top of this, Iranian agents are dumping bags of cash in the laps of tribal leaders in Afghanistan's west, clearly intended to purchase influence and remind them: The Americans may be here for 10 or 20 years, but we will be here forever.
Monday 16 March 2009
A call for a Cease-fire
The internment will begin on Monday with Royal family members and then on Tuesday the first President Daoud Khan in a State funeral, the following has come from Prince Nadir tonight, that was announced in the Afghan media today.
We, the surviving family members of Shaied Mohammad Daoud Khan, the first president of Afghanistan, call for an immediate weeklong ceasefire throughout our beloved country to remember and honor the memory of eighteen members of our family and the million and a half Afghan martyrs who have since lost their lives for the protection of the holy religion of Islam and for the freedom of Afghanistan. We pray for their souls.
We believe that the sacrifices made by all Afghans and their families should be recognized, honored and respected. We call upon all Afghans and the international community to show goodwill and to commit to our request.
Let us put our guns to the side, honor those who have suffered the loss of their loved ones during this painful thirty year struggle, and pray for the souls of our brothers and sisters who have made us proud to be Afghan.
Shaied Daoud Khan and countless other brave Afghans gave up their precious lives for a better future for the next generation.. As we pray for their souls, let us stand together to fulfill their hopes and dreams of a peaceful, united and prosperous Afghanistan.
On the eve of this new year (1388), as we mourn and release our family and all our martyrs back into the ground of this soil from which they’ve come and to which they return, let us bury with them the seeds of an intention; that this cease-fire be turned into the flowering of a lasting peace. In so doing, may they rest at peace and bring peace upon us all, at last.
A statement from the families of Shaied Daoud Khan and his brother Shaied Naim Khan.
We, the surviving family members of Shaied Mohammad Daoud Khan, the first president of Afghanistan, call for an immediate weeklong ceasefire throughout our beloved country to remember and honor the memory of eighteen members of our family and the million and a half Afghan martyrs who have since lost their lives for the protection of the holy religion of Islam and for the freedom of Afghanistan. We pray for their souls.
We believe that the sacrifices made by all Afghans and their families should be recognized, honored and respected. We call upon all Afghans and the international community to show goodwill and to commit to our request.
Let us put our guns to the side, honor those who have suffered the loss of their loved ones during this painful thirty year struggle, and pray for the souls of our brothers and sisters who have made us proud to be Afghan.
Shaied Daoud Khan and countless other brave Afghans gave up their precious lives for a better future for the next generation.. As we pray for their souls, let us stand together to fulfill their hopes and dreams of a peaceful, united and prosperous Afghanistan.
On the eve of this new year (1388), as we mourn and release our family and all our martyrs back into the ground of this soil from which they’ve come and to which they return, let us bury with them the seeds of an intention; that this cease-fire be turned into the flowering of a lasting peace. In so doing, may they rest at peace and bring peace upon us all, at last.
A statement from the families of Shaied Daoud Khan and his brother Shaied Naim Khan.
Thursday 12 March 2009
Sentenced for 20 years for downloading a human rights article
A 23 year old reporter for a local newspaper (Jahaan Naw) and a journalism student from Afghanistan has been sentenced for 20 years in prison for allegedly circulating an article about women's rights.
Sayed Pervez Kambaksh, had hoped that Afghanistan's top judges would quash his conviction for lack of evidence, or because he was tried in secret and convicted without a defense lawyer, Afzal Nooristani, to submit so much as a word in his defense.
Since he was arrested, Sayed Pervez Kambaksh has spent almost 18 months in prison. During this time, he was sentenced to death in 5 minutes by Enayatullah Baleegh for allegedly downloading and distributing a report criticizing the treatment of women under Islamic Law. The motion was later withdrawn due to international pressure, giving Kambaksh the right to appeal the sentence.
That appeal however was quashed and Mr Kambaksh's case has been passed to the prosecutors' office for "execution of the sentence", which means he could be moved to Kabul's notorious Pul-e Charkhi prison, or north to Mazar-i-Sharif, where he was first found guilty. Mr Kambaksh’s lawer has even been threatened with murder.
Mr Kambaksh's case has highlighted the tension between the voices of conservative Islam in Afghanistan and the liberal international backers of President Karzai. Mr Karzai is left in a difficult position - not wanting to appear to bow to international pressure in what is a strongly Islamic country. Mr Kambaksh's best hope is now a presidential pardon, which will force president Hamid Karzai to choose between fundamentalists in his government and the rule of law.
Wednesday 4 February 2009
The Need To Win
Tim Pendry sends his personal reflections on Afghanistan which are of interest.
YOU CAN FIND THEM ON THIS LINK
YOU CAN FIND THEM ON THIS LINK
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