The Afghanistan Working Group has recently finished this policy paper after a meeting a few weeks ago. In this brief paper we address the central problem of state credibility (which Karzai has been complicit in destroying), call for better military and economic aid coordination and a re-thought strategy of governance that concentrates on local, rather than central, systems.
We hope you find our ideas interesting and we look forward to any feedback that you can provide.
Afghanistan:
Forging Credibility
The fundamental aim of Western intervention in Afghanistan is to establish long-term stability and pave the way for economic and human development.
Corruption is the most pressing issue in Afghanistan. Endemic corruption invalidates state credibility. In order for Afghanistan to move towards stability and peace, the state must gain the faith of its citizens. This requires urgent reform of the political and bureaucratic leadership.
Western policy in Afghanistan should focus on developing a credible government that reverses corruption and captures the faith of the Afghan people and foreign investors. This credibility will provide a foundation:
(1) For an Afghan security strategy that delivers safety and stability at a local level
(2) For a co-ordinated national economic development strategy delivered at grassroots level.
By a coordinated effort, the US and UK governments could steer a reformed Afghan administration towards combating corruption rather than proliferating it.
This paper is divided into four parts that provide recommended guidelines for Western policy
Part 1: Diplomatic Leverage to develop Afghan state credibility
I. Development of a strategy, supported by a unified international community, of diplomatic leverage to co-opt the existing Afghan state to clear out its corrupt leaders.
A. Convene a national loya jirga to select replacement ministers that fit agreed criteria of transparency and credibility.
B. “Sticks”: Hard-line measures to force the Afghan administration into action.
1. Threaten to withhold all international community donations from the Afghan government.
2. Threaten to place the ANSF under direct ISAF command.
3. Threaten to withdraw the support which organisations such as OPIC currently give to private sector investors in Afghanistan.[1]
4. Raise the possibility of terminating all reconstruction efforts currently administered through governmental organizations (USAID, NATO, UN, etc.)
C. “Carrots”: Strong incentives for investment in Afghanistan as it becomes increasingly credible.
1. Technical and other assistance in the development of markets and financial institutions
2. Provide contracts to Afghan firms on a preferential basis if they can provide transparent accounting and results
Part 2: Localized governance to play to Afghanistan’s strengths
I. Afghanistan’s strong tradition of local governance should be better supported as a governance development strategy.
A. The Taliban initially gained, and is gaining, support because it offers “justice” with an alacrity that Western courts cannot within a familiar socio-religious context.
B. Local governance allows the population to better monitor its officials and reduces the potential of corruption by middlemen.
C. Local security should increasingly be put into the hands of local people, in coordination with the ANSF, similar to the lashkar model in Pakistan.
Part 3: International coordination to maximize military effectiveness
I. NATO and non-NATO troop contributing countries should formally agree upon one unified chain of command. This should include US forces who currently operate within a parallel command structure as Operation Enduring Freedom.
II. Concurrent with the streamlining of the ISAF command structure, a coherent and clear nationwide counter-insurgency strategy should be developed. This strategy must increase the prevalence of “clear-hold-build” provincial reconstruction teams and emphasize reconstruction and development.
III. The performance of private contractors in training the ANSF should be completely re-evaluated company by company on the basis of results achieved.
Part 4: Economic frameworks for sustainable development
I. Aid Coordination
A. All aid should be channelled by means of an “Aid Council for Afghanistan” which will co-ordinate the work of both government and non-governmental organizations.
B. Donors should work with local governments to develop a long-term strategy for aid application.
II. More use could be made of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the “clear-hold-build” strategy as a tool for economic development. Potentially, PRTs could operate in a role essentially subordinate to local Afghan government, creating a more joined-up approach to reconstruction.
III. Using ISAF and ANSF resources, secure commercial hubs to encourage growth. This is in parallel to, but separate from PRT activities.
IV. Consider using opium licensing and export strategies, such as the Senlis Council’s Poppy for Medicine proposal, to allow farmers to transition smoothly into a licit economy.
[1] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is an agency of the U.S. government. OPIC helps U.S. businesses invest overseas, fosters economic development in new and emerging markets, complements the private sector in managing risks associated with foreign direct investment, and supports U.S. foreign policy.
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