More Responsibility to be Allocated to Tribesmen

The Afghan National Army has experienced certain positive changes under Western military forces during the past 6 months, however evidence dictates that these changes remain superficial and temporary in effectiveness. With appalling attrition rates, continued 'crash-course' training for new recruits and corrupt leadership, it is quite apparent that the ANA stand as little chance of being a functioning, sustainable, legitimate enforcer of security today as they did two hundred years ago.
The Ministry of Interior has consistently failed to control and organise the forces under their command, especially the Afghan National Police who are much less respected than the ANA. The current police force receive such poor salaries that corruption is perceived as being the only way of survival. Many believe that the Upper House should take over responsibility of the ANP as transparent elections and promotions are more probable there, thus making non-corrupt and effective leadership of the ANP more achievable.
As we approach 2014 - the agreed departure date of Western forces from Afghanistan - it is hard to imagine that such thorough reforms of two broken security forces will ever occur at all, let alone in such a short time frame. Some propose that Afghanistan will be split - the North will be under Karzai control with subtle Western influence and the South will once again be under the Taliban. The expected conflict brought about by the separation will undoubtedly overwhelm security forces, possibly leaving the nation spiralling down at a much faster rate with less Western military supervision.
The other approach which attempts to ease the fragile Afghanistan into the 2014 transition is allocating more responsibility to local tribesmen. This would mean an Afghan Government that cooperates with former insurgents such as the Pashtuns and allows them a greater stake in their own country through financial incentives to secure and manage their own local region. The ANA could be organised into smaller divisions and placed in certain regions to oversee and offer support to the tribes. This analogy could also provide greater security to the porous and vulnerable Afghan-Pakistan border as many tribes operate there already and are at high risk of daily assassination. Through creating a strong network of regional security bodies and promoting a more self-determined nation of Afghan civilians with occassional input from a small but organised ANA, Afghanistan can hope to enjoy a better system of security and a more peaceful society.